(PC) Jones v. Alameda County Juvenile Justice Center

1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 8 JIMMIE EARL JONES, Case No. 25-cv-09293-NW 9 Plaintiff, ORDER SCREENING COMPLAINT, 10 v. DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND 11 ALAMEDA COUNTY JUVENILE JUSTICE CENTER, et al., 12 Defendants. 13 14 Plaintiff Jimmie Earl Jones filed a pro se civil rights lawsuit alleging claims against 15 Defendants Angela Gutierrez and Alameda County Juvenile Hall. ECF No. 1. The Complaint is 16 now before the Court for screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). For the reasons set forth 17 below, the Court DISMISSES the Complaint with leave to amend. 18 I. BACKGROUND 19 Jones alleges in his Complaint that in 2009, while detained at the Alameda County 20 Juvenile Hall, he was forced into a sexual relationship with Defendant Angela Gutierrez, who was 21 a Juvenile Institutional Officer at the facility.1 Jones alleges that he was “forced” to engage in 22 sexual activity, including intercourse, with Gutierrez over the course of four years. ECF No. 1 at 23 3. Gutierrez allegedly moved Jones to the building she was in so she could continue to abuse 24 Jones and abused him until she passed away on an unspecified date. Jones was fourteen years of 25 age at the time the sexual abuse began, and he alleges that the Alameda County Juvenile Hall 26 failed to protect him from that abuse. He seeks monetary damages. 27 1 II. LEGAL STANDARD 2 Federal courts engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek redress 3 from a governmental entity or officer, or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 4 § 1915A(a). In its review, the Court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any claims 5 that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek 6 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro 7 se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 8 (9th Cir. 1990). 9 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 10 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Although a complaint “does not need detailed 11 factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to 12 relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 13 cause of action will not do . . . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above 14 the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). 15 A complaint must proffer “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. 16 at 570. The United States Supreme Court has explained the “plausible on its face” standard of 17 Twombly: “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be 18 supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should 19 assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to 20 relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 21 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) a right secured by 22 the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the alleged deprivation was 23 committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 24 Liability may be imposed on an individual defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if the 25 plaintiff can show that the defendant’s actions actually and proximately caused the deprivation of 26 a federally protected right. Lemire v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehabilitation, 726 F.3d 1062, 1074 27 (9th Cir. 2013); Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988). Actions in this context 1 or fails to perform a legally required act. Leer, 844 F.2d at 633. 2 III. DISCUSSION 3 A. Gutierrez 4 Sexual harassment and unwanted sexual contact may violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s2 5 substantive due process right to be free from violations of bodily integrity. See Vazquez v. Cnty. 6 of Kern, 949 F.3d 1153, 1162–64 (9th Cir. 2020) (analyzing claim by ward against officials at 7 county juvenile hall). “The threshold question is ‘whether the behavior of the governmental 8 official is so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary 9 conscience.’” Id. (quoting Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 848 n.8 (1998)). Here, 10 although the allegations raise concerns regarding the timeliness of Jones’ claim, liberally 11 construed, Jones’ allegations that Gutierrez forced him to engage in sexual conduct are sufficiently 12 egregious and shock the conscience. See Vazquez, 949 F.3d at 1162 (finding that adult male 13 officer’s conduct was sufficiently egregious to violate Fourteenth Amendment where he referred 14 to female juvenile ward as “babe,” touched her face and shoulders, made comments about her 15 appearance, and expressed his desire to have sexual relations with her). 16 Nevertheless, because Jones alleges that Gutierrez passed away prior to the filing of this 17 lawsuit, Jones’ claim cannot proceed as alleged. See ECF No. 1 at 4. “[A] party cannot maintain 18 a suit on behalf of, or against, or join, a dead person, or in any other way make a dead person (in 19 that person’s own right, and not through a properly-represented estate or successor) party to a 20 federal lawsuit.” LN Mgmt., LLC v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, 957 F.3d 943, 955 (9th Cir. 2020). 21 Accordingly, assuming Gutierrez indeed passed away prior to Jones’ filing of this lawsuit, Jones 22 must name a proper Defendant if he wishes to pursue his Fourteenth Amendment claim.3 See, 23 24 2 In his Complaint, Jones alleges the claims as excessive force under the Eighth Amendment. See ECF No. 1 at 3–4. But because the incidents allegedly occurred while he was a juvenile in the 25 custody of a county juvenile hall, the Fourteenth Amendment applies. See Vazquez, 949 F.3d 1153 (analyzing similar claim against county juvenile hall under Fourteenth Amendment). 26 3 Jones is cautioned that California law applies to whether his action survives or was extinguished by Gutierrez’s death prior to his filing of this lawsuit, and whether Jones may recover damages 27 against any successor or estate. See Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 592–95 (1978) (forum 1 e.g., id. at 956 (“[A]n estate can only act by and through a personal representative and therefore 2 any action must be brought . . . against the executor or representative of the estate”) (citation 3 modified); Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that incarcerated pro se 4 plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis must provide the marshal with sufficient information 5 necessary for service), abrogated in part on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 6 (1995). 7 B. Juvenile Hall 8 Jones also alleges that the Alameda County Juvenile Hall violated the Eighth Amendment 9 when it failed to protect him from Gutierrez. Because Jones was a juvenile detainee at the time of 10 the alleged incident, the Court analyzes his claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Vazquez, 11 949 F.3d 1153. To state a claim for failure to protect, a plaintiff must allege: 12 (1) The defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under which the plaintiff was confined; (2) Those 13 conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm; (3) The defendant did not take reasonable available measures 14 to abate that risk, even though a reasonable officer in the circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk 15 involved—making the consequences of the defendant’s conduct obvious; and (4) By not taking such measures, the defendant caused 16 the plaintiff’s injuries. 17 Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1071 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert. denied, 580 18 U.S. 1099 (2017). “[A] pretrial detainee who asserts a due process claim for failure to protect 19 [must] prove more than negligence but less than subjective intent—something akin to reckless 20 disregard.” Id. 21 Here, Jones’ claim fails for two reasons. First, his claim for damages against the Alameda 22 County Juvenile Hall does not name a proper Defendant. See Somoza v. Central Juvenile Hall, 23 No. CV 22-8538-SPG, 2023 WL 5506023, *3 (C.D. Cal. Jul. 27, 2023) (“Section 1983 claims 24 must be brought against ‘persons’—a definition that includes municipalities and counties but not 25 buildings or facilities.”). Second, even if Jones had named a proper Defendant for this claim, 26 action for or against a person is not lost by reason of the person’s death, but survives subject to the 27 applicable limitations period.”); Cal. Code Civ. P. § 366.2 (stating that a tort action against a 1 Jones presently fails to state a claim because he does not make any non-conclusory allegations 2 showing that any state actor failed to take reasonable available measures to abate a substantial risk 3 of harm. See Castro, 833 F.3d at 1071. For example, Jones does not explain whether he informed 4 anyone about Gutierrez’s actions during the relevant time period, allege any other facts suggesting 5 that a reasonable official in the circumstances would have been aware of the high risk of harm, 6 or—to the extent he seeks to allege a claim against a municipal or county entity—cite to any 7 official policy or custom that caused his injury. See id.; Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 8 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). The Court therefore DISMISSES the claim against Alameda County 9 Juvenile Hall, and grants Jones LEAVE TO AMEND so he may provide additional information 10 about the nature of his claim and clarification as to intended Defendants as noted above. 11 IV. CONCLUSION 12 The Court orders as follows: 13 1. Jones may be able to state a cognizable Fourteenth Amendment claim based on 14 Gutierrez’s alleged actions. However, because the Complaint indicates that 15 Gutierrez is deceased, Jones must file suit against an appropriate representative to 16 proceed. Gutierrez is DISMISSED, and Jones is granted LEAVE TO AMEND so 17 he may name an appropriate party. 18 2. The claim against Alameda County Juvenile Hall is DISMISSED, and Jones is 19 granted LEAVE TO AMEND so he may address the deficiencies identified above, 20 assuming he can do so in good faith. 21 3. The amended complaint must be filed within twenty-eight (28) days of the date 22 this order is filed and must include the caption and civil case number used in this 23 order and the words “Amended Complaint” on the first page. Because an amended 24 complaint completely replaces the original, Jones must include all claims and 25 allegations of fact to support his claims. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 26 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Jones is cautioned that he may not incorporate material from 27 the prior complaint by reference. He must reallege all claims he wants to pursue ] time will result in this action’s dismissal without prejudice. 2 4. Itis Jones’ responsibility to prosecute this case. He must keep the Court informed 3 of any change of address by filing a separate paper with the Clerk headed “Notice 4 of Change of Address,” and must comply with the Court’s orders in a timely 5 fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to 6 prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). 7 5. The Clerk is requested to send a blank prisoner complaint form to Jones with his 8 copy of this order. 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. 10 || Dated: May 7, 2026 1 hid Noél Wise 12 United States District Judge 14 15 16 (17 Z 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28