Thomas v. San Diego Police Department

1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 CHRISTOPHER THOMAS, Case No.: 3:25-cv-02628-JAH-MSB 8 Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING SECOND 9 v. AMENDED COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 10 SAN DIEGO POLICE DEPARTMENT, 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) ET AL., 11 Defendants. 12 13 14 15 16 INTRODUCTION 17 On October 3, 2025, Plaintiff Christopher Thomas (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, 18 filed a complaint against the San Diego Police Department (“SDPD”) and six other named 19 Defendants, alleging civil rights violations after his arrest and prosecution. See ECF No. 20 1. Plaintiff also filed a Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP Motion”), 21 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(a). See ECF No. 2. After granting Plaintiff’s IFP Motion and 22 screening the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the Court dismissed the 23 complaint without prejudice and with leave to amend. See ECF No. 3. 24 On March 17, 2026, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) alleging 25 four causes of actions under 42 U.S.C § 1983. See ECF No. 4. In the FAC, Plaintiff sought 26 monetary damages, as well as other relief against the SDPD and two other named 27 defendants. Id. After screening the FAC pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the 28 Court dismissed the FAC without prejudice and with leave to amend. See ECF No. 5. 1 On April 29, 2026, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) seeking 2 monetary damages, as well as other relief against one individual defendant, Officer Stonier 3 (“Defendant”). See ECF No. 6. Plaintiff’s SAC alleges three causes of actions under 42 4 U.S.C § 1983. Id. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), because Plaintiff’s 5 fourth claim alleged in the FAC (Monell claim against SDPD) is not re-alleged in the SAC, 6 the Court considers it waived. See S.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. 7 Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading 8 supersedes the original”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) 9 (noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an amended 10 pleading may be considered “waived if not repled”). 11 After careful review of the SAC, and for the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s 12 causes of actions are DISMISSED without prejudice and with leave to amend. 13 DISCUSSION 14 I. Sua Sponte Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 15 A. Standard of Review 16 A plaintiff granted leave to proceed IFP subjects their complaint to sua sponte 17 review, and mandatory dismissal, if the action or appeal “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) 18 fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against 19 a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith, 20 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“section 1915(e) not only permits but 21 requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a 22 claim”) (citation omitted). “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to 23 state a claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the 24 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. 25 Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal citation omitted). Moreover, when 26 the plaintiff is proceeding pro se, these pleading standards are even less stringent because 27 “[a] document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed[.]’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 28 89, 94 (2007) (internal citation omitted). 1 Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 2 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law because 3 of a “lack of a cognizable legal theory or [ ] insufficient facts under a cognizable legal 4 claim.” Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984). 5 Although Rule 12(b)(6) does not require detailed essential facts, it must plead sufficient 6 facts that, if true, “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. 7 v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citation omitted). If the court finds a 8 complaint fails to state a claim, the court “should grant leave to amend, unless it determines 9 that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” See Doe v. 10 United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks and citation 11 omitted). 12 B. Insufficiency of Complaint 13 To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) the deprivation of a right 14 secured by the Constitution and federal laws, and (2) “the alleged deprivation was 15 committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 16 (1988) (internal citations omitted). 17 1. Plaintiff’s False Arrest Claim 18 Plaintiff alleges that “Defendant arrested [him] without probable cause.” SAC at 1. 19 To prevail on a false arrest claim under the Fourth Amendment, the plaintiff must 20 “demonstrate that there was no probable cause to arrest him.” Norse v. City of Santa Cruz, 21 629 F.3d 966, 978 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 22 374, 380 (9th Cir. 1998) (per curiam)). A probable cause inquiry “merely asks[,] whether, 23 under the totality of the circumstances, a prudent officer would have believed that there 24 was a fair probability that [a person] committed a crime.” United States v. Collins, 427 25 F.3d 688, 691 (9th Cir. 2005). 26 Here, Plaintiff alleges that “[o]n February 22, [he] was involved in a vehicle accident 27 near Main Street and Interstate 5 in San Diego, California.” SAC at 1. Plaintiff alleges 28 that “[t]wo officers initially responded and treated the matter as a civil traffic incident” and 1 “[a]pproximately twenty minutes later, Defendant Stonier arrived. Stonier initially 2 detained William Jenkins.” Id. Next, Plaintiff alleges that “[w]hile handcuffed, Jenkins 3 made inconsistent claims that Plaintiff had a gun, knife, or crowbar, then [Jenkins] stated 4 he did not know.” Id. Plaintiff also alleges “[n]o weapon was recovered. No witness 5 observed [him] commit a crime,” and “Jenkins admitted he did not know Plaintiff and 6 speculated about a possible affair without evidence.” Id. Plaintiff further alleges that 7 “[d]espite the lack of evidence and inconsistent accusations, [Defendant] arrested him,” 8 and “[Defendant] claimed pliers had blood on them without testing; later evidence showed 9 this was false.” Id. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that “Jenkins later testified his injury came 10 from broken glass after the crash.” Id. 11 However, “[f]acts uncovered after the arrest are irrelevant.” Collins, 427 F.3d at 691 12 (internal citation omitted). Although the SAC provides more detail about the events 13 leading up to and including the arrest than the FAC, Plaintiff still has not alleged specific 14 facts sufficient to show that “[a] reasonable officer would not have believed probable cause 15 existed.” SAC at 1. Even if construed liberally to suggest that Mr. Jenkins’s “inconsistent” 16 or “unsupported” statements led to Plaintiff’s arrest, the facts alleged in the SAC do not 17 satisfy Plaintiff’s burden of showing a lack of probable cause. See SAC. Absent more 18 specific facts, the Court cannot assess whether probable cause existed. Accordingly, 19 Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim for false arrest. 20 2. Plaintiff’s Malicious Prosecution Claim 21 “A criminal defendant may maintain a malicious prosecution claim not only against 22 prosecutors but also against others—including police officers and investigators—who 23 wrongfully caused his prosecution.” Smith v. Almada, 640 F.3d 931, 938 (9th Cir. 2011) 24 (internal citation omitted). To state a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff 25 must show that “the defendants prosecuted [him] with malice and without probable cause, 26 and that they did so for the purpose of denying [him] equal protection or another specific 27 constitutional right.” Freeman v. City of Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 1995) 28 1 (internal citations omitted). The prosecution must also have terminated in the acquittal or 2 discharge of the accused. See Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 44 (2022). 3 Here, Plaintiff alleges “Defendant caused charges to be initiated and continued based 4 on unreliable statements and false information.” SAC at 2. Along with the facts Plaintiff 5 alleges about his arrest on February 2, 2022, Plaintiff indicates that the criminal 6 proceedings against him proceeded for “over two years” and terminated with an acquittal. 7 Id. at 1. However, Plaintiff has already failed to allege specific facts showing a lack of 8 probable cause for his false arrest claim, and he cannot satisfy the probable cause element 9 of malicious prosecution on those same facts. See SAC. Beyond the conclusory allegation 10 that the charges rested on “unreliable statements and false information,” Plaintiff offers no 11 new facts showing that Defendant acted maliciously and initiated criminal proceedings 12 against him without probable cause. SAC at 2. Absent such facts, the Court cannot 13 determine whether Defendant initiated criminal proceedings against Plaintiff without 14 probable cause or with malice, and for the purpose of denying a specific constitutional 15 right. Freeman, 68 F.3d at 1189. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim for 16 malicious prosecution. 17 3. Plaintiff’s Fabrication of Evidence Claim 18 Plaintiff alleges that “Defendant falsely or recklessly claimed that pliers contained 19 blood without verification, contributing to [his] prosecution.” SAC at 2. “[T]here is a 20 clearly established constitutional due process right not to be subjected to criminal charges 21 on the basis of false evidence that was deliberately fabricated by the government.” 22 Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2001). A Plaintiff can prove this in 23 two ways: (1) through direct evidence of deliberate fabrication; and (2) by producing 24 circumstantial evidence related to a defendant’s motive. Caldwell v. City & Cnty. Of San 25 Francisco, 889 F.3d 1105, 1112 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal citations omitted). To prove a 26 fabrication claim using circumstantial evidence, one must show: “(1) [d]efendants 27 continued their investigation…despite the fact that they knew or should have known that 28 [he] was innocent; or (2) [d]efendants used investigative techniques that were so coercive 1 and abusive that they knew or should have known that those techniques would yield false 2 information.” Devereaux, 263 F.3d at 1076 (internal citation omitted). 3 Here, Plaintiff alleged that “[Defendant] Stonier [ ] claimed pliers had blood on them 4 without testing” but “later evidence showed this was false.” SAC at 1. While Plaintiff 5 alleges that “Defendant falsely or recklessly” made claims about blood found on the pliers 6 before testing, Plaintiff fails to provide any new specific facts showing that Defendant 7 deliberately fabricated this evidence, acted with false or reckless intent, or continued to 8 investigate despite knowing or having reason to know that Plaintiff was innocent. Id. at 2. 9 Plaintiff also provides no new facts showing that Defendant used investigative techniques 10 so coercive and abusive that Defendant knew or should have known they would yield false 11 information. See SAC. Absent such facts, the Court cannot assess whether there was false 12 evidence deliberately fabricated by the defendant. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a 13 plausible claim for fabrication of evidence. 14 CONCLUSION 15 For all the reasons discussed above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 16 1. Plaintiff's case is DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 17 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 18 2. The Court GRANTS Plaintiff forty-five (45) days from the date of this order to file 19 an Amended Complaint which cures the deficiencies of the pleading described 20 herein. Plaintiff is cautioned, however, that if the subsequent Amended Complaint 21 is deficient, the Court will dismiss it with prejudice. Furthermore, should Plaintiff 22 choose to file an Amended Complaint, it must be complete by itself, comply with 23 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Rule 8(a), and any claim not re- 24 alleged will be considered waived. See S.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, 25 Inc., 896 F.2d at 1546 (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes the original”); Lacey, 26 693 F.3d at 928 (noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re- 27 alleged in an amended pleading may be considered “waived if not repled”). A failure 28 1 to file an Amended Complaint will result in dismissal of this action without further 2 order of the Court. 3 4 ||Dated: August 4, 2026 6 {United States District Judge 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28