Ludwig v. Hill

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 KENNETH JAMES LUDWIG, Case No.: 25-CV-2435-TWR (LR) 12 Petitioner, ORDER (1) OVERRULING 13 v. PETITIONER’S OBJECTION, (2) ADOPTING REPORT AND 14 JAMES HILL, RECOMMENDATION, 15 Respondent. (3) GRANTING RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS, 16 (4) DENYING PETITION, AND 17 (5) DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 18 19 (ECF Nos. 4, 9) 20 21 Presently before the Court is Respondent James Hill’s Motion to Dismiss (“Mot.,” 22 ECF No. 4) Petitioner Kenneth James Ludwig’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 23 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Honorable Lupe Rodriguez, Jr. issued a Report and 24 Recommendation regarding Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss (“R&R,” ECF No. 9), 25 recommending that the Court grant Respondent’s Motion, to which Petitioner has filed a 26 timely Objection (“Obj.,” ECF No. 10). Having carefully reviewed the Parties’ arguments, 27 the record, and the relevant law, the Court ADOPTS Magistrate Judge Rodriguez, Jr.’s 28 / / / 1 Report and Recommendation in its entirety, GRANTS Respondent’s Motion, DENIES the 2 Petition, and DENIES Petitioner a Certificate of Appealability. 3 BACKGROUND 4 Magistrate Judge Rodriguez, Jr.’s Report and Recommendation contains a thorough 5 and accurate recitation of the factual and procedural history underlying Respondent’s 6 Motion. (See R&R at 2–7.) This Order incorporates by reference set forth therein. 7 LEGAL STANDARD 8 When a magistrate judge issues a report and recommendation on a motion pending 9 before a district court judge, the district court must “make a de novo determination of those 10 portion of the report . . . to which objection is made” and “may accept, reject, or modify, 11 in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 12 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 673–76 (1980); United 13 States v. Remsing, 874 F.2d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1989). 14 ANALYSIS 15 To begin, Magistrate Judge Rodriguez, Jr. recommends dismissing all claims in the 16 Petition because Petitioner’s claims do not raise a federal issue. (See R&R at 9–16.) 17 Petitioner objects arguing that the R&R “improperly reframes” his claims as state-law 18 disputes, “ignoring their federal nature.” (Obj. at 1–2.) Petitioner’s objection is improper 19 because, as Magistrate Judge Rodriguez, Jr. stated, Petitioner “cannot create federal 20 jurisdiction simply by citing the federal Constitution.” (R&R at 12–13 (collecting cases).) 21 Next, Magistrate Judge Rodriguez, Jr. recommends dismissing all claims because 22 none lie at the core of federal habeas corpus. (See R&R at 16–18.) Petitioner objects 23 arguing that Magistrate Judge Rodriguez, Jr.’s conclusion is legally incorrect. (Obj. at 2.) 24 In support of this objection, Petitioner raises three specific grounds: 25 First, Petitioner contends that success would accelerate release by compelling a 26 resentencing hearing, which “directly affects the duration of [his] custody.” (Id. (citing 27 Docken v. Chase, 393 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2004)).) But the authority Petitioner relies on 28 was expressly overruled by the Ninth Circuit, which in 2016 adopted “the correlative rule 1 that a § 1983 action is the exclusive vehicle for claims brought by state prisoners that are 2 not within the core of habeas corpus.” Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 927 (9th Cir. 3 2016). Thus, Petitioner’s first ground fails. 4 Second, Petitioner contends Magistrate Judge Rodriguez, Jr. applied the incorrect 5 standard of whether release is guaranteed, when the correct standard is “whether success 6 would necessarily accelerate consideration of release[.]” (Obj. at 2 (citing Skinner v. 7 Switzer, 562 U.S. 521 (2011)).) But the authority Petitioner cites explains that “[h]abeas 8 is the exclusive remedy . . . for the prisoner who seeks ‘immediate or speedier release’ from 9 confinement. Where the prisoner’s claim would not ‘necessarily spell speedier release,’ 10 however, suit may be brought under § 1983.” Skinner, 562 U.S. at 525 (citing Wilkinson 11 v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 82 (2005)). Thus, Petitioner’s second ground fails. 12 Third, Petitioner contends Magistrate Judge Rodriguez, Jr. ignores the Mixed-Claim 13 Doctrine by recommending dismissal of the entire Petition rather than severing or 14 converting the non-habeas portions. (See Obj. at 2 (citing Nettles, 830 F.3d).) But 15 Petitioner misstates the rule. As the Ninth Circuit held in Nettles, “a district court may 16 construe a petition for habeas corpus to plead a cause of action under § 1983 after notifying 17 and obtaining the informed consent from the prisoner.” 830 F.3d at 936 (adopting Seventh 18 Circuit rule holding the same). But conversion of the petition requires that the complaint 19 be “amenable on its face” to conversion, meaning “it names the correct defendants and 20 seeks the correct relief.” See id. (citing Glaus v. Anderson, 408 F.3d 382, 388 (7th Cir. 21 2005)) (additional citations omitted). 22 Problematically for Petitioner, his Petition is not amenable on its face to conversion. 23 To begin, Petitioner names James Hill, Warden of the Richard J. Donovan Correctional 24 Facility, as the Respondent. (See ECF No. 1.) While naming the individual responsible 25 for Petitioner’s confinement is proper in a habeas corpus action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, in 26 contrast, when proceeding under Section 1983, plaintiffs must name the individual 27 responsible for the wrongs alleged (e.g., the doctors, guards, or others responsible for the 28 harm). See Glaus, 408 F.3d at 388; see also Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1 1988) (explaining, in a Section 1983 action, “[t]he inquiry into causation must be 2 individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant 3 whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation”) (citing 4 Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370–71 (1976)). Additionally, converting the Petition to a 5 § 1983 action could negatively impact Petitioner because § 1983 claims are subject to 6 different exhaustion requirements (i.e., failure to properly allege exhaustion may result in 7 dismissal), see Nettles, 830 F.3d at 932 n.8, and § 1983 claims are subject to the Prison 8 Litigation Reform Act’s (“PLRA’s”) three-strikes rule, see Coleman v. Tollefson, 575 U.S. 9 532–37 (2015). Accordingly, the Court declines to convert the Petition. 10 Magistrate Judge Rodriguez, Jr. further recommends dismissing all claims because, 11 even if federal habeas jurisdiction existed, Petitioner’s claims are “impermissibly vague 12 and conclusory” and thus violate Rule 2(c) of the Rules Governing Habeas Corpus Cases.1 13 (See R&R at 18.) Petitioner objects and argues that Magistrate Judge Rodriguez, Jr. failed 14 to apply the required liberal construction of pro se habeas petitions. (See Obj. at 2 (first 15 citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007), and then citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 16 519 (1972)).) But the authorities Petitioner relies on both concern the pleading standards 17 for a pro se litigant who seeks relief pursuant to a civil action under Section 1983—not 18 habeas relief. See Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94–95; Haines, 404 U.S. at 520–21; see also 19 McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856 (1994) (explaining “[h]abeas corpus petitions must 20 meet heightened pleading requirements” and “[f]ederal courts are authorized to dismiss 21 summarily any habeas petition that appears legally insufficient on its face) (citing 28 22 U.S.C. § 2254 Rules 2(c), 4). Therefore, as explained by Magistrate Judge Rodriguez, Jr., 23 / / / 24 25 26 1 Rule 2(c) of the Rules Governing Habeas Corpus Cases provides that a petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 must (1) specify all the grounds for relief available to the petitioner; (2) state the facts 27 supporting each ground; (3) state the relief requested; (4) be printed, typewritten, or legibly handwritten; and (5) be signed under penalty of perjury by the petitioner or by a person authorized to sign it for the 28 1 Petitioner’s claims “do not provide sufficient facts to support each cognizable ground for 2 habeas relief.” (R&R at 18 (citations omitted).) 3 Additionally, Magistrate Judge Rodriguez, Jr. recommends dismissing all claims 4 because “although federal law authorizes federal courts to grant compassionate release to 5 federal prisoners when ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’ warrant a reduction in 6 sentence, . . . Petitioner is not a federal inmate serving a federal sentence and that provision 7 does not apply to state prisoners.” (R&R at 20–21 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)).) 8 Petitioner objects and argues that Magistrate Judge Rodriguez, Jr. (1) misunderstands 9 California Penal Code § 1172.2 as discretionary when it contains “mandatory procedural 10 protections,” (2) misinterprets Petitioner’s Supremacy Clause claim as arguing that 18 11 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) applies to state prisoners when he instead argues that “California’s 12 implementation of § 1172.2 violated federal constitutional protections,” and (3) misapplies 13 Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991), as standing for the proposition that federal courts 14 cannot review state-law errors when it “explicitly permits federal review where state 15 procedures violate federal constitutional rights.” (Obj. at 2–3.) 16 First, as to Petitioner’s argument regarding California Penal Code § 1172.2, 17 Magistrate Judge Rodriguez, Jr. explained that “Petitioner’s claim that the [California 18 Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”)] erroneously determined that he 19 did not meet eligibility requires for compassion release under [§ 1172.2] alleges a violation 20 of state, not federal, law.” (R&R at 11.) The Court agrees. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67– 21 68 (“[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court 22 determinations on state-law questions. In conducting habeas review, a federal court is 23 limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the 24 United States.” (citations omitted)). The Court additionally rejects Petitioner’s argument 25 that Magistrate Judge Rodriguez, Jr. misapplied Estelle. (See R&R at 12–13 (collecting 26 cases standing for the proposition that there is no constitutional liberty interest at stake in 27 the context of compassionate release).) Moreover, Estelle and the other cases cited by 28 Magistrate Judge Rodriguez, Jr. defeat Petitioner’s argument that California’s 1 implementation of § 1172.2 violated his constitutional rights. See, e.g., Greenholtz v. 2 Inmates of Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979) (“There is no constitutional 3 or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released before the expiration of 4 a valid sentence.”); Roberts v. Spaulding, 783 F.2d 867, 870–71 (9th Cir. 1986) (“A mere 5 expectation of receiving a benefit is not enough to create a protected liberty interest.”); 6 Salazar v. von Blanckensee, No. CV-20-00352-TUC-SHR (JR), 2022 WL 17096202, at *5 7 (D. Ariz. Sept. 30, 2022) (“In the context of compassionate release, the Ninth Circuit has 8 made it clear there is no constitutional liberty interest at stake; the mere hope of conditional 9 liberty is ‘a hope which is not protected by due process.’”) (citations omitted). 10 Finally, Petitioner’s Objection raises two additional grounds. First, he argues that 11 Magistrate Judge Rodriguez, Jr. misapplied Equal Protection standards because, at the 12 pleading stage, Petitioner’s allegation that similarly situated inmates were referred for 13 compassionate release is satisfactory to state a claim. (See Obj. at 3 (citation omitted).) 14 But again, there is no constitutional right to conditionally released before the expiration of 15 a valid sentence. See Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 7. Thus, regardless of whether Petitioner 16 sufficiently plead that he is similarly situated to other inmates who were referred for 17 compassionate release, his argument fails. Second, Petitioner argues that Magistrate Judge 18 Rodriguez, Jr. improperly weighed evidence and made factual findings by opining that a 19 favorable ruling from a state court is “highly speculative” considering the nature of 20 Petitioner’s convictions. (Obj. at 3.) Regardless of how speculative Magistrate Judge 21 Rodriguez, Jr. believes such a ruling may be, the fact that Petitioner alleges only a violation 22 of state law is what ultimately dooms his claim. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67–68. 23 Having reviewed the R&R in its entirety, the Court finds that it is thorough, well- 24 reasoned, and contains no clear error. The Court therefore OVERRULES Petitioner’s 25 Objection, ADOPTS Judge Rodriguez, Jr.’s Report and Recommendation in its entirety, 26 and DENIES the Petition. 27 / / / 28 / / / I CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 2 A petitioner may not appeal “the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which 3 || the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court” except where “a 4 circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). 5 ||“A certificate of appealability may issue... only if the applicant has made a substantial 6 ||showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The Supreme 7 || Court has further explained: “When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural 8 || grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a certificate of 9 appealability should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would 10 || find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional 11 and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct 12 |/in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 13 The Court finds that no reasonable jurist would find it debatable whether the Court 14 || was correct in its determination that Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas corpus relief. 15 ||Thus, the questions presented by the Petition do not warrant further proceedings. 16 || Accordingly, the Court DENIES a Certificate of Appealability. 17 CONCLUSION 18 In light of the foregoing, the Court ADOPTS Magistrate Judge Rodriguez, Jr.’s 19 || Report and Recommendation in its entirety, GRANTS Respondent’s Motion, DENIES the 20 || Petition, and DENIES Petitioner a Certificate of Appealability. The Court does so, 21 ||however, without making a decision on the ultimate merits of the case and without 22 precluding Petitioner from refiling under the proper legal label. See Glaus, 408 F.3d at 23 ||389-90. 24 IT IS SO ORDERED. 25 Dated: August 31, 2026 —— 26 | as) (2 (re 7 Honorable Todd W. Robinson 9g United States District Judge