(PS) Ahmadzai v. County of Sacramento

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MOHIBULLAH AHMADZAI, Case No. 2:25-cv-02625-DC-CSK 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER AND FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, ET AL., (ECF Nos. 1, 5) 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff Mohibullah Ahmadzai is proceeding in this action pro se.1 On January 5, 18 2026, the Court Denied Plaintiff’s original in forma pauperis (“IFP”) application for lacking 19 sufficient detail to establish how many months his financial aid covers. See 1/05/26 20 Order (ECF No. 4). On January 6, 2026, Plaintiff filed a second IFP application. (ECF 21 No. 5.) Plaintiff has clarified that his financial aid totaling $11,761.75 covered only his fall 22 semester, from August to December 2025. Id. at 4. Accordingly, the Court determines 23 that Plaintiff’s IFP application makes the required financial showing and grant his IFP 24 request. 25 / / / 26 27 1 This matter proceeds before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, Fed. R. 28 Civ. P. 72, and Local Rule 302(c). 1 I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT 2 The determination that a plaintiff may proceed without payment of fees does not 3 complete the inquiry. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the court must screen every in 4 forma pauperis proceeding, and must order dismissal of the case if it is “frivolous or 5 malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary 6 relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 7 Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (2000) (en banc). A claim is legally frivolous 8 when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 9 325 (1989). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court accepts as true the 10 factual allegations contained in the complaint, unless they are clearly baseless or 11 fanciful, and construes those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See 12 Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327; Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 13 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 564 U.S. 1037 (2011). 14 Pleadings by self-represented litigants are liberally construed. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 15 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (liberal construction appropriate even post–Iqbal). 16 However, the court need not accept as true conclusory allegations, unreasonable 17 inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 18 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action does 19 not suffice to state a claim. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007); 20 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 21 To state a claim on which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must allege enough 22 facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A 23 claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court 24 to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 25 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the 26 complaint and an opportunity to amend unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be 27 cured by amendment. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31; Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 28 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1996). 1 II. THE COMPLAINT 2 Plaintiff Mohibullah Ahmadzai has filed a Complaint against Defendants County of 3 Sacramento, Sacramento County Sheriff, City and County of San Francisco, San 4 Francisco County Sheriff, and Does 1-20. Compl. at 1. Plaintiff alleges claims under 5 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 22-24. Plaintiff seems to only raise Monell claims against 6 Sacramento County and the City and County of San Francisco, despite naming all 7 Defendants. Id. at 24. Plaintiff further alleges negligence and intentional infliction of 8 emotional distress against all defendants. Id. at 25-26. Plaintiff further alleges violations 9 of the California Constitution under Article I, Sections 1, 7, and 13 and violations of the 10 Bane Act under Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1 against all Defendants. Id. at 26-28. 11 Plaintiff alleges that he and his family have been subjected to an “ongoing, 12 deliberate, and highly coordinated campaign or harassment and safety threats.” Id. at 6. 13 Plaintiff appears to allege that this was a multifaceted harassment campaign, causing 14 financial disruption and psychological intimidation in the form of “near-daily use of loud, 15 modified vehicles and motorcycles, operating in synchronized formations.” Id. at 6-7. 16 Plaintiff alleges that beginning in 2020 he “repeatedly reported harassment and 17 safety threats to multiple law enforcement agencies.” Id. at 8. Plaintiff alleges that these 18 agencies “routinely declined to investigate, closed reports without meaning, and 19 minimized the severity of the harassment.” Id. at 9. Plaintiff later alleges he underwent a 20 “forced relocation abroad to protect himself and his children,” in early 2023. Id. at 10. 21 After returning to the United States in 2024, Plaintiff alleges that the San Francisco 22 Police Department’s Ingleside Station “summarily dismissed” a report he made in 23 response to “an escalating pattern of harassment and credible safety threats.” Id. Plaintiff 24 subsequently alleges to have suffered from two panic and anxiety attacks on July 6, 25 2024, and July 20, 2024, which he attributes to their lack of action. Id. at 10-11. 26 Plaintiff also alleges that the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department displayed 27 similar conduct as the San Francisco Police Department, alleging that responsibility was 28 shifted among the Sheriff’s Department, the Sacramento Police Department, and the 1 California Highway Patrol, with “each agency disclaiming jurisdiction rather than acting to 2 address the threats.” Id. at 11. Plaintiff alleges he filed three complaints between August 3 6, 2024 and May 1, 2025, which were “dismissed without investigation.” Id.at 11-13. 4 Plaintiff alleges that the conduct of both Defendants Sacramento and San 5 Francisco Counties led to “physical and psychological harm to Plaintiff and his children.” 6 Id. at 13. Plaintiff alleges that he suffers from a hearing impairment as a result of 7 “repeated high-decibel noise exposure in the vicinity of [his] family’s residence.” Id. at 13- 8 14. In response, Plaintiff alleges he has contacted the San Francisco Sheriff’s 9 Department and Sacramento Sheriff’s Leadership and Internal Affairs Office for follow- 10 up, but has not received a satisfactory outcome, leading to this action. Id. at 15-20. 11 III. DISCUSSION 12 A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 13 The Complaint does not contain a short and plain statement of a claim as required 14 by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. In order to give fair notice of the claims and the 15 grounds on which they rest, a plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of 16 particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the claims. See Kimes v. 17 Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). A review of Plaintiff’s Complaint reveals it 18 fails to state a claim for relief under Section 1983. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 19 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, 20 privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” 21 Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (internal quotation marks 22 omitted). “Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights but merely provides a 23 method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 24 266, 271 (1994) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). To state a cognizable 25 § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right protected by the Constitution 26 and laws of the United States, and that the alleged deprivation was committed by a 27 person who acted under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Florer v. 28 Congregation Pidyon Shevuyim, N.A., 639 F.3d 916, 921 (9th Cir. 2011). An individual 1 defendant is not liable on a civil rights claim unless the facts establish the defendant's 2 personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or a causal connection between 3 the defendant's wrongful conduct and the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Hansen 4 v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 645 (9th Cir. 1989); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743-44 (9th 5 Cir. 1978). That is, a plaintiff may not sue any official on the theory that the official is 6 liable for the unconstitutional conduct of his or her subordinates. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. 7 1. Section 1983 Claims Against All Defendants 8 Plaintiff alleges that all Defendants breached his Fourteenth Amendment rights by 9 being deliberatively indifferent to the alleged harassment campaign against him and by 10 failing to protect Plaintiff from “known and ongoing harassment, threats, and misconduct 11 that Plaintiff repeatedly reported to agencies. Compl. at 22-23. 12 It appears that Plaintiff is attempting to plead a violation of the state created 13 danger exception to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. “The 14 Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause ... does not confer any affirmative right to 15 governmental aid” and “typically does not impose a duty on the state to protect 16 individuals from third parties.” Henry A. v. Wilden, 678 F.3d 991, 998 (9th Cir. 2012). An 17 exception to this rule is the state created danger exception, where “the state affirmatively 18 places the plaintiff in danger by acting with deliberate indifference to the obvious 19 danger.” Id. To determine whether an official affirmatively placed an individual in danger, 20 the court must determine “whether any affirmative actions of the official placed the 21 individual in danger he would otherwise not have faced, whether the danger was known 22 or obvious, and whether the officer acted with deliberate indifference to that danger.” Id. 23 at 1002 (citing Kennedy v. City of Ridgefield, 439 F.3d 1055, 1062-64 (9th Cir. 2006)). 24 To show deliberate indifference, the Ninth Circuit requires the actor “must recognize[] 25 [an] unreasonable risk and actually intend[] to expose the plaintiff to the risk without 26 regard to the consequences to the plaintiff.” Patel v. Kent School District, 648 F.3d 965, 27 974 (9th Cir. 2011). 28 Plaintiff alleges in both causes of action that Defendants “knew of and 1 disregarded an excessive risk” to Plaintiff’s safety, and “dismissed, minimized, and 2 mishandled [Plaintiff’s] reports [demonstrating this harassment].” Compl. at 22-23. 3 However, Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently plead a state created danger claim where 4 Plaintiff makes conclusory and vague allegations that fail to describe who the actors are 5 and whether the conduct is directed at Plaintiff. Plaintiff has not sufficiently pled whether 6 he was under any danger that would merit a state created danger claim. Because 7 Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, these claims are dismissed with leave to amend to provide 8 Plaintiff with another opportunity to attempt to plead a state created danger claim. 9 2. Monell Claim Against Defendants County of Sacramento and City 10 and County of San Francisco 11 “In order to establish municipal liability [under Monell], a plaintiff must show that a 12 ‘policy or custom’ led to the plaintiff’s injury.” Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 13 1060, 1073 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (quoting Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of 14 New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). To state a Monell claim, a plaintiff must allege that 15 (1) he was deprived of a constitutional right; (2) the municipality has a policy; (3) the 16 policy amounts to deliberate indifference to plaintiff's constitutional rights; and (4) the 17 policy is the moving force behind the constitutional violation. See Anderson v. Warner, 18 451 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th 19 Cir. 1994)). The complaint must identify the particular policy that the plaintiff alleges 20 caused his constitutional injury. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 681 (9th 21 Cir. 2002); see also Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (under § 1983, local 22 governments are responsible only for “their own illegal acts,” and therefore to impose 23 liability on a local government, plaintiffs must prove that an “action pursuant to official 24 municipal policy” caused their injury) (citations omitted). Further, the policy at issue must 25 be the result of a decision of a person employed by the entity who has final decision or 26 policymaking authority. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. There must be a direct causal link 27 between the policy or custom and the injury, and a plaintiff must be able to demonstrate 28 that his injury resulted from a permanent and well-settled practice. Anderson, 451 F.3d 1 at 1070. 2 To successfully plead a Monell claim, the Ninth Circuit has held that there must be 3 sufficiently detailed factual allegations “‘to give fair notice and to enable the opposing 4 party to defend itself effectively’ and which ‘plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.’” 5 J.M. by and Through Rodriguez v. County of Stanislaus, 2018 WL 5879725, at *4 (E.D. 6 Cal. Nov. 7, 2018) (quoting Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011)). To meet 7 this standard, a plaintiff may do so by “specifying ‘the content of the policies, customs, or 8 practices the execution of which gave rise to [the plaintiff’s] constitutional injury.’” Id. 9 (quoting Mateos-Sandoval v. Cty. of Sonoma, 942 F.Supp.2d 890, 900 (N.D. Cal. 2013)). 10 Plaintiff fails to plead that Defendants County of Sacramento and City and County 11 of San Francisco have a policy to deprive Plaintiff of his constitutional rights. As 12 described above, Plaintiff has failed to plead a state created danger claim against all 13 Defendants. Because a Monell claim requires a constitutional violation to be actionable, 14 Plaintiff’s Monell claim is also dismissed with leave to amend. 15 3. Negligence Claim Against All Defendants 16 Under California law, a negligence claim requires a showing of “duty, breach, 17 causation, and damages.” State Farm General Insurance Company v. General Electric 18 Company, 799 F.Supp.3d 996, 1004 (C.D. Cal. 2025) (citation omitted). Plaintiff alleges 19 Defendants owed him a duty of reasonable care to “investigate credible reports of 20 harassment and threats to their safety, and to take reasonable steps to prevent 21 foreseeable harm.” Compl. at 25. Plaintiff alleges Defendants breached their duty to 22 Plaintiff by “mishandling Plaintiff’s complaints… failing to conduct adequate 23 investigations…and failing to implement even minimal protective measures.” Id. As a 24 result, Plaintiff alleges Defendant’s breaches of duty were the causes of “… medical 25 injuries, emotional trauma, financial disruption, and a loss of a safe and stable 26 environment.” Plaintiff has sufficiently pled his negligence claim for screening purposes. 27 To the extent Plaintiff attempts to raise a negligence claim on behalf of his minor 28 children, see Compl. at 25-26, Plaintiff is informed that a parent cannot bring an action 1 on behalf of a minor child without retaining counsel. See Johns v. San Diego, 114 F.3d 2 874, 877 (9th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff is granted leave to amend to clarify his claims. If 3 Plaintiff does attempt to bring a negligence claim on behalf of his minor children, Plaintiff 4 must retain counsel and will be provided with time to retain counsel. 5 4. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim Against All 6 Defendants 7 To adequately state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a 8 plaintiff must demonstrate: “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with 9 the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional 10 distress; (2) the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual 11 and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous 12 conduct.” Chaconas v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, 713 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1187 (S.D. Cal. 13 2010) (quoting Hughes v. Pair, 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050 (2009). 14 Plaintiff alleges all Defendants engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct by 15 “repeatedly ignoring, dismissing, or mishandling Plaintiff’s credible pleas for protection,” 16 that Defendants acted with reckless disregard of the probability of causing Plaintiff 17 severe emotional distress, and Plaintiff suffered emotional distress in the form of “panic 18 attacks, chronic anxiety, sleep disruption, fear, and a loss of a sense of safety and 19 stability.” Compl. at 26. Plaintiff’s allegations are conclusory and insufficient to state an 20 intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, which is dismissed with leave to amend. 21 As with the negligence claim, it is unclear whether Plaintiff also attempts to bring an 22 intentional infliction of emotional distress claim on behalf of his minor children. If any 23 such claim is raised, it is also insufficiently pled and dismissed with leave to amend. 24 5. California Constitutional Claims Against All Defendants 25 Plaintiff alleges that the conduct of all Defendants violated Plaintiff’s rights under 26 Article I, Sections 1, 7, and 13 of the California Constitution, impinging on Plaintiff’s 27 rights to “life, liberty, safety, due process, and equal protection under the law.” Id. at 27. 28 In California, “[a] constitutional provision is presumed to be self-executing unless 1 contrary intent is shown.” Coming Up Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco, 857 F. 2 Supp. 711, 719 (N.D. Cal. 1994). However, the California Supreme Court has ruled that 3 there are no private rights of action for Article I, Sections 7 and 13 of the California 4 Constitution. Katzenberg v. Regents of University of California, 29 Cal.4th 300, 328 5 (2002) (“The availability of meaningful alternative remedies leads us to decline to 6 recognize a constitutional tort to remedy the asserted violation of article 1, section 7(a) in 7 the case before us.”); see also Estate of F.R. v. County of Yuba, 2023 WL 6130049, at 8 *7 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2023) (“The court therefore concludes that no private cause of 9 action is available under Article I, Section 13.”). Accordingly, those constitutional claims 10 should be dismissed without leave to amend. 11 Plaintiff also raises an Article I, Section 1 claim against all Defendants, which 12 states “All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. 13 Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and 14 protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.” Cal. 15 Const. Art. I, § 1. California courts have noted that these provisions “do not provide ‘rules 16 by means of which’ the principals at issue could be given force of law.” Leger v. Stockton 17 Unified School Dist., 202 Cal. App. 3d 1448, 1455 (1988). Additionally, courts have 18 found these provisions to be “devoid of guidelines, mechanisms, or procedures from 19 which a damages remedy could be inferred.” Coming Up, Inc. v. City and County of San 20 Francisco, 857 F. Supp. 711, 719 (N.D. Cal. 1994). Accordingly, courts have dismissed 21 these state constitutional claims where a statute or common law is the more appropriate 22 vehicle for the action. Id. at 719-20 (dismissing plaintiff’s California constitutional claims 23 against police officers for removing free local newspapers from news racks and finding a 24 state statute to be a more appropriate vehicle for the action). Because Plaintiff has sued 25 Defendants under a variety of causes of action that provide redress for his claims 26 outside of California constitutional provisions, the Court recommends dismissing his 27 claim under Article 1, Section 1 of the California Constitution without leave to amend. 28 / / / 1 6. Bane Act Claims Against All Defendants 2 The Bane Act provides a civil cause of action for “[a]ny individual whose exercise 3 or enjoyment of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of 4 right secured by the Constitution or laws of [California] has been interfered with” or 5 attempted to be interfered with’ through actual or attempted “threats, intimidation, or 6 coercion.” Campbell v. Feld Entertainment, Inc., 75 F.Supp.3d 1193, 1211 (N.D. Cal. 7 2014). The Bane Act defines interference as a violation of one’s constitutional rights. Id. 8 To prevail on a Bane Act claim, a plaintiff must first show that there was an interference 9 of his constitutional rights, and then must show that the interference “was accompanied 10 by actual or attempted threats, intimidation, or coercion.” Id. Here, Plaintiff has failed to 11 plead a violation of his constitutional rights as described above. Therefore, he cannot 12 plead a violation of the Bane Act. This claim is dismissed with leave to amend. 13 B. Leave To Amend 14 Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, even a pro se 15 litigant’s complaint must give fair notice and state the elements of a claim plainly and 16 succinctly. Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). In 17 light of Plaintiff’s pro se status, and because it is at least conceivable that Plaintiff could 18 allege additional facts to state claims under Section 1983, Monell, intentional infliction of 19 emotional distress, and the Bane Act, the Court finds it appropriate to grant Plaintiff an 20 opportunity to amend the Complaint. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31 (indicating that 21 prior to dismissal, the court is to tell the plaintiff of deficiencies in the complaint and 22 provide an opportunity to cure – if it appears at all possible the defects can be 23 corrected). 24 If Plaintiff elects to file an amended complaint, this new pleading shall allege facts 25 establishing the existence of federal jurisdiction and must contain a short and plain 26 statement of Plaintiff's claim. The allegations of the complaint must be set forth in 27 sequentially numbered paragraphs, with each paragraph number being one greater than 28 the one before, each paragraph having its own number, and no paragraph number being 1 repeated anywhere in the complaint. Each paragraph should be limited “to a single set of 2 circumstances” where possible. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). Forms are available to help 3 plaintiffs organize their complaint in the proper way. They are available at the Clerk's 4 Office, 501 I Street, 4th Floor (Rm. 4-200), Sacramento, CA 95814, or online at 5 www.uscourts.gov/forms/pro-se-forms. 6 The amended complaint must not require the Court and the defendants to guess 7 at what is being alleged against whom. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th 8 Cir. 1996) (affirming dismissal of a complaint where the district court was “literally 9 guessing as to what facts support the legal claims being asserted against certain 10 defendants”). The amended complaint must not require the Court to spend its time 11 “preparing the ‘short and plain statement’ which Rule 8 obligated plaintiffs to submit.” Id. 12 at 1180. The amended complaint must not require the Court and defendants to prepare 13 lengthy outlines “to determine who is being sued for what.” Id. at 1179. 14 Plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior complaint or other filing in 15 order to make the amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an 16 amended complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a 17 general rule, an amended complaint supersedes prior complaint(s), and once the 18 amended complaint is filed and served, any previous complaint no longer serves any 19 function in the case. Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 927 (9th Cir. 2012). 20 IV. CONCLUSION 21 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 22 1. Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 5) is GRANTED. 23 2. Plaintiff is provided with 60 days from the date of this order to retain counsel. 24 Further, based on the findings above, it is RECOMMENDED: 25 1. Plaintiff’s California Constitutional claims be DISMISSED without leave to 26 amend. 27 2. Plaintiff’s Section 1983, Monell, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and 28 Bane Act claims against Defendants County of Sacramento, Sacramento 1 County Sheriff, City and County of San Francisco, San Francisco County 2 Sheriff, and Does 1-20 be DISMISSED with leave to amend. 3 3. Plaintiff's negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims 4 brought on behalf of his minor children be DISMISSED with leave to amend. 5 4. Plaintiff be provided with 30 days from the date of this order to file an 6 amended complaint If Plaintiff does not file an amended complaint, the 7 Complaint will proceed on Plaintiff's negligence claim on his own behalf 8 against all Defendants. 9 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District 10 | Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within 11 | 14 days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file 12 | written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. This document should 13 | be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any 14 | reply to the objections shall be served on all parties and filed with the Court within 14 15 | days after service of the objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time 16 | may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 17 | 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991). 18 19 | Dated: April 2, 2026 C i s \U 20 CHI SOO KIM UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 22 23 || 7/anma.2625.25.screen 24 25 26 27 28 12