(PS) Sunak v. City of Vallejo

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ARVINDER PAL SINGH SUNAK, Case No. 2:25-cv-02624-DC-CSK (PS) 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER AND FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS 14 CITY OF VALLEJO, et al., (ECF Nos. 16, 20) 15 Defendant. 16 17 Pending before the Court is Defendant City of Vallejo and Doe Officer 18 Defendants’ motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint and Plaintiff Arvinder Pal 19 Singh Sunak’s motion for relief and request to consider Plaintiff’s opposition.1 (ECF Nos. 20 16, 20.) Plaintiff is appearing without counsel. Pursuant to Local Rule 230(g), the Court 21 submits the motion upon the record and briefs on file and vacated the June 30, 2026 22 hearing. 23 For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for relief and 24 recommends GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART Defendants’ motion to 25 dismiss. 26 / / / 27 1 This matter proceeds before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, Fed. R. 28 Civ. P. 72, and Local Rule 302(c). 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 A. Factual Allegations2 3 Plaintiff Arvinder Pal Singh Sunak alleges that in March 2023, a writ of possession 4 was executed in an action concerning his residence, which was executed and satisfied 5 on or about March 21, 2023. First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) at 2 (ECF No. 15). 6 Plaintiff alleges that on or about April 2023, after the execution of the writ of possession, 7 he and his family were permitted to reoccupy the residence. Id. 8 Plaintiff alleges on September 13, 2023, Doe Officer Defendants intervened in a 9 civil housing dispute at Plaintiff’s dwelling and removed Plaintiff and his family from their 10 home without first seeking a valid writ of possession or having judicial authorization to do 11 so. Id. at 3. Following the removal, Plaintiff alleges that “a restrained party” installed a 12 new alarm system and changed the locks. Id. Plaintiff alleges that he subsequently 13 disabled the alarm system and restored access to the dwelling. Id. 14 Plaintiff subsequently alleges that on September 16, 2023, after contacting the 15 Vallejo Police Department regarding violations of a restraining order between Plaintiff, 16 his family, and another party, officers arrived eight hours later and detained Plaintiff, 17 placing him in a patrol car. Id. Plaintiff alleges that he was arrested for vandalism for 18 disabling the alarm system. Id. at 4. 19 B. Procedural Posture 20 Plaintiff filed the original complaint on September 12, 2025 against Doe Officer 21 Defendants, City of Vallejo and Vallejo Police Department. (ECF No. 1.) On December 22 31, 2025, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss with a hearing noticed for March 3, 2026. 23 (ECF No. 6.) Plaintiff failed to file a timely opposition or statement of non-opposition. See 24 Docket. On January 21, 2026, the Court vacated the March 3, 2026 hearing, provided 25 26 2 These facts primarily derive from the FAC (ECF No. 15), which are construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff as the non-moving party. Faulkner v. ADT Sec. Servs., 27 706 F.3d 1017, 1019 (9th Cir. 2013). However, the Court does not assume the truth of any conclusory factual allegations or legal conclusions. Paulsen v. CNF Inc., 559 F.3d 28 1061, 1071 (9th Cir. 2009). 1 Plaintiff with another opportunity to file his opposition, and ordered Plaintiff to file an 2 opposition or statement of non-opposition within 14 days. (ECF No. 7.) 3 On February 10, 2026 the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time 4 and Plaintiff was given an additional 30 days to file an opposition. (ECF No. 9.) On 5 March 9, 2026, Plaintiff filed both an opposition to the motion to dismiss and a motion to 6 amend the Complaint against Doe Defendant Officers and City of Vallejo only. (ECF 7 Nos. 10, 11.) Defendants failed to oppose Plaintiff’s motion to amend the Complaint. See 8 Docket. On April 21, 2026, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to amend the Complaint 9 and denied the motion to dismiss without prejudice. (ECF No.14.) The First Amended 10 Complaint was filed on April 22, 2026. (ECF No. 15.) 11 On May 5, 2026, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the First Amended 12 Complaint. (ECF No. 16.) Plaintiff again failed to file a timely opposition, and on May 27, 13 2026, the Court vacated the hearing noticed for June 30, 2026, and submitted the 14 motion on record for written briefing. (ECF No. 17.) On June 10, 2026, Plaintiff filed a 15 late opposition to the motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 18.) On June 18, 2026, Defendants 16 replied to Plaintiff’s opposition. (ECF No. 19.) On June 22, 2026, Plaintiff filed a motion 17 for relief requesting that his untimely opposition be considered. (ECF No. 20.) On July 6, 18 2026, Defendants filed an opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for relief. (ECF No. 21.) 19 II. LEGAL STANDARDS 20 A. Rule 8, Pro Se Pleadings, Construction, and Amendment 21 Pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed and afforded the benefit of any 22 doubt. Chambers v. Herrera, 78 F.4th 1100, 1104 (9th Cir. 2023). However, the court 23 need not accept as true conclusory allegations, unreasonable inferences, or 24 unwarranted deductions of fact. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th 25 Cir. 1981). To give fair notice of the claims and the grounds on which they rest, a plaintiff 26 must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants 27 which support the claims. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). A 28 formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action does not suffice to state a claim. 1 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 2 662, 678 (2009). To state a claim on which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must 3 allege enough facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 4 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that 5 allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 6 misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 7 B. Failure to State a Claim under Rule 12(b)(6) 8 A claim may be dismissed because of the plaintiff’s “failure to state a claim upon 9 which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A complaint fails to state a claim if 10 it either lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal 11 theory. Mollett v. Netflix, Inc., 795 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2015). When considering 12 whether a claim has been stated, the court must accept the well-pleaded factual 13 allegations as true and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the non- 14 moving party. Id. However, the court is not required to accept as true conclusory factual 15 allegations contradicted by documents referenced in the complaint, or legal conclusions 16 merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations. Paulsen v. CNF Inc., 559 17 F.3d 1061, 1071 (9th Cir. 2009). 18 III. DISCUSSION 19 Plaintiff brings claims arising under the Fourth Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 20 § 1983 against the Doe Officer Defendants for the September 13, 2023 removal and the 21 September 16, 2023 arrest, a claim arising under the Fourteenth Amendment pursuant 22 to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Doe Officer Defendants for the September 13, 2023 23 removal, and a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 under a Monell theory of liability 24 against Defendant City of Vallejo for the September 13, 2023 removal. FAC at 4-6. 25 Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Section 1983 Fourth Amendment removal 26 claim, Fourth Amendment unlawful arrest claim, and Fourteenth Amendment Due 27 Process claim on qualified immunity grounds. Def. Mot. at 3-4 (ECF No. 16). Separately, 28 Defendants also move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment removal claim for failure 1 to allege an unlawful seizure. Id. at 2-3. Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Due 2 Process claim for failure to allege a protected property interest. Id. at 4-5. Defendants 3 move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Monell claim for failure to state a claim. Id. at 5-7. Last, 4 Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s state law claims are barred. Id. at 7. 5 Before examining Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Court first turns to Plaintiff’s 6 motion for relief to file a late opposition. 7 A. Plaintiff’s Motion for Relief to File a Late Opposition 8 Plaintiff moves for relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b)(1)(B) for the 9 Court to consider his late opposition, arguing that his failure to respond to the motion to 10 dismiss was due to excusable neglect and difficulties with mail service. Pl. Mot. Relief 11 (ECF No. 20 at 3). Defendants oppose Plaintiff’s motion and argue that they would be 12 prejudiced by the Court’s allowance of a late opposition. Def. Opp. Mot. Relief (ECF No. 13 21 at 2.) Given Plaintiff’s pro se status and the potential prejudice from not considering 14 his opposition to a motion to dismiss his entire complaint, the Court grants Plaintiff’s 15 motion for relief. The Court will consider Plaintiff’s opposition in ruling on the motion to 16 dismiss the FAC. Plaintiff has now missed filing deadlines multiple times and is 17 expressly warned that any future late filings will not be accepted. 18 B. Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice 19 When reviewing a motion to dismiss, courts may consider undisputed facts 20 contained in judicially noticeable documents under Federal Rule of Evidence 201 without 21 converting the motion to one for summary judgment. United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 22 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003). This includes undisputed facts from documents attached to the 23 complaint or those on which the complaint “necessarily relies.” Marder v. Lopez, 450 24 F.3d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 2006); see Harris v. Cnty. of Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th 25 Cir. 2012) (approving judicial notice of documents from judicial proceedings); King v. 26 California Dep't of Water Res., 561 F. Supp. 3d 906, 910 (E.D. Cal. 2021) (taking judicial 27 notice of administrative agency records, including decisional documents); Gamboa v. Tr. 28 Corps., 2009 WL 656285, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2009) (taking judicial notice of 1 recorded documents related to a foreclosure sale, including grant deed and deed of 2 trust, as they were “part of the public record and [] easily verifiable”). 3 Defendants request judicial notice of a Writ of Possession and Return on Writ of 4 Possession issued by Solano County. Def. Req. Judicial Notice at 2 (ECF No. 16-1). The 5 Court concludes this is a public government record properly subject to judicial notice, 6 and grants Defendants’ request. See Santa Monica Food Not Bombs v. City of Santa 7 Monica, 450 F. 3d 1022, 1025 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006). 8 C. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 9 1. Qualified Immunity 10 Defendants City of Vallejo and Doe Officer Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s 11 Section 1983 Fourth Amendment removal and wrongful arrest claims and Fourteenth 12 Amendment Due Process claims against the Doe Officer Defendants because they are 13 entitled to qualified immunity. Def Mot. at 3. Plaintiff counters that qualified immunity is 14 not appropriate because the FAC plausibly alleges a violation of constitutional rights, 15 and that further discovery is needed to determine whether the qualified immunity 16 defense is appropriate. Pl. Opp. at 4 (ECF No. 18.) “The doctrine of qualified immunity 17 protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct 18 does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 19 reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) 20 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). The Court declines to resolve 21 the issue of qualified immunity at this pleading stage in the absence of a more 22 developed factual record. See Gomez v. City of Los Angeles, 2023 WL 3431279, at *3 23 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2023) (quoting Sabra v. Maricopa County Community College Dist., 24 44 F. 4th 867, 892 (9th Cir. 2022) (overruled on other grounds by Arizona Alliance for 25 Retired Americans v. Mayes, 2026 WL 2277101 (9th Cir. Aug. 7, 2026)). 26 2. Section 1983 Fourth Amendment Removal Claim against the Doe 27 28 1 Officer Defendants3 2 Defendants argue Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment removal claim should be 3 dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to allege facts 4 to suggest Plaintiff had a property right in his dwelling, that a valid writ of possession 5 existed, and that he failed to allege the Doe Officer Defendants’ actions were more than 6 “mere acquiescence” to establish state action. Def. Mot. at 2-3 (quoting Howerton v. 7 Gabica, 708 F. 2d 380, 383-84 (9th Cir. 1983)). Plaintiff counters that he has sufficiently 8 pled a Fourth Amendment claim alleging wrongful removal. Pl. Opp. at 3. 9 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, 10 privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” 11 Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (internal quotation marks 12 omitted). “Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights but merely provides a 13 method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 14 266, 271 (1994) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). To state a cognizable 15 Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right protected by the 16 Constitution and laws of the United States, and that the alleged deprivation was 17 committed by a person who acted under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also 18 Florer v. Congregation Pidyon Shevuyim, N.A., 639 F.3d 916, 921 (9th Cir. 2011). 19 “The Fourth Amendment, which applies to the states through the Fourteenth 20 Amendment, protects against unreasonable searches and seizures by law enforcement 21 officers.” Holt v. Forsyth, 2025 WL 2654134, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2025) (citing 22 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961)). “A ‘seizure’ of property occurs when there is 23 some meaningful interference with the individual’s possessory interests in that property.” 24 U.S. v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (quotation omitted). 25 Defendants argue that a Fourth Amendment deprivation did not occur on 26 27 3 Defendants do not move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment wrongful arrest claim against Doe Officer Defendants for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). 28 See Defs. Mot. 1 September 13, 2023 because a valid writ of possession had existed prior to Plaintiff’s 2 removal from his house. Def. Mot. at 2. Defendants also argue the Officer Doe 3 Defendants did not assist in effectuating a repossession of Plaintiff’s dwelling and 4 instead merely acquiesced. Def. Mot. at 2-3 (citing Harris, 664 F. 2d at 1127). 5 “Under California law, entry of judgment and a writ of possession following 6 unlawful detainer proceedings extinguishes all other legal and equitable possessory 7 interests in the real property at issue.” In re Perl, 811 F. 3d 1120, 1127-28 (9th Cir. 2016) 8 (citing Vella v. Hudgins, 20 Cal. F.3d 251 (1977)). “No occupant of the premises retains 9 any kind of possessory interest following service of the writ of possession.” Id. (citing 10 Cal. Civ. Code P. § 715.020(d)). Plaintiff does not contest the validity of the March 2023 11 writ of possession but instead argues that this action challenges the later police 12 intervention occurring in September 2023, which he argues is invalid because no 13 subsequent unlawful detainer action was filed, nor was a subsequent writ of possession 14 issued. Pl. Opp. at 4. Further, Plaintiff alleges he has a possessory interest in the 15 dwelling due to his reoccupation of the dwelling in April 2023. Pl. Opp. at 5. Plaintiff has 16 failed to allege that he was granted permission to reoccupy the dwelling after the valid 17 March 2023 writ of possession. Thus, Plaintiff has not alleged a possessory interest in 18 the dwelling. See Dix v. Edelman Financial Services, LLC, 978 F. 3d 507, 514 (7th Cir. 19 2020) (“The existence of a landlord-tenant relationship is a legal conclusion that we can 20 reject at the motion to dismiss stage.”). Therefore, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has 21 failed to allege a possessory interest to establish a Fourth Amendment violation and 22 recommends dismissing his Section 1983 Fourth Amendment removal claim. 23 3. Section 1983 Fourteenth Amendment Claim against the Doe Officer 24 Defendants 25 Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Section 1983 due process claim against 26 the Doe Officer Defendants for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil 27 Procedure 12(b)(6) because Plaintiff failed to allege a property interest in his residence 28 or a lack of process. Def. Mot. at 4-5. Conversely, Plaintiff alleges that he alleges a 1 possessory interest in his dwelling because he has alleged a reoccupation of the 2 property, payment of utilities in his name, and the presence of other possessions in the 3 property. Pl. Opp. at 5. 4 To state a procedural due process claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a plaintiff must 5 allege: (1) a deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest, and 6 (2) a denial of adequate procedural protections. Kildare v. Saenz, 325 F.3d 1078, 1085 7 (9th Cir. 2003); see Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1972). Liberty or 8 property interests may arise from the United States Constitution or from state law. See 9 Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-27 (1976); Shanks v. Dressel, 540 F.3d 1082, 10 1091 (9th Cir. 2008) (a governing state statute that compels a result upon compliance 11 with certain criteria, none of which involve the exercise of discretion by the reviewing 12 body, creates a constitutionally protected property interest). Where a constitutionally 13 protected liberty or property interest is at stake, determination of what process is due is a 14 fact-specific inquiry. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 15 As stated above, despite Plaintiff alleging he has a “protected possessory interest 16 in the dwelling,” the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to allege a protected 17 property interest by failing to plead how he was permitted re-entry of this dwelling or a 18 landlord-tenant relationship for this dwelling following the March 2023 issuance of the 19 writ of possession. FAC at 10; see also, Shapiro v. Willowbrook Home LLC, 2014 WL 20 3706703, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Jun. 23, 2014) (finding a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 21 claim failed where a plaintiff failed to allege the existence of a conventional relationship 22 between a landlord and tenant). Therefore, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed 23 to state a deprivation of a constitutionally protected property interest required to state a 24 procedural due process claim under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The Court recommends 25 dismissing Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment Section 1983 claim concerning the 26 September 13, 2023 removal. 27 4. Section 1983 Monell Claim against Defendant City of Vallejo 28 Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Monell claim against Defendant City of 1 Vallejo under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failing to allege factual 2 allegations that Plaintiff’s unlawful removal was carried out pursuant to a policy or 3 custom, that there was a link between the policy or custom of Plaintiff’s deprivation of 4 property, and how a failure to train officers resulted in a constitutional violation. Def. Mot. 5 at 6. In contrast, Plaintiff alleges that he satisfactorily pled a Monell claim. Pl. Opp. at 5. 6 “In order to establish municipal liability [under Monell], a plaintiff must show that a 7 ‘policy or custom’ led to the plaintiff’s injury.” Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 8 1060, 1073 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (quoting Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of 9 New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). To state a Monell claim, a plaintiff must allege that 10 (1) he was deprived of a constitutional right; (2) the municipality has a policy; (3) the 11 policy amounts to deliberate indifference to plaintiff's constitutional rights; and (4) the 12 policy is the moving force behind the constitutional violation. See Anderson v. Warner, 13 451 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th 14 Cir. 1994)). The complaint must identify the particular policy that the plaintiff alleges 15 caused his constitutional injury. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 681 (9th 16 Cir. 2002); see also Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (under § 1983, local 17 governments are responsible only for “their own illegal acts,” and therefore to impose 18 liability on a local government, plaintiffs must prove that an “action pursuant to official 19 municipal policy” caused their injury) (citations omitted). Further, the policy at issue must 20 be the result of a decision of a person employed by the entity who has final decision or 21 policymaking authority. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. There must be a direct causal link 22 between the policy or custom and the injury, and a plaintiff must be able to demonstrate 23 that his injury resulted from a permanent and well-settled practice. Anderson, 451 F.3d 24 at 1070. 25 “A municipality’s culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous where 26 a claim turns on a failure to train.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011) (citation 27 omitted). To allege a failure to train, Plaintiff must allege facts to support a reasonable 28 inference of “(1) a constitutional violation; (2) a municipal training policy that amounts to 1 deliberate indifference to constitutional rights; and (3) that the constitutional injury would 2 not have resulted if the municipality properly trained their employees.” Benavidez v. 3 County of San Diego, 993 F. 3d 1134, 1153-1154 (9th Cir. 2020). 4 Here, Plaintiff alleges in support of his Monell claim that the policy at issue is 5 “inadequate training and supervision of officers regarding the limits of police authority in 6 civil landlord-tenant disputes.” FAC at 5. Defendants argue that the Monell claim fails 7 due to Plaintiff’s failure to allege a specific policy or custom outside of a conclusory 8 statement devoid of facts, a link between the alleged policy and Plaintiff’s constitutional 9 violation, and how the failure to train resulted in constitutional injury. Def. Mot. at 6-7. As 10 a preliminary matter, Plaintiff’s Monell claim arising out of Plaintiff’s September 13, 2023 11 removal fails due to Plaintiff’s inability to allege a constitutional injury. The Court also 12 agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff’s allegations regarding a policy are conclusory and 13 fails to convey deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Iqbal, 556 14 U.S. at 678 (“Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of 15 further factual enhancement.”) (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). 16 Thus, the Court recommends dismissing Plaintiff’s Monell claim. 17 D. Plaintiff’s State Law Claims 18 Defendants move to dismiss state law claims of negligence and intentional 19 infliction of emotional distress pursuant to California Government Code § 945.4 for 20 failure to comply with procedural requirements under the Act, such as submitting a claim 21 to the public entity before initiating the lawsuit. Def. Mot. at 7 (citing Phillips v. Desert 22 Hosp. Dist. 49 Cal. 3d 699, 708 (1989)). Plaintiff responds by arguing that his primary 23 claims arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and does not oppose the dismissal of any state-law 24 claims without prejudice. Pl. Opp. at 6. Upon review of the FAC, the Court finds that 25 Plaintiff only raises causes of action arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and does not 26 appear to allege violations of state tort law. Therefore, the Court denies Defendants’ 27 motion to dismiss as unnecessary. 28 E. Plaintiff’s Options 1 Plaintiff may proceed forthwith to serve Doe Officer Defendants and pursue his 2 Fourth Amendment wrongful arrest claim under Section 1983. Or, Plaintiff may delay 3 serving any Defendant and attempt again to state cognizable claims against Defendant 4 City of Vallejo. If Plaintiff elects to proceed forthwith against Doe Officer Defendants as 5 to his Fourth Amendment wrongful arrest claim under Section 1983, then within thirty 6 (30) days of the District Court’s order, Plaintiff must so elect on the appended form. In 7 this event, the Court will construe Plaintiff’s election as consent to the dismissal of his 8 Fourth Amendment removal claim under Section 1983 against Doe Officer Defendants, 9 Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim under Section 1983 against Doe Officer 10 Defendants, and Monell claim against Defendant City of Vallejo. Under this option, 11 Plaintiff does not need to file a Second Amended Complaint. 12 Or, Plaintiff may delay serving any Defendant and attempt again to cure the 13 deficiencies identified above. If Plaintiff elects to attempt to amend his FAC to cure the 14 deficiencies identified above, he has thirty days to do so. 15 If Plaintiff elects to file an amended complaint, this new pleading shall allege facts 16 establishing the existence of federal jurisdiction and must contain a short and plain 17 statement of Plaintiff's claims. The allegations of the complaint must be set forth in 18 sequentially numbered paragraphs, with each paragraph number being one greater than 19 the one before, each paragraph having its own number, and no paragraph number being 20 repeated anywhere in the complaint. Each paragraph should be limited “to a single set of 21 circumstances” where possible. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). Forms are available to help 22 plaintiffs organize their complaint in the proper way. They are available at the Clerk's 23 Office, 501 I Street, 4th Floor (Rm. 4-200), Sacramento, CA 95814, or online at 24 www.uscourts.gov/forms/pro-se-forms. 25 The amended complaint must not require the court and the defendants to guess 26 at what is being alleged against whom. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th 27 Cir. 1996) (affirming dismissal of a complaint where the district court was “literally 28 guessing as to what facts support the legal claims being asserted against certain 1 defendants”). The amended complaint must not require the court to spend its time 2 “preparing the ‘short and plain statement’ which Rule 8 obligated plaintiffs to submit.” Id. 3 at 1180. The amended complaint must not require the court and defendants to prepare 4 lengthy outlines “to determine who is being sued for what.” Id. at 1179. 5 Plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior complaint or other filing in 6 order to make the amended complaint complete. The amended complaint should be 7 titled “Second Amended Complaint.” Local Rule 220 requires that an amended complaint 8 be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, an 9 amended complaint supersedes prior complaint(s), and once the amended complaint is 10 filed and served, any previous complaint no longer serves any function in the case. 11 Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 927 (9th Cir. 2012). 12 IV. CONCLUSION 13 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for relief to file a late opposition 14 (ECF No. 20). 15 Further, based upon the findings above, it is RECOMMENDED: 16 1. Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment removal claim under Section 1983 against 17 Doe Officer Defendants, Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim under 18 Section 1983 against Doe Officer Defendants, and Monell claim against 19 Defendant City of Vallejo be DISMISSED with leave to amend; 20 2. Plaintiff may proceed on his Fourth Amendment wrongful arrest claim 21 under Section 1983 against Doe Officer Defendants. If Plaintiff chooses to 22 proceed solely as to this claim, Plaintiff shall so indicate on the attached 23 form and return it to the Court within thirty days from the date of the district 24 court’s order ruling on these findings and recommendations. In that event, 25 the Court will construe Plaintiff’s election to proceed forthwith as consent to 26 an order dismissing the defective claims without prejudice; 27 3. Plaintiff shall have 30 days from the date of any order by the district judge 28 ruling on these findings and recommendations to file an amended 1 complaint that complies with the instructions provided. If Plaintiff fails to 2 timely comply with this order, the undersigned may recommend that this 3 action be dismissed. Plaintiff is instructed not to file any amended 4 complaint until the district judge rules on these findings and 5 recommendations. 6 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District 7 || Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within 8 || 14 days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file 9 | written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. This document should 10 | be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any 11 || reply to the objections shall be served on all parties and filed with the Court within 14 12 || days after service of the objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time 13 || may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 14 | 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991). 15 16 | Dated: September 14, 2026 C i s 7 CHI SOO KIM 18 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 19 || 7, suna.2624.25.mtd 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 14 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ARVINDER PAL SINGH SUNAK, No. 2:25-cv-02624-TLN-CSK (PS) 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. NOTICE OF ELECTION 14 CITY OF VALLEJO, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 Plaintiff elects to proceed as follows: 19 ______ Plaintiff opts to proceed with his Section 1983 wrongful arrest claim 20 against Doe Officer Defendants. Under this option, Plaintiff consents to dismiss his Fourth Amendment removal claim against the Doe 21 Officer Defendants, Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim against the Doe Officer Defendants, and Monell claim against 22 Defendant City of Vallejo without prejudice. OR 23 _____ Plaintiff opts to file a second amended complaint and delay service 24 of process. 25 26 DATED: ________ 27 _______________________________ Plaintiff 28