Wood v. Wood

1 2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 3 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 4 ANDREA WOOD, Case No. 3:25-cv-00427-ART-CLB 5 Plaintiff, v. ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS 6 JANSEN WOOD, et al., (ECF No. 29) 7 Defendants. 8 9 Pro se Plaintiff Andrea Wood sues her siblings Jansen Wood and Melissa 10 Wood over the management of their father’s estate, bringing claims sounding in 11 conversion, fraudulent misrepresentation, and other causes of action. (ECF No. 12 7.) Defendants filed a motion to dismiss claiming, among other things, that the 13 Court lacks personal jurisdiction. (ECF No. 29.) Plaintiff has since submitted 14 several filings in response to the motion to dismiss (ECF Nos. 32, 37, 39), 15 including two motions to strike (ECF No. 32, 37). The Court now denies Plaintiff’s 16 motions to strike (ECF No. 32, 37) and grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss. 17 (ECF No. 29.) 18 I. DISCUSSION 19 A. Plaintiff’s motion to strike Defendant’s motion to dismiss is 20 denied. (ECF No. 38.) 21 Under Rule 12(f), “[t]he court may strike from a pleading an insufficient 22 defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. 23 R.Civ. P. 12(f). “The function of a 12(f) motion to strike is to avoid the expenditure 24 of time and money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing 25 with those issues prior to trial....” Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 26 (9th Cir.1993) (quotation marks, citation, and first alteration omitted), rev'd on 27 other grounds by Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994). 28 1 The Court denies Plaintiff’s motions to strike. (ECF No. 32, 37.) Construing 2 Plaintiff’s pro se motion liberally, she alleges in essence that Defendants’ motion 3 to dismiss is “immaterial” and constitutes an “insufficient defense.” See Hall v. 4 Turner, 924 F.2d 1062 n.1 (9th Cir. 1991). The motion to dismiss asserts lack of 5 personal jurisdiction, lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker- 6 Feldman doctrine, failure to state a claim, and res judicata. (ECF No. 29.) In 7 response to the Defendants’ claim that this case should be dismissed under the 8 Rooker-Feldman doctrine and res judicata, Plaintiff argues that this case’s issues 9 are distinct because it involves the inheritance of assets, whereas other cases 10 involved matters such as charitable assets established by the estate and the 11 income of management fees paid to the co-trustees. (ECF No. 32.) In response to 12 Defendants’ jurisdictional arguments, she asserts that federal courts have 13 jurisdiction to hear claims for damages from heirs. (Id.) First, Plaintiff’s 14 arguments do not show that the motion to dismiss is immaterial or insufficient. 15 At best, they may show a dispute on the merits as to certain bases for dismissal, 16 but not that Defendants’ motion is so flimsy that it should be stricken rather than 17 adjudicated. Second, her motions do not address Defendants’ arguments about 18 personal jurisdiction or failure to state a claim. Defendants’ motion to dismiss is 19 far from “spurious.” Fantasy, 984 F.2d at 1527. It should be evaluated on the 20 merits, and in fact, on the merits it succeeds. See infra, Section I.B. 21 B. Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted. (ECF No. 23.) 22 Although the defendant is the moving party on a motion to dismiss, the 23 plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that jurisdiction exists. See KVOS, Inc. 24 v. Assoc. Press, 299 U.S. 269, 278 (1936). The plaintiff need only make a prima 25 facie showing of jurisdiction to avoid the defendant's motion to dismiss. Omeluk 26 v. Langsten Slip & Batbyggeri A/S, 52 F.3d 267, 268 (9th Cir.1995); Data Disc, 27 Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assocs., 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir.1977). In determining 28 1 whether Plaintiff has met this burden, uncontroverted allegations in Plaintiff’s 2 complaint must be taken as true, and conflicts between the facts contained in 3 the parties' affidavits must be resolved in the plaintiff’s favor. AT & T v. Compagnie 4 Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 588 (9th Cir.1996). 5 Personal jurisdiction must comport with the state long-arm statute, and 6 with the requirements of due process. Omeluk, 52 F.3d at 269. Because Nevada's 7 long-arm statute permits the exercise of jurisdiction to the same extent as the 8 Constitution, it is sufficient to show that the exercise of personal jurisdiction 9 would comply with due process. NRS 14.065; see id. 10 Courts have general jurisdiction over individuals where they live. See 11 Vontress v. Nevada, No. 218CV01746RFBPAL, 2019 WL 2503948, at *1 (D. Nev. 12 June 17, 2019) (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462–64 (1940)). Specific 13 jurisdiction “exists when there are sufficient minimal contacts with the forum 14 such that the assertion of personal jurisdiction ‘does not offend traditional 15 notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Waterfall Homeowners Ass'n v. 16 Viega, Inc., 283 F.R.D. 571, 576 (D. Nev. 2012) (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of 17 Wash., Office of Unemployment Comp. & Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). In 18 the Ninth Circuit, a three-part test dictates whether specific jurisdiction can be 19 exercised over the defendant: (1) Defendants must have performed some act or 20 consummated some transaction with the forum by which they purposefully 21 availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in Nevada; (2) Plaintiff’s 22 claims must arise out of or result from Defendants’ forum-related activities; and 23 (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable. Burger King Corp. v. 24 Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985); Haisten v. Grass Valley Med. 25 Reimbursement Fund, 784 F.2d 1392, 1397 (9th Cir.1986). 26 In the absence of general or specific jurisdiction, courts may also exercise 27 personal jurisdiction over defendants who have given “express or implied consent 28 1 to the personal jurisdiction of the court,” Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des 2 Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703 (1982). These arrangements often take the 3 form of a contractual forum-selection clause or a stipulation. Burger King Corp. 4 v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473 (1985). 5 This Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendants. General jurisdiction 6 does not lie because Defendants reside in Florida. (ECF No. 1.) There is no dispute 7 on that point. As for specific jurisdiction, Plaintiff has not met her burden to show 8 that the complaint relates to Defendants’ purposeful contacts with the state of 9 Nevada. The acts giving rise to the complaint relate to the alleged theft of money 10 from a “Florida trust.” (ECF No. 1). There has been no allegation that Defendants 11 have performed acts within Nevada that gave rise to the claim. (Id.) Plaintiff 12 asserts that the court can take jurisdiction over the Defendants under the “federal 13 probate exception” of Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293 (2006). (ECF No. 15, 18, 14 57.) That case deals not with personal jurisdiction, but with a carve-out to an 15 exception to bankruptcy jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334. In her pleadings on 16 jurisdiction, Plaintiff has not alleged that the supposed wrongs arise out of or 17 result from Defendants’ purposeful Nevada-related activities, or indeed that 18 Defendants have purposefully availed themselves of the privileges of conducting 19 business in Nevada. 20 Defendants have not consented to the exercise of personal jurisdiction in this 21 case. In one of Plaintiff’s filings, she argues that Defendants have consented to 22 jurisdiction. It appears that her argument is based on Defendants having filed in 23 another case between the same parties, Wood v. Wood, No. 3:25-CV-00180-ART- 24 CSD. A defendant does not consent to personal jurisdiction in Nevada merely by 25 filing in court in Nevada, and nothing shows that Defendants have otherwise 26 entered into an agreement to litigate in Nevada. See, e.g. Siren Gaming, LLC v. 27 Arviso, 153 F. App'x 420, 421 (9th Cir. 2005); Pfister v. Selling Source, LLC, 931 28 1 || F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1116 (D. Nev. 2013). 2 As this case is dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, dismissal is without 3 || prejudice. Fiorani v. Berenzweig, 441 F. App'x 540, 541 (9th Cir. 2011) 4 || (“dismissals for failure to effect service and for lack of personal jurisdiction must 5 || be without prejudice”). 6 II. CONCLUSION 7 It is therefore ordered that Defendant’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 29) is 8 || GRANTED. Plaintiffs claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Clerk 9 || of the Court is instructed to ENTER JUDGMENT accordingly and to CLOSE this 10 || case. 11 It is further ORDERED that Plaintiffs motions to strike Defendants’ motion 12 || to dismiss (ECF No. 32, 37) are denied. 13 It is further ORDERED that all other motions by Plaintiff or by Defendants 14 || are denied as moot. (ECF No. 25, 27, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 48, 50, 51, 53, 57, 15 || 64, 65, 66, 67, 70, 72) 16 DATED: April 14, 2026 17 18 Aras jlosed Wen 19 ANNER TRAUM 20 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28