Winter Abrams v. Frank Bisignano

Docket 5:25-cv-02016

Filed
2025-08-04
Terminated
Not recorded
Case type
cv

Outcome

magistrate appeal affirmed

FJC civil IDB DISTRICT=73 OFFICE=5 DOCKET=2502016 FILEDATE=08/04/2025 DISP=19, PROCPROG=10, JUDGMENT=0; codebook: https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/idb/codebooks/Civil%20Codebook%201988%20Forward%2010252023.pdf

Outcome source

Parties and representation

      Party and firm records are not available for this case.

      Panel

        No sourced panel votes are recorded.

        Opinions and documents

        1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 11 WINTER A., No. 5:25-cv-02016-AYP 12 Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM OPINION AND 13 v. ORDER 14 FRANK BISIGNANO, 15 Commissioner of Social Security, 16 Defendant. 17 18 Plaintiff Winter A.1 seeks review of the Commissioner’s decision finding 19 that her disability ended and that she was no longer entitled to supplemental 20 security income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. (Dkt. No. 1.) The 21 parties consented to proceed before the magistrate judge and thereafter filed 22 briefs addressing the disputed issues. (Dkt. Nos. 6, 7, 12, 13, 15.) The Court 23 took the matter under submission without oral argument. For the reasons 24 discussed below, the Court finds that the Commissioner’s decision should be 25 26 1 Plaintiff’s name is partially redacted in accordance with Federal Rule of 27 Civil Procedure 5.2(c)(2)(B) and the recommendation of the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the Judicial Conference of the 28 United States. 1 affirmed. 2 I. BACKGROUND 3 On September 12, 2014, an application for supplemental security income 4 was filed on Plaintiff’s behalf. (Administrative Record (“AR”) 138.) In a May 8, 5 2015 determination, the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) found Plaintiff 6 disabled as of the application date because her asthma met childhood medical 7 listing 103.03B.2 (AR 111-18.) 8 In 2018, the SSA initiated a continuing disability review and determined 9 that Plaintiff, then age twelve, was no longer disabled as of May 1, 2018. (AR 10 120-30.) That determination was upheld on reconsideration, after which 11 Plaintiff requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). (AR 12 132-33, 206-08.) The ALJ held a hearing on February 1, 2022, and thereafter 13 issued a decision on March 30, 2022, finding that Plaintiff was no longer 14 disabled. (AR 65-92, 135-57.) The Appeals Council subsequently remanded the 15 matter for further proceedings to address the opinion evidence and the 16 standards applicable after Plaintiff attained age eighteen. (AR 160-61.) 17 Plaintiff appeared with counsel at a second hearing on June 4, 2024, at which a 18 vocational expert (“VE”) also testified. (AR 43-64.) On June 28, 2024, the ALJ 19 issued the decision now under review. (AR 11-42.) 20 Because Plaintiff turned eighteen before the ALJ issued the June 28, 2024 21 decision, the ALJ was required to evaluate her claim under both the childhood 22 and adult standards. For the period before Plaintiff turned eighteen, the ALJ 23 applied the three-step evaluation process governing childhood continuing 24 25 26 2 At the time of that decision, Listing 103.03B generally required asthma 27 attacks of qualifying frequency and severity despite prescribed treatment. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt.P, app. 1 § 103.03B (2015). 28 1 disability reviews. (AR 19-28.) In doing so, the ALJ compared Plaintiff’s 2 current condition to the May 8, 2015 comparison point decision (“CPD”), the 3 most recent favorable determination finding Plaintiff disabled. (AR 19-20.) The 4 ALJ found that medical improvement had occurred as of May 1, 2018, and that 5 Plaintiff continued to have severe impairments of asthma and eczema. (AR 20.) 6 The ALJ further found that those impairments no longer met or medically 7 equaled childhood Listing 103.03B and did not otherwise meet, medically equal, 8 or functionally equal a listed impairment. (AR 19-28.) 9 For the period after Plaintiff turned eighteen, the ALJ applied the five- 10 step evaluation process applicable to adult disability claims.4 (AR 28-31.) The 11 ALJ found that Plaintiff continued to have severe impairments of asthma and 12 eczema, but determined that, despite those impairments, she retained the 13 residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform work at all exertional levels, 14 except that she must avoid all pulmonary irritants and skin allergens. (AR 28.) 15 Based on the VE’s testimony, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had no past relevant 16 work but could perform jobs existing in significant numbers in the national 17 economy, such as dining room attendant, warehouse worker, and ticket taker. 18 (AR 31-32.) The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled under the adult 19 20 3 The ALJ determines continuing disability for a child using a three-step evaluation process, which examines whether (1) there has been medical 21 improvement in the impairment(s) present at the comparison point decision, 22 (2) the impairment(s) still meet, medically equal, or functionally equal the listing that supported the prior finding of disability, and (3) the claimant 23 remains disabled under the current childhood standards, including whether the impairment(s) meet, medically equal, or functionally equal a listed 24 impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 416.994a(b). 25 4 The ALJ determines disability using a five-step sequential evaluation 26 process, which examines whether (1) the claimant engaged in substantial gainful activity, (2) the claimant has one or more severe impairments, (3) the 27 impairment(s) meet or equal a listed impairment, (4) the claimant is able to do past relevant work, and (5) the claimant is able to do any other work. 20 28 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4). 1 disability standards. (AR 32.) 2 On August 19, 2024, Plaintiff filed a request with the Appeals Council for 3 review of the ALJ’s decision. (AR 488.) The Appeals Council subsequently 4 denied Plaintiff’s request for review. (AR 1-6.) 5 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 6 Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court reviews the Commissioner’s decision 7 to determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence and whether the 8 proper legal standards were applied. Moncada v. Chater, 60 F.3d 521, 523 (9th 9 Cir. 1995). “Substantial evidence” is “more than a mere scintilla,” and means 10 only “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 11 support a conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103 (2019) (citations 12 omitted). In determining whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s 13 findings, the Court must review the administrative record as a whole, weighing 14 both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the ALJ’s 15 conclusion. Ahearn v. Saul, 988 F.3d 1111, 1115-16 (9th Cir. 2021). When the 16 evidence can rationally be interpreted in more than one way, the Court must 17 uphold the Commissioner’s decision. Id.; Attmore v. Colvin, 827 F.3d 872, 875 18 (9th Cir. 2016). 19 III. DISCUSSION 20 Plaintiff raises a single claim, specifically that the ALJ failed to provide 21 legally sufficient reasons for discounting her subjective symptom testimony 22 concerning the frequency and severity of her asthma. (Dkt. No. 12 at 4-7.) 23 When a claimant produces objective medical evidence of an underlying 24 impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the alleged symptoms, 25 and there is no affirmative evidence of malingering, an ALJ may reject the 26 claimant’s testimony regarding the severity of those symptoms only by 27 providing specific, clear and convincing reasons supported by substantial 28 1 evidence. Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th 2 Cir. 2014). General findings are insufficient; rather, the ALJ must specifically 3 identify the testimony being discounted and explain what evidence undermines 4 it. See Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 493-94 (9th Cir. 2015). Although 5 an ALJ need not discuss every piece of evidence or draft a “line-by-line exegesis” 6 of the record, the Court must be able to follow the ALJ’s reasoning and 7 determine that the claimant’s testimony was not arbitrarily discredited. 8 Lambert v. Saul, 980 F.3d 1266, 1277 (9th Cir. 2020); Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 9 F.4th 489, 499 (9th Cir. 2022) (clear and convincing standard requires ALJ to 10 “show his work”). 11 Here, Plaintiff alleged that she was unable to work due to asthma. (AR 12 47, 50-51, 54.) She testified that she suffered severe episodes approximately 13 two to four times per month, and that they could happen unpredictably even 14 when she was otherwise having a “good day.” (AR 51-52, 54-55.) She further 15 stated that flare-ups could be triggered by cold weather, scents, and other 16 irritants and would cause symptoms including sneezing, wheezing, shortness of 17 breath, and trembling. (AR 50-51, 57.) Plaintiff also stated that her asthma 18 exacerbations could require prolonged breathing treatments, emergency-room 19 visits, or overnight hospitalizations, and that she often would feel tired the next 20 morning after an episode. (AR 50, 54-55). According to Plaintiff, she continued 21 to experience symptoms despite taking daily medication and treatments. (AR 22 54-55). 23 In the decision, the ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s subjective symptom 24 allegations based on the objective medical evidence and the treatment evidence. 25 26 5 The Court need not decide the standard governing an ALJ’s evaluation of subjective symptom allegations for the period before Plaintiff turned eighteen. 27 Even assuming the clear-and-convincing standard cited by Plaintiff applies, Plaintiff’s challenge fails for the reasons discussed below. 28 1 (AR 20-31.) As discussed below, the ALJ’s stated rationales were specific, clear, 2 and convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence. See Treichler, 775 3 F.3d at 1102. 4 First, the ALJ cited the objective medical findings. (AR 20-31.) Although 5 objective medical evidence cannot be the sole basis for discounting a claimant’s 6 subjective symptom allegations, it remains a relevant consideration in 7 evaluating those symptoms. See Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 16-3p, 2017 WL 8 5180304, at *5; see also Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005). 9 Here, the record repeatedly reflected normal oxygen saturation, normal or only 10 mildly elevated respiratory rates, nonlabored respirations, and no acute 11 distress, including during treatment for exacerbations. (AR 1152, 1165, 1270, 12 1296-97, 1300, 1302, 1428, 1439, 1442, 1447, 1462, 1596-97, 1604-06, 1651.) 13 Treatment notes also frequently described Plaintiff’s asthma as mild and 14 intermittent and otherwise documented benign pulmonary findings between 15 flare-ups. (AR 1176, 1283, 1285, 1287, 1291, 1295, 1297, 1301, 1303, 1540, 1549, 16 1558, 1680.) In addition, the state agency medical consultant, who provided the 17 only medical opinion in the record, reviewed the medical evidence, found that 18 Plaintiff’s asthma was non-severe, and assessed no functional limitations. (AR 19 124.) On this record, the ALJ reasonably concluded that the objective medical 20 evidence did not substantiate Plaintiff’s allegations of frequent and disabling 21 asthma symptoms. See Ahearn v. Saul, 988 F.3d 1111, 1115-16 (9th Cir. 2021) 22 (where evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the 23 court must uphold the ALJ’s conclusion). 24 Second, the ALJ cited Plaintiff’s treatment history. (AR 20-31.) Evidence 25 of conservative or routine treatment, improvement with treatment, and the 26 frequency or intensity of medical care may properly be considered in evaluating 27 a claimant’s subjective symptom allegations. See Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 28 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *9; see also Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1 1040 (9th Cir. 2008). Here, the record reflects intermittent treatment for 2 || asthma exacerbations, including several emergency-room visits during the 3 || relevant period, but it does not document treatment at the frequency alleged by 4 || Plaintiff. When Plaintiff sought acute care, treatment generally consisted of 5 || nebulizer treatments, inhalers, and short steroid courses, after which her 6 || symptoms improved and she was discharged home. (AR 1158, 1847, 1429, 1488, 7 || 1607-08, 1646, 1680.) Treatment notes otherwise reflect routine follow-up care 8 || and medication refills; contrary to Plaintiffs allegations, they do not show 9 || prolonged hospitalizations or escalating intervention. (AR 1293-97, 1302-038, 10 |} 1542-49, 1558.) Accordingly, the ALJ reasonably concluded that □□□□□□□□□□□ 11 || treatment history was inconsistent with her allegations of frequent and 12 || disabling asthma symptoms. 13 In sum, the ALJ provided specific, clear, and convincing reasons for 14 || discounting Plaintiffs subjective symptom allegations, and substantial evidence 15 || supports the ALJ’s evaluation of that testimony. Thus, remand is not warranted 16 || on this claim. 17 IV. ORDER 18 For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that the decision of the 19 || Commissioner is affirmed. 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. 21 22 || DATED: May 6, 2026 AK = 23 A ANNA Y. PARK UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 25 26 27 28

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