Kurihara v. Castagnetti

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF HAWAII TED K. KURIHARA, CIV. NO. 25-00320 LEK-KJM Plaintiff, vs. JUDGE JEANETTE H. CASTAGNETTI, JUDGE KEVIN T. MORIKONE, NATASHA R. SHAW, and GALE L.F. CHING, Defendants. ORDER: DISMISSING, WITH PREJUDICE, PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR VACATUR OF FINAL JUDGMENTS, COMPENSATORY AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES, AND DECLARATORY RELIEF; STRIKING THE MOTION TO DISMISS FILED ON OCTOBER 14, 2025; AND DIRECTING DEFENDANTS CHING AND SHAW TO RESPOND TO THE REMAINING PORTIONS OF THE AMENDED COMPLAINT The operative pleading in this case is pro se Plaintiff Ted K. Kurihara’s (“Plaintiff”) Amended Complaint for Vacatur of Final Judgments, Compensatory and Punitive Damages, and Declaratory Relief (“Amended Complaint”), filed on September 11, 2025. [Dkt. no. 12.] On October 1, 2025, this Court issued an Order to Show Cause Why Portions of the Amended Complaint Should Not Be Dismissed with Prejudice (“10/1 OSC”). [Dkt. no. 18.] On October 9, 2025, Plaintiff filed a document, [dkt. no. 20,] that has been liberally construed as a partial response to the 10/1 OSC (“10/9 Response”). See entering order, filed 10/15/25 (dkt. no. 22). Plaintiff filed a supplemental response to the 10/1 OSC on October 24, 2025 (“10/24 Response”). [Dkt. no. 24.] For the reasons set forth below, the following claims in the Amended Complaint are dismissed with prejudice: all of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Judge Jeanette H. Castagnetti (“Judge Castagnetti”); all of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Judge Kevin T. Morikone (“Judge Morikone”); Plaintiff’s Title 42 United States Code Section 1983 claims against Defendant Natasha Shaw (“Shaw”); and Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against Defendant Gale Ching (“Ching”). The only remaining claims are Plaintiff’s state law claims against Shaw and Plaintiff’s state law claims against Ching. Ching and Shaw are ordered to respond to the sole remaining portion of the Amended Complaint by December 8, 2025. BACKGROUND The Amended Complaint challenges actions that Judge Castagnetti, in her individual and official capacities, and Judge Morikone, in his individual and official capacities, took during litigation that Plaintiff was involved in before the State of Hawai`i Probate Court (“the state court”). See Amended Complaint at pg. 3, ¶¶ 2-3; id. at ¶¶ 16, 22-23, 26. The Amended Complaint also challenges the actions of Shaw and Ching, attorneys who represented another party in the state court proceedings. See id. at ¶¶ 4-6, 8-10.1 Judge Castagnetti, Judge Morikone, Shaw, and Ching will be referred to collectively as “Defendants.” The Amended Complaint asserts the following counts: two Section 1983 claims against Defendants alleging violations of Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process (“Counts I and III”); see id. at ¶¶ 27, 29; a Section 1983 claim against Shaw and Ching alleging fraud in the state court proceedings and conspiracy to violate Plaintiff’s rights (“Count II”); see id. at ¶ 28; and a claim against Defendants that reiterates Plaintiff’s Section 1983 procedural due process claims and that also alleges state law claims of “fraud, misappropriation, suppression of evidence, and unjust enrichment” (“Count IV”), see id. at ¶¶ 32-33. In the 10/1 OSC, this Court noted that Plaintiff previously filed another action against Judge Castagnetti, Shaw, and Ching, Kurihara v. Castagnetti et al., CV 25-00138 HG-KJM (“CV 25-138”). See 10/1 OSC at 4-5 (summarizing the relevant background of CV 25-138). In CV 25-138, Plaintiff alleged the following claims: 1) a Section 1983 claim against Judge Castagnetti asserting violations of Plaintiff’s Fourteenth 1 Plaintiff states that Shaw is also a State of Hawai`i Family Court judge. However, Plaintiff’s claims against Shaw arise from events that occurred while Shaw was acting as an attorney. See Amended Complaint at ¶ 4. Amendment right to procedural due process; [CV 25-138, Amended Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Request for Relief, filed 4/2/25 (dkt. no. 10) (“CV 25-138 Amended Complaint”), at ¶¶ 19-20;] 2) a Section 1983 claim against Judge Castagnetti asserting violations of Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection; [id. at ¶¶ 21- 22;] and 3) a Section 1983 claim against Judge Castagnetti, Ching, and Shaw alleging a conspiracy to violate Plaintiff’s civil rights, [id. at ¶¶ 23-25]. On July 8, 2025, the district court issued an order that, inter alia, granted Judge Castagnetti’s motion to dismiss, granted Ching and Shaw’s motion to dismiss, and denied Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint (“CV 25-138 7/8 Order”). [CV 25-138, dkt. no. 55.2] The district court ruled that Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Castagnetti attempted to challenge rulings in the state court proceeding and therefore were barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.3 [CV 25- 138 7/8 Order at 11-12.] In the alternative, the district court ruled that Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Castagnetti in her official capacity were barred by the Eleventh Amendment, [id. at 2 The CV 25-138 7/8 Order is also available at 2025 WL 1898389. 3 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine was developed in Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), and their progeny. 12-13,] and that Judge Castagnetti had judicial immunity from the claims in CV 25-138, [id. at 13-15]. As to Ching and Shaw, the district court ruled that Plaintiff could not sue them under Section 1983 because they were not state actors. [Id. at 19-22.] The district court also ruled that any amendment of Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Castagnetti and any amendment of Plaintiff’s claims against Ching and Shaw would be futile. [Id. at 15-16, 22-23.] The CV 25-138 Amended Complaint was therefore dismissed with prejudice. [Id. at 25.] Final judgment was entered pursuant to the CV 25-138 7/8 Order. [CV 25-138, Judgment in a Civil Case, filed 7/8/25 (dkt. no. 56).] Plaintiff did not file an appeal. In the 10/1 OSC, this Court stated its inclinations based upon the judgment in CV 25-138 and the rulings in the CV 25-138 7/8 Order. See 10/1 OSC at 8-9, 11-12. Plaintiff was cautioned that, if this Court ruled consistently with the inclinations in the 10/1 OSC, his only remaining claims would be the state law claims in Count IV against Ching and Shaw. See id. at 12. Plaintiff was ordered to show cause why this Court should not rule consistently with the inclinations in the 10/1 OSC. [Id.] Plaintiff has presented additional allegations regarding the events in the state court proceedings that form the basis of his claims in the instant case. See 10/9 Response at ¶¶ 1-4; 10/24 Response at ¶¶ 3-14. The 10/24 Response also includes legal arguments that Plaintiff presents to support his claims. See, e.g., 10/24 Response at ¶¶ 15-23. As to the issues that the 10/1 OSC directed Plaintiff to address, Plaintiff argues: -“[r]es judicata is inapplicable because prior dismissal in CV 25-00138 was procedural, not on the merits, and current claims allege fraud upon the court rendering prior judgment void”; [id. at ¶ 27 (citations omitted);] and -“[b]ecause the fraud was committed outside judicial capacity for private benefit, judicial immunity does not apply,” [id. at ¶ 10 (citations omitted)]. STANDARD This district court has stated: A federal court must screen an in forma pauperis civil action to determine whether it is “frivolous or malicious[,] . . . fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted[,] or . . . seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). And even if a Plaintiff has paid the full filing fee, a court may dismiss a complaint sua sponte provided the court “give[s] notice of its intention to dismiss and afford[s] plaintiffs an opportunity to at least submit a written memorandum in opposition . . . .” Reed v. Lieurance, 863 F.3d 1196, 1207 (9th Cir. 2017) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Seismic Reservoir 2020, Inc. v. Paulsson, 785 F.3d 330, 335 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he district court must give notice of its sua sponte intention to dismiss . . . .”); Belanus v. Clark, 796 F.3d 1021, 1029 (9th Cir. 2015) (“A frivolous action clogs the system and drains resources regardless of whether the plaintiff pays the filing fee or proceeds in forma pauperis.”). Kahoopii v. Hawai`i, CIV. NO. 25-00019 JMS-KJM, 2025 WL 238879, at *1 (D. Hawai`i Jan. 17, 2025) (alterations in Kahoopii). Thus, although Plaintiff paid the filing fee, see receipt, filed 8/5/25 (dkt. no. 6), this Court has conducted a screening review of Plaintiff’s original complaint, [filed 7/30/25 (dkt. no. 1),] and the Amended Complaint. DISCUSSION I. Preclusive Effect of CV 25-138 On July 8, 2025, a judgment was entered in CV 25-138, pursuant to an order that dismissed the CV 25-138 Amended Complaint with prejudice. [CV 25-138, order, filed 7/8/25 (dkt. no. 55) (“CV 25-138 7/8 Order”);4 id., Judgment in a Civil Case, filed 7/8/25 (dkt. no. 56) (“CV 25-138 Judgment”).] The preclusive effect of a federal-court judgment is determined by federal common law. See Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 507–508 (2001). For judgments in federal-question cases . . . federal courts participate in developing “uniform federal rule[s]” of res judicata, which this Court has ultimate authority to determine and declare. Id., at 508. The federal common law of preclusion is, of course, subject to due process limitations. See Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 797 (1996). Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 891 (2008) (some alterations in Taylor) (footnote omitted). 4 The CV 25-138 7/8 Order is also available at 2025 WL 1898389. The preclusive effect of a judgment is defined by claim preclusion and issue preclusion, which are collectively referred to as “res judicata.” Under the doctrine of claim preclusion, a final judgment forecloses “successive litigation of the very same claim, whether or not relitigation of the claim raises the same issues as the earlier suit.” New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 748 (2001). Issue preclusion, in contrast, bars “successive litigation of an issue of fact or law actually litigated and resolved in a valid court determination essential to the prior judgment,” even if the issue recurs in the context of a different claim. Id., at 748–749. By “preclud[ing] parties from contesting matters that they have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate,” these two doctrines protect against “the expense and vexation attending multiple lawsuits, conserv[e] judicial resources, and foste[r] reliance on judicial action by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions.” Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153–154 (1979). A person who was not a party to a suit generally has not had a “full and fair opportunity to litigate” the claims and issues settled in that suit. The application of claim and issue preclusion to nonparties thus runs up against the “deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court.” Richards, 517 U.S., at 798 (internal quotation marks omitted). . . . Id. at 892-93 (some alterations in Taylor) (footnote omitted). Plaintiff argues that preclusion does not apply and that “full adjudication” of his claims is required because he asserts there was fraud in the state court orders that are at issue in the instant case. See 10/24 Response at ¶ 3. Under Hawai`i law, “res judicata will not bar claims of which the plaintiff or petitioner was ignorant due to the fault or fraud of an adverse party.” See Griffin ex rel. Griffin v. Davenport, No. CAAP–10–0000242, 2012 WL 1138937, at *3 (Hawai`i Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2012) (citing Bolte v. Aits, Inc., 60 Haw. 58, 62, 587 P.2d 810, 813-14 (1978)). However, the issue before this Court is not whether the judgment in the state court proceedings has preclusive effect; the issue is whether the CV 25-138 Judgment has preclusive effect. Because Plaintiff has not identified any evidence that there was fraud by an adverse party in CV 25-138, this Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument that preclusion does not apply because of fraud. A. Judge Morikone Because Judge Morikone was not a party in CV 25-138, this Court concludes that neither claim preclusion nor issue preclusion applies between the CV 25-138 Judgment and Plaintiff’s claims in the Amended Complaint against Judge Morikone. B. Claim Preclusion “Claim preclusion requires (1) an identity of claims, (2) a final judgment on the merits, and (3) privity between parties.” Howard v. City of Coos Bay, 871 F.3d 1032, 1039 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 1. Judge Castagnetti Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Castagnetti in CV 25- 138 were dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See CV 25-138 7/8 Order at 11-12. The Eleventh Amendment immunity analysis and the judicial immunity analysis were set forth as alternative grounds for the dismissal. See id. at 12-15. A dismissal based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Wood v. County of Contra Costa, 2020 WL 1505717, at *3 n.7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2020). “[A] dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction does not ‘operate[] as an adjudication on the merits[.]” Id. (quoting Fed. Civ. P. 41(b)); see also Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 285-86 (1961) (where claim alleged in first action was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding res judicata did not bar plaintiff from realleging claim in subsequent action); see also Glaude v. Deutsche Bank, 2024 WL 664806, at *2 n.3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2024) (a dismissal without prejudice based on Rooker-Feldman would not have res judicata effect). . . . King v. Tarver, Case No. 2:24-cv-03757-DAD-CSK, 2025 WL 1167552, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2025) (some alterations in King).5 Because the dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Castagnetti in CV 25-138 was based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the CV 25-138 Judgment as to Judge Castagnetti is not 5 The magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations in King were adopted by the district judge. 2025 WL 2402763 (Aug. 19, 2025). a final judgment on the merits for purposes of claim preclusion. Because the second requirement is not satisfied, claim preclusion does not apply to Plaintiff’s current claims against Judge Castagnetti. 2. Ching and Shaw Plaintiff’s claims against Ching and Shaw in CV 25-138 were dismissed for failure to state a plausible Section 1983 claim because the CV 25-138 Amended Complaint did not assert that Ching and Shaw were state actors. See CV 25-138 7/8 Order at 20-22. “Dismissal for failure to state a claim is a judgment on the merits for purposes of claim preclusion.” Save Bull Trout v. Williams, 51 F.4th 1101, 1109 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). The CV 25-138 Judgment was a judgment on the merits as to Plaintiff’s claims against Ching and Shaw in CV 25-138, and the CV 25-138 Judgment became final when Plaintiff did not appeal. The second claim preclusion requirement is therefore satisfied as to Plaintiff’s claims against Ching and Shaw. This Court also finds that the third claim preclusion requirement is satisfied as to Plaintiff, Ching, and Shaw, all of whom were parties in CV 25-138 and are parties in the instant case. In determining whether the first claim preclusion requirement is satisfied, courts consider the following criteria: (1) whether rights or interests established in the prior judgment would be destroyed or impaired by prosecution of the second action; (2) whether substantially the same evidence is presented in the two actions; (3) whether the two suits involve infringement of the same right; and (4) whether the two suits arise out of the same transactional nucleus of facts. Harris v. Cty. of Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Liquidators of European Fed. Credit Bank, 630 F.3d 1139, 1150 (9th Cir. 2011)). These criteria are not applied “mechanistically.” Garity v. APWU Nat’l Labor Org., 828 F.3d 848, 855 (9th Cir. 2016). “The fourth criterion is the most important.” Harris, 682 F.3d at 1132. Howard, 871 F.3d at 1039. The claims in CV 25-138 also arose from the state court proceedings that are at issue in the instant case. See, e.g., CV 25-138 Amended Complaint at ¶ 9 (“Defendant Gale Ching, an attorney, represented Douglas Kurihara in the Petition for Accounting action. Defendants Shaw and Ching engaged in misconduct, including misappropriation of $88,000 in trust funds, suppression of evidence, and the filing of a malicious Petition for Accounting.”); Amended Complaint at ¶ 8 (“On April 30, 2020, Shaw and Ching filed a malicious Petition for Accounting against Plaintiff under the guise of protecting Douglas’ $400,000 inheritance . . . .”); Amended Complaint at ¶ 15 (“On March 10, 2021, Shaw and Ching proceeded to misappropriate $88,387.33 from the Trust and concealed the canceled checks . . . .”). In the instant case, Count I, Count III, and a portion of Count IV assert Section 1983 claims against Ching and Shaw based on alleged violations of Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process. See Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 27, 29, 32-33. Count II asserts a Section 1983 claim against Ching and Shaw based on alleged fraud in the state court proceeding and an alleged conspiracy to violate Plaintiff’s rights. [Id. at ¶ 28.] Count IV also asserts various state law claims against Ching and Shaw. [Id. at ¶¶ 32-33.] The CV 25-138 Amended Complaint alleged a Section 1983 procedural due process claim, but the claim was not alleged against either Ching or Shaw. See CV 25-138 Amended Complaint at pg. 4. Further, the CV 25-138 Amended Complaint did not allege any state law claims. See generally CV 25-138 Amended Complaint. Thus, the first and third Harris criteria are not satisfied as to either Plaintiff’s Section 1983 procedural due process claim against Ching and Shaw or Plaintiff’s state law claims against Ching and Shaw. Like the Amended Complaint in the instant case, the CV 25-138 Amended Complaint alleged a Section 1983 conspiracy claim against Ching and Shaw. See id. at pg. 5; see also Amended Complaint at pg. 7. Although the conspiracy claim in the CV 25-138 Amended Complaint did not expressly allege fraud, as Count II in the instant case does, the two conspiracy claims are based on the same series of alleged acts. Compare CV 25-138 Amended Complaint at ¶ 24 (“Defendants conspired to obstruct justice, conceal financial misconduct, and deny Plaintiff access to crucial evidence, including canceled trust checks.”), and id. at ¶ 25 (“The fabricated Court Minute Order dated October 12, 2024, supports the existence of a conspiracy between Defendants to deprive Plaintiff of his rights.”), with Amended Complaint at ¶ 28 (“Shaw and Ching filed a malicious Petition for Accounting, misappropriated trust funds, concealed evidence including the trust’s canceled checks, participated in and profited from the fabricated October 12, 2024 Minute Order, and filed over 50 unauthorized pleadings and petitions to secure fraudulent judgments . . . .”). Because both CV 25-138 and Count II in the instant case alleged that Ching and Shaw conspired to violate Plaintiff’s civil rights, the third Harris criterion is satisfied as to Count II in the instant case because “the two suits involve the infringement of the same right.” See Harris, 682 F.3d at 1132 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Further, because Plaintiff’s Section 1983 conspiracy claim against Ching and Shaw in CV 25-138 was dismissed with prejudice, see CV 25-138 7/8 Order at 25, allowing Plaintiff to pursue Count II in the instant case would destroy Ching’s and Shaw’s respective interests in the CV 25-138 7/8 Order’s dismissal of the Section 1983 conspiracy claim. This Court therefore finds that the first Harris criterion is satisfied as to Count II in the instant case. Finally, for the reasons described above, Plaintiff’s Section 1983 conspiracy claim against Ching and Shaw in CV 25-138 and his Section 1983 conspiracy claim against Ching and Shaw in the instant case “arise out of the same transactional nucleus of facts,” and proving both claims would have involved “substantially the same evidence.” See Harris, 682 F.3d at 1132 (quotation marks and citation omitted). All of the Harris criteria exist as to Plaintiff’s Section 1983 conspiracy claim against Ching and Shaw in the instant case. This Court therefore finds that Count II is identical to Plaintiff’s Section 1983 conspiracy claim against Ching and Shaw in CV 25-138. Because all of the claim preclusion requirements are satisfied, this Court concludes that Count II of the Amended Complaint in the instant case must be dismissed based on the preclusive effect of the CV 25-138 Judgment. Because it is absolutely clear that Plaintiff cannot cure the defect in his Section 1983 conspiracy claim against Ching and Shaw, the dismissal must be with prejudice, i.e., without leave to amend. See Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (“Unless it is absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the defect, however, a pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the complaint’s deficiencies and an opportunity to amend prior to dismissal of the action.” (citations omitted)). C. Issue Preclusion “The party asserting issue preclusion must demonstrate: (1) the issue at stake was identical in both proceedings; (2) the issue was actually litigated and decided in the prior proceedings; (3) there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue; and (4) the issue was necessary to decide the merits.” Howard, 871 F.3d at 1041 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In determining whether the first requirement is satisfied, courts consider four factors: (1) is there a substantial overlap between the evidence or argument to be advanced in the second proceeding and that advanced in the first? (2) does the new evidence or argument involve the application of the same rule of law as that involved in the prior proceeding? (3) could pretrial preparation and discovery related to the matter presented in the first action reasonably be expected to have embraced the matter sought to be presented in the second? (4) how closely related are the claims involved in the two proceedings? Id. (citations omitted). 1. Judge Castagnetti a. Procedural Due Process Claims In both CV 25-138 and the instant case, Plaintiff alleged that Judge Castagnetti violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process. Plaintiff’s procedural due process claim in CV 25-138 was dismissed based upon the Rooker- Feldman doctrine, with Eleventh Amendment immunity and judicial immunity as alternate grounds for dismissal. There is substantial overlap in the two cases as to the issues of: whether Plaintiff’s procedural due process claims are precluded under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; whether Judge Castagnetti has Eleventh Amendment immunity from Plaintiff’s procedural due process claims; and whether Judge Castagnetti has judicial immunity from Plaintiff’s procedural due process claims. The resolution of these issues in the instant case would involve the same rule of law that the district court applied in CV 25-138. Thus, the first and second factors relevant to the first Howard issue preclusion requirement are satisfied. Plaintiff’s procedural due process claims in the instant case arise from the same series of alleged events as Plaintiff’s procedural due process claims in CV 25-138. Compare CV 25-138 Amended Complaint at ¶ 7 (“Defendant Judge Jeanette Castagnetti is a probate judge of The First Circuit Court in the State of Hawaii, acting under color of state law.”), and id. at ¶ 16 (“Judge Castagnetti approved a fabricated Court Minute Order dated October 12, 2024, which falsely exonerated attorneys Shaw and Ching.”), with Amended Complaint at ¶ 23 (“On October 12, 2024, Judge Castagnetti issued a fabricated Minute Order exonerating Shaw and Ching.” (citation omitted)). Thus, the motions practice in CV 25-138 could have reasonably been expected to have embraced the issues currently before this Court because Plaintiff has essentially alleged the same procedural due process claims in the instant case that Plaintiff alleged in CV 25-138. The third and fourth factors are also satisfied. Because all of the Howard factors are satisfied, see Howard, 871 F.3d at 1041, this Court concludes that the procedural due process issues that are at stake in the instant case are identical to those that were at stake in CV 25-138. The Rooker-Feldman issues, Eleventh Amendment immunity issues, and judicial immunity were actually litigated and decided in CV 25-138, and Plaintiff and Judge Castagnetti had a full and fair opportunity to litigate these issues. Finally, the Rooker- Feldman issue was necessary to the decision on the merits of Plaintiff’s procedural due process claims against Judge Castagnetti in CV 25-138. Because all of the Howard requirements are satisfied, see Howard, 871 F.3d at 1041, this Court concludes that issue preclusion applies to the district court’s Rooker-Feldman analysis of Plaintiff’s procedural due process claims against Judge Castagnetti in CV 25-138. Therefore, for the same reasons set forth in the CV 25-138 7/8 Order, this Court concludes that Plaintiff’s procedural due process claims against Judge Castagnetti in the instant case are barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Plaintiff’s procedural due process claims against Judge Castagnetti in Counts I, II, and IV are dismissed. Because it is absolutely clear that Plaintiff cannot amend those claims to avoid the preclusive effect of the CV 25-138 7/8 Order, the dismissal must be with prejudice. b. State Law Claims Plaintiff’s state law claims against Judge Castagnetti in Count IV arise from the same series of alleged events as Plaintiff’s procedural due process claims against Judge Castagnetti. See Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 30-33. Thus, Plaintiff’s state law claims against Judge Castagnetti in Count IV also challenge actions that Judge Castagnetti took in the state court proceedings. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to state law claims. See, e.g., Mothershed v. Justs. of Sup. Ct., 410 F.3d 602, 607-08 (9th Cir. 2005), as amended on denial of reh’g, No. 03-16878, 2005 WL 1692466 (9th Cir. July 21, 2005) (holding that the district court did not err in dismissing the plaintiff’s Section 1983 and state law tort claims that challenged the results of Arizona disciplinary proceedings because such claims were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine). For the reasons set forth above regarding Plaintiff’s procedural due process claims against Judge Castagnetti, issue preclusion applies, and the district court’s Rooker-Feldman analysis in the CV 25-138 7/8 Order also applies to Plaintiff’s state law claims against Judge Castagnetti in the instant case. Plaintiff’s state law claims against Judge Castagnetti in Count IV are dismissed. Because it is absolutely clear that Plaintiff cannot amend those claims to avoid the preclusive effect of the CV 25-138 7/8 Order, the dismissal must be with prejudice. 2. Ching and Shaw a. Procedural Due Process Claims As previously stated, there was no Section 1983 procedural due process claim asserted against Ching and Shaw in CV 25-138, but Plaintiff’s Section 1983 conspiracy claim against Ching and Shaw was dismissed because they were not state actors. The issue of whether Ching and Shaw are state actors for the purposes of Plaintiff’s procedural due process claims in the instant case substantially overlaps with the issue of whether Ching and Shaw were state actors for purposes of Plaintiff’s Section 1983 conspiracy claim in CV 25-138. The resolution of the state actor issue in the instant case would involve the same rule of law that the district court applied in CV 25-138. Thus, the first and second factors relevant to the first Howard issue preclusion requirement are satisfied. Plaintiff’s Section 1983 procedural due process claims against Ching and Shaw in the instant case and Plaintiff’s Section 1983 conspiracy claim against them in CV 25-138 both arise from Ching and Shaw’s actions in the state court proceedings. Thus, the motions practice in CV 25-138 could have reasonably been expected to have embraced the issues currently before this Court because state action is a requirement for all Section 1983 claims. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . , subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured . . . .”). The third and fourth Howard factors are also satisfied. Because all of the Howard factors are satisfied, this Court concludes that the state actor issue was identical in both proceedings. The state actor issue was actually litigated and decided in CV 25-138; Plaintiff and Ching and Shaw had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue; and the state actor issue was necessary to the decision on the merits of Plaintiff’s Section 1983 conspiracy claim against Ching and Shaw in CV 25-138. Because all of the Howard requirements are satisfied, this Court concludes that issue preclusion applies to the district court’s state actor analysis of Plaintiff’s Section 1983 conspiracy claim against Ching and Shaw in CV 25-138. Therefore, for the same reasons set forth in the CV 25-138 7/8 Order, this Court concludes that Plaintiff’s procedural due process claims against Ching and Shaw in the instant case fail as a matter of law. Plaintiff’s procedural due process claims against Ching and Shaw in Counts I, II, and IV are dismissed. Because it is absolutely clear that Plaintiff cannot amend those claims to avoid the preclusive effect of the CV 25-138 7/8 Order, the dismissal must be with prejudice. b. State Law Claims The state actor issue that was necessary to the decision on the merits of Plaintiff’s Section 1983 conspiracy claim against Ching and Shaw in CV 25-138 does not overlap with the issues that will be necessary to resolve Plaintiff’s state law claims against Ching and Shaw in the instant case. This Court therefore concludes that issue preclusion does not apply to Plaintiff’s state law claims in Count IV against Ching and Shaw. Plaintiff will be permitted to proceed on that portion of Count IV. II. Persuasiveness of the Analysis in the CV 25-138 7/8 Order Although neither claim preclusion nor issue preclusion applies to CV 25-138 for purposes of Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Morikone in the instant case, the district court’s analysis of the issues presented in Judge Castagnetti’s motion to dismiss are highly relevant. The district court stated: Pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal courts are without subject-matter jurisdiction to review state court decisions, and state court litigants may only obtain federal review by filing a petition for a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. Mothershed v. Justs. of the Sup. Ct., 410 F.3d 602, 606 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486–87 (1983)). Federal District Courts are barred from exercising jurisdiction over direct appeals of state court decisions and any de facto equivalent of such an appeal. Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 777 (9th Cir. 2012). Courts pay close attention to the relief sought by the federal court plaintiff in determining whether an action is a de facto appeal. Id. at 777-78. A de facto appeal is found when the plaintiff in federal district court complains of a legal wrong allegedly committed by the state court and seeks relief from the judgment of that court. Id. at 778. Federal District Courts lack jurisdiction to review challenges to state court decisions, even if the federal lawsuit alleges that the state court’s action was unconstitutional, as those challenges may only be reviewed by the United States Supreme Court. Mothershed, 410 F.3d at 607. As-applied constitutional claims are also barred because they constitute de facto appeals of state court decisions. Scheer v. Kelly, 817 F.3d 1183, 1186 (9th Cir. 2016). [CV 25-138 7/8 Order at 11-12.] The district court concluded that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applied to Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Castagnetti because the CV 25-138 Amended Complaint effectively asked the district court to review Judge Castagnetti’s decisions in the state court proceedings. [Id. at 12.] Similarly, in the instant case, Plaintiff asks this Court to review decisions that Judge Morikone issued in the state court proceedings. See, e.g., Amended Complaint at ¶ 3 (alleging Judge Morikone “issued final judgments on July 11, 2025, including dismissal of two pending petitions without hearings seeking to expose the fabricated October 12, 2024 Minute Order on which he relied on to issue his final judgment”). This Court lacks jurisdiction to review Plaintiff’s challenge to Judge Morikone’s decisions in the state court proceedings. See CV 25- 138 7/8 Order at 11-12 (citing Mothershed, 410 F.3d at 607). Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Morikone are dismissed. Because it is absolutely clear that Plaintiff cannot amend his claims against Judge Morikone to avoid the effect of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the dismissal must be with prejudice. Because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a sufficient ground for dismissal, this Court declines to address whether Judge Morikone is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity and/or judicial immunity. III. Remaining Issues In light of the foregoing, the only remaining claims in the Amended Complaint are Plaintiff’s state law claims against Ching and Shaw in Count IV. The Amended Complaint includes a request for alternate service of the Amended Complaint on Judge Castagnetti, Judge Morikone, and Shaw. See Amended Complaint at pg. 11. This request is moot as to Judge Castagnetti and Judge Morikone because there are no remaining claims against them. In addition, the request is moot as to Shaw because Shaw and Ching have filed a motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint, [filed 10/14/25 (dkt. no. 21) (“Motion to Dismiss”),] and Shaw “is willing to waive service and seeks dismissal based on Fed. R. Civ. P. Rules 12(b)(6) and 9(b).” See Motion to Dismiss, Memorandum in Support of Motion at 1 n.1. The 10/1 OSC expressly stated that Defendants were not required to respond to the Amended Complaint unless they were directed to do so by this Court. See 10/1 OSC at 13. Because this Court did not direct Ching and Shaw to respond to the Amended Complaint, their Motion to Dismiss is stricken. Ching and Shaw are directed to file an answer to the remaining portion of the Amended Complaint, i.e. the state law claims in Count IV, by December 8, 2025. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint for Vacatur of Final Judgments, Compensatory and Punitive Damages, and Declaratory Relief, filed September 11, 2025, is DISMISSED IN PART. Specifically, the following claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE: all of Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Castagnetti; all of Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Morikone; and Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against Ching and Shaw. The only remaining claims in this case are Plaintiff’s state law claims against Ching and Shaw in Count IV of the Amended Complaint. Ching and Shaw’s motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint, filed October 14, 2025, is STRICKEN, and Ching and Shaw are ORDERED to respond to the sole remaining portion of the Amended Complaint by December 8, 2025. There are no remaining claims against either Judge Castagnetti or Judge Morikone. The Clerk’s Office is therefore DIRECTED to terminate them as parties on December 9, 2025. PagelD.455 IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED AT HONOLULU, HAWAII, November 24, 2025. SES = ep, @ hd tn ° = . = ry fe /s/ Leslie E. Kobayashi Leslie E. Kobayashi A Senior U.S. District Judge zr < Cars TED K. KURIHARA VS. JUDGE JEANETTE H. CASTAGNETTI, ET AL.; CV. 25-00320 LEK-KJM; ORDER: DISMISSING, WITH PREJUDICE, PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR VACATUR OF FINAL JUDGMENTS, COMPENSATORY AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES, AND DECLARATORY RELIEF; STRIKING THE MOTION TO DISMISS FILED ON OCTOBER 14, 2025; AND DIRECTING DEFENDANTS CHING AND SHAW TO RESPOND TO THE REMAINING PROTIONS OF THE AMENDED COMPLAINT 27