Adams v. Fisher

1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 7 AT SEATTLE 8 RYAN ADAMS, 9 Plaintiff, CASE NO. C25-1372-TMC-SKV 10 v. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 11 JENNIFER FISHER, et al., 12 Defendants. 13 14 This is a civil rights action proceeding under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff Ryan Adams is 15 currently in the custody of the Washington Department of Corrections. This matter comes before 16 the Court on Plaintiff’s second amended prisoner civil rights complaint. For the reasons discussed 17 below, this Court concludes that Plaintiff has not demonstrated he qualifies to proceed with this 18 action in forma pauperis (“IFP”), and therefore recommends that Plaintiff’s IFP application be 19 denied and that he be required to pay the $405 filing fee if he wishes to proceed with this action. 20 I. BACKGROUND 21 Plaintiff initiated this action on July 22, 2025, with the filing of his original civil rights 22 complaint. Dkt. 1. Plaintiff alleged therein that he had been denied adequate medical and/or 23 mental health care in violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment and had been subjected 1 to harmful conditions of confinement relating to an improperly functioning ventilation system at 2 the Monroe Correctional Complex (“MCC”) – Intensive Management Unit (“IMU”), in violation 3 of his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Dkt. 1, 5-2. Plaintiff identified as Defendants 4 in his original pleading a Washington State Penitentiary (“WSP”) mental health care provider and 5 four MCC employees/officials. See id. 6 Plaintiff failed to submit with his original pleading the requisite filing fee or an application 7 to proceed with this action IFP, and thus, on July 23, 2025, the Clerk’s Office sent Plaintiff a 8 letter advising him he would need to correct the filing fee deficiency, or this action would be 9 subject to dismissal. Dkt. 3. Plaintiff submitted a completed IFP application to the Court for 10 consideration on September 17, 2025, and the Court accepted the submission even though it was 11 untimely. Dkt. 5. 12 After reviewing Plaintiff’s IFP application and his complaint, this Court concluded that 13 Plaintiff had neither demonstrated he qualified to proceed with this action IFP, nor had he stated 14 a viable claim for relief. Thus, on October 9, 2025, the Court issued an Order declining to grant 15 Plaintiff leave to proceed IFP or to direct service of the complaint but granting him leave to file 16 an amended complaint correcting specified deficiencies. See Dkt. 6. 17 As to Plaintiff’s IFP application, the Court explained that Plaintiff, having had three or 18 more prior cases dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, was 19 precluded from proceeding with this action IFP absent a plausible allegation that he faced 20 imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time he filed the action. See Dkt. 6 at 4-5 21 (citing Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1055 (9th Cir. 2007); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)). The 22 Court noted that Plaintiff had not made any specific allegation of imminent danger in his 23 complaint and that the facts alleged therein lacked sufficient clarity and specificity to give rise to 1 a plausible inference of imminent danger. Id. at 5. Plaintiff was advised that he would be 2 afforded an opportunity to make the requisite showing of imminent danger in an amended 3 complaint. Id. 4 As to Plaintiff’s complaint, the Court first noted that Plaintiff’s asserted claim against a 5 WSP mental health provider appeared unrelated to the claims asserted against the remaining 6 Defendants, all of whom were employed at MCC. Dkt. 6 at 7. The Court advised that any claim 7 against the WSP employee would have to be brought in a separate action. Id. The Court also 8 noted that though Plaintiff had asserted a claim against his MCC psychiatrist in the body of his 9 complaint, he had not identified the psychiatrist as a Defendant in the appropriate sections of his 10 pleading. Id. 11 The Court went on to explain, as to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment medical and mental 12 health care claims, that the facts alleged were insufficient to satisfy the standard applicable to 13 such claims. See Dkt. 6 at 7-9. The Court further explained, with respect to Plaintiff’s 14 conditions of confinement claim relating to the MCC-IMU ventilation system, that the claim 15 arose under the Eighth Amendment not the Fourteenth Amendment, and that Plaintiff’s 16 allegations in support of the claim were vague and conclusory and wholly insufficient to state a 17 constitutional claim against the identified Defendants. Id. at 9-11. 18 Plaintiff was granted thirty days to file an amended complaint correcting the noted 19 deficiencies. Dkt. 6 at 11. Plaintiff was advised that if he failed to make an adequate showing of 20 imminent danger in any amended pleading, the Court would recommend that his IFP application 21 be denied and he be required to pay the filing fee before proceeding with this action. Id. 22 Plaintiff was further advised that if he failed to timely file an amended complaint correcting the 23 identified deficiencies, the Court would recommend this action be dismissed pursuant to 28 1 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), regardless of whether he was able to satisfy the Court that he qualified to 2 proceed IFP. Id. 3 Plaintiff failed to timely file an amended complaint, and on November 25, 2025, this 4 Court issued a Report and Recommendation recommending to United States District Judge 5 Tiffany M. Cartwright that this action be dismissed. Dkt. 7. The Court explained therein that 6 Plaintiff had not demonstrated he qualified to proceed with this action IFP, nor had he presented 7 a pleading which stated a viable claim for relief, and the action should therefore be dismissed. 8 See id. On December 1, 2025, Petitioner submitted an amended complaint to the Court for filing, 9 approximately three weeks after the deadline for filing an amended pleading had passed. Dkt. 9. 10 Judge Cartwright, upon review of Plaintiff’s submission, found good cause to excuse 11 Plaintiff’s untimely filing and, on December 17, 2025, referred the matter back to this Court for 12 screening of Plaintiff’s amended complaint. Dkt. 10. On January 7, 2026, before this Court had 13 an opportunity to screen Plaintiff’s amended complaint, he submitted another amended 14 complaint which the Court construes as a second amended complaint. Dkt. 11. Plaintiff’s 15 second amended complaint is substantially similar to his first amended complaint, with the 16 differences limited to the addition of two new Defendants, and new allegations supporting his 17 fifth ground for relief. Compare Dkt. 9 with Dkt. 11. 18 Plaintiff’s second amended complaint is much more expansive than his original 19 complaint, asserting seven causes of action against 18 named Defendants, including employees 20 at the Clallam Bay Corrections Center, MCC, WSP, and DOC headquarters. See Dkt. 11 at 6-10. 21 While Plaintiff’s second amended complaint attempts to impermissibly combine unrelated claims 22 from various facilities in a single action and, like his original complaint, lacks the clarity and 23 specificity necessary to adequately state a claim for relief against any named Defendant, the 1 Court need not address the specific deficiencies in Plaintiff’s second amended complaint because 2 Plaintiff has not demonstrated, as he must in the first instance, that he is entitled to proceed with 3 this action IFP. 4 II. DISCUSSION 5 As Plaintiff was advised in the court’s Order declining to serve his original complaint, the 6 Prison Litigation Reform Act’s “‘three-strikes’ rule prohibits a prisoner from filing an action 7 [IFP] if he has accumulated three ‘strikes’ for prior federal-court actions while incarcerated or in 8 detention, unless he is ‘under imminent danger of serious physical injury.’” Washington v. L.A. 9 Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 833 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)). “A 10 prisoner can incur a ‘strike’ for bringing an action ‘that was dismissed on the grounds that it is 11 frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.’” Id. 12 A review of Plaintiff’s litigation activities in this District and in the Eastern District of 13 Washington reveals that he has had at least three prior actions dismissed for failure to state a 14 claim upon which relief may be granted, and these dismissals therefore constitute “strikes” under 15 § 1915(g). See Adams v. Inslee, Case No. 3:24-cv-5417-TMC (W.D. Wash.); Adams v. 16 Robertson, Case No. 4:24-cv-5053-SAB (E.D. Wash.); Adams v. Jackson, Case No. 4:24-cv- 17 5041-SAB (E.D. Wash.). 18 Because Plaintiff has accumulated three strikes, he may only proceed IFP if his complaint 19 contains “a plausible allegation that [he] faced imminent danger of serious physical injury at the 20 time of filing.” Andrews, 493 F.3d at 1055 (citations and internal quotations omitted); see also 21 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). To show a danger that is “imminent,” a prisoner must plausibly allege that 22 the danger is “ongoing” and is “ready to take place” or “hanging threateningly over his head.” 23 1 Andrews, 493 F.3d at 1056. Additionally, a prisoner plaintiff must make specific or credible 2 allegations showing the threat to them is real and proximate. Id. at 1053. 3 Plaintiff appears to assert in a cover letter attached to his second amended complaint that 4 all claims alleged therein cause him harm, (see Dkt. 11 at 3), and in the body of his complaint he 5 references the harm he alleges he suffered in relation to his individual claims (see id. at 11-30). 6 Plaintiff, however, makes no specific allegation of “imminent danger” in his second amended 7 complaint. Moreover, the facts alleged therein, which as noted above lack clarity and specificity, 8 do not give rise to a plausible inference that Plaintiff faced imminent danger of serious physical 9 injury at the time he filed this action, or at the time he filed his amended and second amended 10 complaints. As Plaintiff fails to satisfy the imminent danger exception to § 1915(g), this Court 11 concludes that Plaintiff is ineligible to file this lawsuit in federal court without paying the $350 12 filing fee plus a $55.00 administrative fee (for a total of $405.00). 13 III. CONCLUSION 14 For the foregoing reasons, this Court recommends that Plaintiff’s application to proceed 15 IFP (Dkt. 5) be DENIED. This Court further recommends that Plaintiff be directed to pay the 16 filing fee within thirty (30) days of the date on which this Report and Recommendation is 17 adopted, and that this action be terminated if Plaintiff fails to do so. Finally, this Court 18 recommends that Plaintiff’s pending motions for appointment of counsel (Dkt. 12), and for court 19 intervention (Dkt. 13), be STRICKEN as moot. A proposed Order accompanies this Report and 20 Recommendation. 21 Objections to this Report and Recommendation, if any, should be filed with the Clerk and 22 served upon all parties to this suit not later than fourteen (14) days from the date on which this 23 Report and Recommendation is signed. Failure to file objections within the specified time may 1 affect your right to appeal. Objections should be noted for consideration on the District Judge’s 2 motions calendar fourteen (14) days from the date they are filed. Responses to objections may 3 be filed by the day before the noting date. If no timely objections are filed, the matter will be 4 ready for consideration by the District Judge on March 3, 2026. 5 DATED this 10th day of February, 2026. 6 7 A S. KATE VAUGHAN 8 United States Magistrate Judge 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23