Rami v. Bisignano

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 REZA R., Case No.: 25-cv-1399-DDL 12 Plaintiff, ORDER AFFIRMING THE 13 v. DECISION OF THE COMMISSIONER 14 FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner of Social Security, 15 Defendant. 16 17 18 Plaintiff Reza R. seeks judicial review of the Social Security Commissioner’s denial 19 of his application for disability insurance benefits. Dkt. No. 1. The parties have consented 20 to the undersigned’s jurisdiction. Dkt. No. 3. Plaintiff moves the Court to remand his 21 application to the Social Security Administration for an award of benefits or, alternatively, 22 for further proceedings. See generally Dkt. No. 12. For the reasons stated below, the 23 Court finds the Commissioner’s determination that Plaintiff is not disabled is free of legal 24 error and supported by substantial evidence. The Commissioner’s decision 25 is therefore AFFIRMED. 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 I. 2 BACKGROUND 3 A. Plaintiff’s Application for Disability Benefits 4 5 On July 14, 2022, Plaintiff applied for disability benefits under Title II of the Social 6 Security Act (“Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 423, alleging disability beginning on February 10, 7 2020. Certified Administrative Record (“AR”) at 193-199. Plaintiff alleged an inability 8 to work due to neck, back, and right knee pain and depression. Id. at 22. Plaintiff’s 9 application was denied initially on January 24, 2023, and was denied again upon 10 reconsideration on November 17, 2023. Id. at 18. Plaintiff requested an administrative 11 hearing, which was held before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Michael Radensky on 12 April 29, 2024. Id. at 36-53. On June 7, 2024, the ALJ issued a finding that Plaintiff was 13 not disabled. Id. at 15-28. Plaintiff appealed the decision to the Appeals Council, which 14 denied review on May 19, 2025, making the ALJ’s decision final. Id. at 1-4. 15 B. Summary of the ALJ’s Opinion 16 A person is considered “disabled” within the meaning of the Act if they suffer from 17 a medically determinable physical or mental impairment which is expected to last at least 18 a year and is of such severity that they cannot work, considering their age, education, and 19 work experience. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d). The ALJ followed the sequential five-step 20 evaluation set forth in the regulations in adjudicating Plaintiff's disability claim.1 See 21 22 23 1 The five-step sequential evaluation is the same for both disability insurance benefits and 24 supplemental security income. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; id. § 416.920. The ALJ must 25 determine the following: at step one, whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity; at step two, whether the claimant suffers from a severe impairment within the 26 meaning of the regulations; at step three, whether the impairment meets or is medically 27 equal to an impairment identified in the Listing of Impairments; at step four, the claimant's residual functional capacity (“RFC”) based on all impairments and whether the claimant 28 1 generally AR at 15-28. 2 At step one, the ALJ found Plaintiff “meets the insured status requirement of the 3 Social Security Act through December 31, 2027,” and that Plaintiff had “not engaged in 4 substantial gainful activity since February 10, 2020, the alleged onset date.” Id. at 20. 5 At step two, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: 6 “degenerative disc disease of the neck and back, status post surgeries to both areas; history 7 of right knee injury status post-surgery; and bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome status post 8 release on the left.” Id. The ALJ determined that these impairments “significantly limit 9 [Plaintiff’s] ability to perform basic work activities.” Id. However, the ALJ found that 10 Plaintiff’s “medically determinable mental impairments of major depression disorder and 11 generalized anxiety disorder” were non-severe because they cause no more than a minimal 12 limitation in Plaintiff’s ability to perform basic mental work activities. Id. at 21. In 13 reaching this conclusion, the ALJ considered the four functional areas referred to as the 14 “paragraph B” criteria: understanding, remembering, or applying information; interacting 15 with others; concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; and adapting or managing 16 oneself. Id. The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s mental impairments caused no more than a 17 mild limitation in any of the paragraph B criteria. Id. 18 At step three, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or medically equal 19 a listed impairment. Id. Proceeding to step four, the ALJ determined Plaintiff: 20 has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 21 CFR 404.1567(b), specifically as follows: can lift and/or carry 20 pounds 22 occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; can stand and/or walk for 4 hours out 23 of an 8-hour workday with regular breaks; can sit for 6 hours out of an 8-hour 24 workday with regular breaks; can occasionally climb, balance, stoop, kneel, 25 crouch and crawl but cannot climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; can frequently, 26 27 adjustment to other work. If the claimant is found not disabled at any step, the analysis 28 1 but not constantly, handle and finger bilaterally; can occasionally reach 2 overhead bilaterally; should avoid concentrated exposure to extremes of 3 temperature and vibration; and should avoid unprotected heights. 4 Id. at 21-22. 5 In formulating the above residual functional capacity (RFC), the ALJ considered 6 Plaintiff’s subjective testimony regarding his limitations. Id. at 22-26. Having reviewed 7 the evidence, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s statements “concerning the intensity, persistence 8 and limiting effects of [his] symptoms…not entirely consistent with the medical evidence 9 and other evidence in the record.” Id. at 22. 10 At step four, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff was unable to perform his past relevant 11 work as an automobile salesperson or chef. Id. at 27. At step five, the ALJ determined an 12 individual of Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity 13 would be able to perform jobs which exist in significant numbers in the national economy. 14 Id. Accordingly, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff was “not disabled” within the meaning of the 15 Act. Id. at 28. 16 II. 17 DISPUTED ISSUE 18 Plaintiff raises a single issue for review: Whether the ALJ erred in finding Plaintiff’s 19 mental impairments to be non-severe. Dkt. No. 12 at 2. 20 III. 21 STANDARD OF REVIEW 22 The Court’s review of the Commissioner’s final decision is “highly 23 deferential.” Kitchen v. Kijakazi, 82 F. 4th 732, 738 (9th Cir. 2023). The Court “will 24 disturb the denial of benefits only if the decision contains legal error or is not supported by 25 substantial evidence.” Id. “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable 26 mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, and must be more than a mere 27 scintilla, but may be less than a preponderance.” Id. This Court must review the entire 28 record and consider adverse as well as supporting evidence. See Ahearn v. Saul, 988 F.3d 1 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2021). The Court “may not reweigh the evidence or substitute [its] 2 judgment for that of the ALJ.” Id. Moreover, “[t]he ALJ is responsible for determining 3 credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and for resolving ambiguities.” Id. If 4 the evidence is susceptible of more than one rational interpretation, the ALJ’s decision 5 must be upheld. See id. at 1115-16. However, the Court cannot affirm “on a ground upon 6 which [the ALJ] did not rely.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1010 (9th Cir. 7 2014). Where the ALJ commits legal error, the Court may affirm the decision if the error 8 is harmless, meaning “it is inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination, or 9 that, despite the legal error, the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned, even if the 10 agency explains its decision with less than ideal clarity.” Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 11 F.3d 487, 492 (9th Cir. 2015). 12 IV. 13 DISCUSSION 14 A. Plaintiff Has Not Demonstrated Harmful Error 15 1. Step Two Error 16 Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ erred in finding that his mental impairments – major 17 depressive disorder and generalized anxiety disorder – caused no more than “minimal 18 limitations in [Plaintiff’s] ability for basic mental activities,” resulting in a step two finding 19 that Plaintiff’s mental limitations were non-severe. Dkt. No. 12 at 2. 20 In support of his argument, Plaintiff relies on the opinions of psychologist Dr. David 21 Kendis, nurse practitioner Tiffany Tran, and psychiatrist Dr. Ernest Bagner. In Plaintiff’s 22 view, the ALJ engaged in circular reasoning by “reject[ing] all three treating and examining 23 sources as being inconsistent with each other,” and in doing so failed to provide the 24 “specific and legitimate [reasoning] required for their rejection.” Id. Plaintiff asserts that 25 the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s mental impairment was non-severe was “at clear odds 26 with all treating and examining opinions” and that the opinions of non-examining, non- 27 treating doctors should have been given less weight. Id. at 5-6. 28 / / / 1 As an initial note, Plaintiff’s argument applies the incorrect standard for rejecting 2 medical opinions. Because Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits after March 3 27, 2017, the revised regulations set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c apply to his claim. For 4 claims brought after March 27, 2017, the regulations displaced the Ninth Circuit’s case law 5 requiring an ALJ to provide “specific and legitimate reasons” for rejecting examining 6 opinions and “clear and convincing reasons” to reject uncontradicted opinions. Woods v. 7 Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 787 (9th Cir. 2022). “Insisting that ALJs provide a more robust 8 explanation when discrediting evidence from certain sources necessarily favors the 9 evidence from those sources—contrary to the revised regulations.” Id. at 792. “Now, an 10 ALJ’s decision, including the decision to discredit any medical opinion, must simply be 11 supported by substantial evidence.” Id. at 787. 12 Even so, the Court need not decide whether the ALJ’s step two determination was 13 supported by substantial evidence. Any alleged error by the ALJ in classifying Plaintiff’s 14 mental impairments as non-severe cannot justify reversal because the ALJ resolved step 15 two in Plaintiff’s favor and continued with the remaining steps of the analysis. See Buck v. 16 Berryhill, 869 F.3d 1040, 1049 (9th Cir. 2017) (because step two was decided in the 17 claimant’s favor, he “could not possibly have been prejudiced”); see also Loader v. 18 Berryhill, 722 F. App'x 653, 655 (9th Cir. 2018) (where the claimant prevailed at step two, 19 and his case proceeded on the basis of “other” severe impairments, “it made no difference 20 for the ALJ’s ensuing analysis whether his medically determinable depression was 21 previously considered severe”). “Step two is merely a threshold determination meant to 22 screen out weak claims,” and it does not “identify the impairments that should be taken 23 into account when determining the RFC.” Buck, 869 F.3d at 1048. Accordingly, the Court 24 need not decide whether the ALJ was substantially justified in finding Plaintiff’s mental 25 impairments to be non-severe. Even if the finding was not substantially justified, it was 26 harmless, and “[t]he Court may not reverse an ALJ’s decision on account of a harmless 27 error.” Id. 28 / / / 1 2. Consideration of Mental Limitations in Formulating the RFC 2 Plaintiff’s only charge of error is that the ALJ found his mental impairments to be 3 non-severe at step two of the analysis; Plaintiff does not argue that the ALJ failed to account 4 for his mental impairments in formulating the RFC. By failing to raise this issue in his 5 brief, Plaintiff has arguably waived it. See Carmickle v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 6 F.3d 1155, 1161 n.2 (9th Cir. 2008) (declining to address the ALJ’s finding where plaintiff 7 “failed to argue [the] issue with any specificity in his briefing”); Thompson v. King, No. 8 23-3976, 2025 WL 560696, at *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 20, 2025) (finding that plaintiff waived 9 their challenge to the ALJ’s step two finding where the error was not included in their 10 opening brief). Regardless, the Court now examines the issue. 11 When formulating the RFC, the ALJ must “consider the limiting effects of all [a 12 claimant’s] impairment(s), even those that are not severe.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(e). But 13 consideration of the limiting effects of all impairments does not require the inclusion of 14 every impairment into the final RFC if the record indicates the non-severe impairment does 15 not cause a significant limitation in the plaintiff's ability to work. See Burch v. Barnhart, 16 400 F.3d 676, 684 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding ALJ’s decision not to include plaintiff’s non- 17 severe impairment in RFC determination was proper because there was no evidence the 18 impairment caused any functional limitations). 19 First, the ALJ considered at length Plaintiff’s mental limitations in formulating the 20 RFC. The ALJ states that in making the RFC determination, he “considered all 21 symptoms…based on the requirements on 20 CFR 404.1529 and SSR 16-3p.” AR at 22 22 (emphasis added). The ALJ discussed the opinions of state agency psychological 23 consultants Dr. Campbell and Dr. Caruso Radin, who reviewed Plaintiff’s mental health 24 records; the opinion of psychology consultative examiner Dr. Kendis, who examined 25 Plaintiff on December 15, 2022; and the opinion of psychiatric consultative examiner Dr. 26 Bagner, who examined Plaintiff on October 26, 2023; and the opinion of NP Tran, whom 27 Plaintiff identified as his primary mental health provider, and her treatment records. AR 28 at 20-21, 25-26. The ALJ also considered Plaintiff’s subjective testimony and his spouse’s 1 Third Party Function Statement. Id. at 26. The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s mental 2 impairments “did not cause more than a minimal limitation in [Plaintiff’s] ability to 3 perform basic mental work activities,” and that Plaintiff’s “statements concerning the 4 intensity, persistence and limiting effects” of his mental impairments were “not entirely 5 consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record.” Id. at 21-22. 6 Second, there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s decision not to include 7 Plaintiff’s mental limitations in the RFC. The ALJ “is the final arbiter with respect to 8 resolving ambiguities in the medical evidence,” Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 494 (9th 9 Cir. 2022), and they “need not take every medical opinion at face value.” Cross v. 10 O'Malley, 89 F.4th 1211, 1213 (9th Cir. 2024). “Rather, the ALJ must scrutinize the 11 various—often conflicting—medical opinions to determine how much weight to afford 12 each opinion.” Id. at 1213-14. The “most important factors” the ALJ must consider in 13 doing so are “supportability” (whether the provider supported their opinion with citations 14 to objective findings) and “consistency” (whether the opinion is consistent with other 15 evidence in the record). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a); id. § 404.1520c(c)(1) (defining 16 “supportability” and “consistency”). 17 NP Tran’s records reflect consistently normal mental health functioning, especially 18 when Plaintiff consistently took his prescribed medication. AR at 916-939. On March 2, 19 2023, Plaintiff was evaluated to have “normal mental functioning” and be “cognitively 20 intact” with intact memory, fair concentration, average intelligence, fair judgment and 21 insight, and fair impulse control. Id. at 937-38. Similar notes were made at NP Tran’s 22 evaluations on March 30, 2023 (id. at 934-35), April 27, 2023 (id. at 931-32), May 25, 23 2023 (id. at 928-29), July 13, 2023 (id. at 924-25), September 7, 2023 (id. at 920-22), and 24 October 25, 2023 (id. at 916-18). Although Plaintiff self-reported varying degrees of 25 motivation and depression throughout that time, he was assessed to have normal mental 26 functioning each time. See generally id. at 916-939. On March 21, 2024, NP Tran 27 completed a mental residual functional capacity assessment and reported that Plaintiff had 28 “no issues with concentration, memory, or alertness,” was “patient, punctual, and 1 pleasant,” and had fair judgment and insight. Id. at 1315. In this assessment, NP Tran also 2 opined that Plaintiff was markedly limited in his ability to complete a normal workday, 3 would be off task eighty percent of the workday, and would be absent from work potentially 4 15 days a month. Id. at 1314-15. However, the ALJ rejected this part of NP Tran’s opinion, 5 finding that it lacked supportability in light of the rest of the assessment and Plaintiff’s 6 normal activities of daily living. Id. at 26. 7 On December 15, 2022, Dr. Kendis completed a psychological consultative 8 examination. Id. at 639-642. At this examination, Plaintiff reported feeling sad, having 9 decreased motivation, and having a negative view of himself. Id. at 640. Dr. Kendis noted 10 that Plaintiff was taking medication for his depression and anxiety and was seeing a 11 therapist. Id. Dr. Kendis observed Plaintiff to be “alert, responsive, and cooperative,” with 12 no deficiency in delayed recall and fair attention and concentration. Id. at 641. Dr. Kendis 13 concluded that “[d]ue to the combination of chronic pain, cognitive issues, emotional 14 dysregulation, and anxiety, [Plaintiff] cannot currently maintain any meaningful job 15 search, schooling or employment.” Id. Dr. Kendis also concluded that Plaintiff had mild 16 to moderate limitations in various work-related abilities. Id. The ALJ found Dr. Kendis’s 17 opinion unpersuasive because of its inconsistencies with the rest of the record, notably NP 18 Tran’s treatment notes and Dr. Bagner’s report of Plaintiff’s normal level of functioning. 19 Id. at 25. 20 On October 26, 2023, Dr. Bagner performed a complete psychiatric evaluation. Id. 21 at 946-49. At this evaluation, Plaintiff reported that he could bathe and dress himself, 22 watch television, cook meals, and handle his own money. Id. at 947. After conducting the 23 evaluation, Dr. Bagner concluded that Plaintiff had mild limitations in his abilities to follow 24 simple instructions, comply with job rules, respond to changes, and complete daily 25 activities, and moderate limitations in his abilities to follow detailed instructions, interact 26 appropriately with the public, and respond to work pressure. Id. at 949. The ALJ found 27 Dr. Bagner’s opinion on Plaintiff’s limitations unpersuasive because it was inconsistent 28 with NP Tran’s treatment notes and Dr. Kendis’s report of Plaintiff’s normal level of 1 functioning. 2 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ engaged in “circular reasoning” because each of the 3 examining opinions – NP Tran, Dr. Bagner, and Dr. Kendis—was rejected in part due to 4 inconsistencies with the other two. Dkt. No. 12. However, the Court finds the reasoning 5 set forth by the ALJ is logical and substantially justified. The ALJ did not, as Plaintiff 6 alleges, reject medical opinions based solely on inconsistencies with other entirely rejected 7 opinions. Rather, the ALJ found portions of each opinion persuasive and other portions 8 unpersuasive. For example, Plaintiff takes issue with the ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Kendis’s 9 opinion based on its inconsistencies with NP Tran and Dr. Bagner’s opinions because the 10 ALJ also rejected parts of NP Tran and Dr. Bagner’s opinions. Dkt. No. 12 at 4 (citing AR 11 at 25). It is true that the ALJ found NP Tran’s opinion regarding Plaintiff’s workplace 12 abilities and Dr. Bagner’s conclusions regarding Plaintiff’s limitations to be unpersuasive, 13 but these are not the bases on which the ALJ found Dr. Kendis’s opinion to be 14 unpersuasive. The ALJ rejected Dr. Kendis’s opinion because it was inconsistent with NP 15 Tran’s treatment notes and Dr. Bagner’s record of Plaintiff’s normal level of functioning, 16 neither of which were discredited. AR at 25-26. The ALJ did not rely on circular 17 reasoning, as Plaintiff suggests, but engaged in a thoughtful examination of each opinion 18 in the context of the medical record as a whole. 19 It is evident from the Court’s review of the ALJ’s entire decision that Plaintiff’s 20 mental impairments were thoroughly considered by the ALJ, and the ALJ’s decision not to 21 include Plaintiff’s mental impairments in the RFC was supported by substantial evidence. 22 For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden to establish harmful 23 error. 24 B. Substantial Evidence Support the ALJ’s Conclusion 25 The Court now turns to the question of whether the ALJ’s conclusion is supported 26 by substantial evidence. The Court has independently “assess[ed] the entire record, 27 weighing the evidence both supporting and detracting from the [ALJ’s] conclusion.” See 28 Ahearn, 988 F.3d at 1115. Based on this review, the Court finds substantial evidence 1 supports the ALJ’s decision, as summarized below. 2 The record confirms Plaintiff suffers from pain and limitations in his neck and back. 3 MRIs throughout the record show multilevel degenerative disc disease, a prior C6-C7 4 fusion, degenerative changes, stenosis, foraminal narrowing, and edema of the fact joints. 5 AR at 426, 532, 788, 1064-65. The record shows that Plaintiff has a moderately reduced 6 cervical range of motion and tenderness and pain in his lower back. Id. at 516, 549, 559, 7 910. On November 10, 2021, Plaintiff underwent an L3-L5 laminectomy and fusion. Id. 8 at 440. 9 The record also shows Plaintiff has limitations in his hands. EMG testing showed 10 mild bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. Id. at 1067. Plaintiff had left carpal tunnel release 11 surgery in March 2024, and at the hearing on April 29, 2024, Plaintiff reported that he was 12 scheduled for right carpal tunnel release surgery in six weeks. Id. at 40-41. The record 13 also shows Plaintiff had surgery on his right knee in 2001, but there is no evidence that 14 Plaintiff sought treatment for his knee during the relevant time period. Id. at 425. 15 Treatment records describe Plaintiff’s gait as normal and report full strength in both his 16 upper and lower extremities. Id. at 444, 454, 463. 17 In Plaintiff’s Adult Function Reports, completed on August 18, 2022, and September 18 23, 2023, he reports that he prepared himself simple meals multiple times a week, went 19 shopping for groceries multiple times a month, could walk two to three blocks before 20 needing to rest, and could drive a car. Id. at 301-302, 318-19. On September 18, 2022, 21 Plaintiff’s wife completed a Third Party Function Report and reported that Plaintiff was 22 limited with movement and could walk about ten minutes before needing to rest. Id. at 23 275. At the hearing on April 29, 2024, Plaintiff stated that his wife helped him with self- 24 care and meal preparation. Id. at 42. Plaintiff also reported that he took oxycodone twice 25 a day to help with his pain and that he had been taking pain medication for some time. Id. 26 at 44. 27 The Court finds the foregoing is relevant and substantial evidence adequate to 28 support the ALJ’s RFC, and the subsequent determination based on Plaintiff’s RFC 1 ||that he was not disabled. Accordingly, the ALJ’s decision will not be disturbed. See 2 || Ahearn, 988 F.3d at 1115 (“If substantial evidence in the record supports the ALJ’s 3 || decision we must defer to the ALJ.”); see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g) (“The findings of the 4 ||Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall 5 || be conclusive”). 6 V. 7 CONCLUSION 8 For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that the ALJ’s decision was not 9 legally erroneous and was supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiff's request for 10 |/reversal and remand is therefore DENIED. The final decision of the Commissioner of 11 || Social Security is AFFIRMED. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly 12 || and terminate the case. 13 IT IS SO ORDERED. 14 || Dated: September 1, 2026 _— 13 Tb hohe A Ig United States Magistrate Judge 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28