Hallsted v. The Standard Fire Insurance Company

1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 7 LA VERNE RUSSEL HALLSTED, III, CASE NO. 3:24-cv-06027-BHS 8 Plaintiff, ORDER 9 v. 10 THE STANDARD FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, 11 Defendant. 12 13 THIS MATTER is before the Court on defendant Standard Fire Insurance 14 Company’s motion for summary judgment. Dkt. 23. In November 2024, Plaintiff 15 Hallsted sued Standard Fire in Kitsap County Superior Court, seeking UIM benefits after 16 he was rear-ended by an underinsured motorist. Dkt. 1-3. He also asserts five extra- 17 contractual bad faith, Consumer Protection Act and Insurance Fair Conduct Act claims. 18 Id. Standard Fire removed the case here based on diversity of citizenship. Dkt. 1. 19 On March 11, 2026, Standard Fire moved for summary judgment on all of 20 Hallstead’s claims, including his claim that Standard Fire breached its policy by failing to 21 pay his UIM benefits. Dkt. 23. On March 20, Standard Fire filed a stipulated motion to 22 1 dismiss his extra contractual claims, noted for April 17.1 Dkt. 26. Hallsted’s breach of 2 contract claim, and Standard Fire’s summary judgment motion on that claim, remain 3 pending. 4 Under LCR 7(d)(4), Hallsted’s response to the summary judgment motion was due 5 21 days after the motion was filed, or April 2. Under LCR 7(b)(2), “except for motions 6 for summary judgment, if a party fails to file papers in opposition to a motion, such 7 failure may be considered by the court as an admission that the motion has merit.” 8 Hallsted has not responded to Standard Fire’s summary judgment motion. That 9 motion argues that Hallsted seeks UIM benefits under his contract with Standard Fire for 10 treatment and damages that was not related to the accident. Dkt. 23 at 27 (citing its own 11 expert’s independent medical record review, Dkt. 25-2). Standard Fire’s expert opines 12 that the post-accident infection of which Hallsted complains is “not related” to the 13 accident. Dkt. 25-2 at 11. 14 Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure 15 materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is “no genuine dispute as to any 16 material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. 17 P. 56(a). In determining whether an issue of fact exists, the Court must view all evidence 18 in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in 19 that party’s favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248–50 (1986); 20 Bagdadi v. Nazar, 84 F.3d 1194, 1197 (9th Cir. 1996). A genuine issue of material fact 21 1 Under LCR 7(d)(1), stipulated motions are “same day” motions, properly noted for 22 consideration on the day they are filed. 1 exists where there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to find for the 2 nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The inquiry is “whether the evidence 3 presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one- 4 sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Id. at 251–52. The moving party 5 bears the initial burden of showing that there is no evidence that supports an element 6 essential to the nonmovant’s claim. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 7 Once the movant has met this burden, the nonmoving party then must show that there is 8 a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. If the nonmoving party fails 9 to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, “the moving party is entitled 10 to judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323–24. 11 There is no requirement that the moving party negate elements of the non- 12 movant’s case. Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 885 (1990). Once the moving 13 party has met its burden, the non-movant must then produce concrete evidence, without 14 merely relying on allegations in the pleadings, that there remain genuine factual issues. 15 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. 16 Hallsted has the burden of proving that Standard Fire breached its insurance 17 contract with him, and that he was damaged as the result. The only evidence before the 18 Court is defense expert Dr. Ehni’s opinion that the later infection for which Hallsted 19 seeks UIM benefits was not related to or caused by the accident. Even viewed in the light 20 most favorable to Hallsted, the evidence does not support the inference that his infection 21 was caused by the accident. There is no evidence that Standard Fire breached its contract. 22 1 Standard Fire’s motion for summary judgment, Dkt. 23, on Hallstead’s breach of 2 contract claim is GRANTED, and that claim is DISMISSED with prejudice. Based on 3 the parties’ stipulation, Dkt. 26, Hallsted’s remaining extra-contractual claims are 4 DISMISSED with prejudice. 5 The Clerk shall enter a JUDGMENT and close the case. 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. 7 Dated this 10th day of April, 2026. A 8 9 BENJAMIN H. SETTLE 10 United S tates District Judge 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22