Opinions and documents
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 BRITTANY RIGGS, et al., Case No.: 3:24-cv-323-JM-MSB
12 Plaintiffs,
ORDER ON NOTICE TO
13 v. SUBSTITUTE; APPLICATION FOR
ORDER ESTABLISHING TIME FOR
14 SCRIPPS MEMORIAL HOSPITAL
FEDERAL DEFENDANT TO
ENCINITAS, et al.,
15 RESPOND TO PLAINTIFFS’
Defendants. COMPLAINT
16
17
18
19 Plaintiffs Britttany and Caley Riggs, as individuals and successors-in-interest,
20 bring this wrongful death and medical malpractice action against Defendants alleging
21 negligence in the care of decedent Charles Rigg. (Doc. No. 1-2). The case was originally
22 filed in San Diego Superior Court on November 14, 2023 and removed to this court on
23 February 21, 2024. (Doc. No. 1). Presently before the court is: (1) the Notice of
24 Substitution, filed by the United States, to substitute itself in place of Defendant Kaitlyn
25 Benson, D.O. (Doc. No. 4); and (2) the United States’ “Ex Parte Application for an Order
26 Establishing Time for Federal Defendant to Respond to Plaintiffs’ Complaint” (Doc. No.
27 5).
28 ///
1 I. Notice of Substitute
2 In its Notice, the United States requests that it be substituted in place of Defendant
3 Kaitlyn Benson under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”). (Doc. No. 4).
4 The FTCA provides that a suit against the United States shall be the exclusive
5 remedy for persons alleging damages resulting “from the negligent or wrongful act or
6 omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office
7 or employment.” 28 USCS § 2679(b)(1); see Estate of Carlos Escobar Mejia v. United
8 States, No. 20-cv-2454-L-KSC, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 240035, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 2,
9 2022) (“[T]he only proper defendant in a suit under the FTCA is the Government.”);
10 Reynoso v. Pascasio, No. 20CV1425-GPC(LL), 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157916, at *3–4
11 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2020).
12 “Under the Westfall Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d), the Attorney General may certify
13 that a ‘defendant employee was acting within the scope of his office or employment [for
14 the United States government] at the time of the incident out of which the claim arose.’”
15 Wilson v. Horton’s Towing, 906 F.3d 773, 780 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting 28 U.S.C. §
16 2679(d)(1)). “In such cases, the action ‘shall be deemed an action against the United
17 States,’ and ‘the United States shall be substituted as the party defendant.’” Id. (quoting
18 28 U.S.C. §§ 2679(d)(1)). “Certification by the Attorney General is prima facie evidence
19 that a federal employee was acting in the scope of her employment at the time of the
20 incident and is conclusive unless challenged.” Billings v. United States, 57 F.3d 797, 800
21 (9th Cir. 1995); see Saleh v. Bush, 848 F.3d 880, 889 (9th Cir. 2017).
22 “The United States Attorney for the district where the civil action or proceeding is
23 brought . . . is authorized to make the statutory authorization that the Federal employee
24 was acting within the scope of his office or employment with the Federal Government at
25 the time of the incident out of which the suit arose.” 28 CFR § 15.4(a). In turn, the
26 United States Attorney for the Southern District of California has delegated certification
27 authority to the Chief of the Civil Division. (Doc. No. 4 at ¶ 3).
28
1 Here, Assistant United States Attorney Katherine Parker, Chief of the Civil
2 Division for the Southern District of California, has certified that at the time of the
3 conduct alleged, Defendant Kaitlyn Benson was acting within the scope of her
4 employment as an employee of the United States Department of Navy. (Doc. No. 1-5 at
5 2). At the time of this Order, Plaintiffs do not challenge the certification.
6 For the above reasons, the court GRANTS the United States’ Motion to Substitute.
7 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the United States shall be substituted as the Defendant
8 herein, in place of Defendant Kaitlyn Benson, as to the claims raised in Plaintiffs’
9 Complaint. Defendant Kaitlyn Benson is hereby DISMISSED from this action
10 WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
11 II. Application Establishing Time for United States to Respond
12 In its Application, the United States requests that the court issue an order
13 establishing that the United States has sixty days from the date of removal to respond to
14 Plaintiffs’ Complaint. (Doc. No. 5). No Party opposes the request. (Doc. No. 5-1 at ¶
15 3).
16 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 81, after removal, a defendant who has not
17 yet filed a responsive pleading must do so within the longer of either: (1) “21 days after
18 receiving—through service or otherwise—a copy of the initial pleading stating the claim
19 for relief;”; (2) “21 days after being served with the summons for an initial pleading on
20 file at the time of service; or”; (3) “7 days after the notice of removal is filed.” Fed. R.
21 Civ. P. 81(c). On the other hand, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(a)(2), if the
22 United States, a United States agency, or a United States officer or employee are sued in
23 their official capacity, they “must serve an answer to a complaint, counterclaim, or
24 crossclaim within 60 days after service on the United States attorney.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
25 (a)(2).
26 Here, since the United States would have had sixty days to answer Plaintiffs’
27 Complaint if the case had been originally filed in this court, the court finds it appropriate
28 to find that the United States is entitled to the same period of time to respond in this
1 removal action. See Cal. Fair Plan Ass’n v. United States Dep't of Agric., No. 3:21-cv-
2 02099-BEN-KSC, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 244258, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2021)
3 (granting enlargement of time for Federal defendants to respond to complaint in a
4 removal action).
5 For these reasons, the court GRANTS the United States’ Application. The United
6 States shall have sixty days from the date of removal to respond to Plaintiffs’ Complaint.
7 IT IS SO ORDERED.
8 DATED: February 27, 2024
JEFFREY T. MILLER
9
United States District Judge
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Not legal advice. These patterns come from public court records, not ratings of judges as people. They may reflect the types of cases a judge handles, local procedures or other factors, and they do not account for the facts of any individual case. Past patterns do not predict future rulings. Records can be incomplete, months behind current activity, or matched to the wrong person; sealed and confidential cases are not included. Use this as one piece of information, never the sole basis for legal strategy or a recusal motion. Full disclaimer: https://judgefinder.io/legal/disclaimer Read the full disclaimer.