Singh v. Singh

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 9 HARPREET SINGH, Case No. 3:21-cv-00094-HDM-WGC 10 Plaintiff, v. ORDER 11 ROOP SINGH and DHALIWAL, INC., 12 Defendants. 13 14 Before the court is the defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF 15 No. 11). The plaintiff has opposed or, in the alternative, moved 16 to strike the motion to dismiss (ECF No. 16). The defendants have 17 filed a reply (ECF No. 24). 18 The complaint in this action alleges several causes of action, 19 including a federal claim of human trafficking/peonage in 20 violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589 and 1592 and several state law 21 claims. The complaint claims this court has jurisdiction on the 22 grounds of both diversity and federal question jurisdiction. The 23 defendants now move to dismiss the complaint for lack of 24 jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The defendants first 25 assert that diversity jurisdiction does not exist because, 26 assuming as true their version of events, the amount in controversy 27 cannot be met. Next, the defendants assert that although the 28 federal human trafficking claim would otherwise provide the court 1 with subject matter jurisdiction, that claim is insufficiently 2 pled. The court addresses first the human trafficking claim. 3 Under § 1589, it is unlawful to 4 knowingly provide[] or obtain[] the labor or services of a person by any one of, or by any combination of, the 5 following means—(1) by means of force, threats of force, physical restraint, or threats of physical restraint to 6 that person or another person; (2) by means of serious harm or threats of serious harm to that person or another 7 person; (3) by means of the abuse or threatened abuse of law or legal process; or (4) by means of any scheme, 8 plan, or pattern intended to cause the person to believe that, if that person did not perform such labor or 9 services, that person or another person would suffer serious harm or physical restraint. 10 A defendant “is guilty of forced labor if he intends to cause a 11 person in his employ to believe that if she does not continue to 12 work, she will suffer the type of serious harm—physical or 13 nonphysical, including psychological, financial, reputation harm— 14 that would compel someone in her circumstances to continue working 15 to avoid that harm.” United States v. Dann, 652 F.3d 1160, 1169– 16 70 (9th Cir. 2011). A violation of § 1589 requires two things: (1) 17 the threat of harm must be serious – that is, “the threat, 18 considered from the vantage point of a reasonable person in the 19 place of the victim, must be ‘sufficiently serious’ to compel that 20 person to remain”; and (2) there must be scienter – that is, “the 21 employer intended the victim to believe that such harm would befall 22 her” if she did not continue to work. Id. Both of these elements 23 must be alleged in the complaint to sufficiently state a § 1589 24 violation. See Mallela v. Cogent Infotech Corp., 2020 WL 2541860, 25 at *4 (W.D. Pa. 2020) (unpublished disposition). 26 Section 1592 makes it unlawful to 27 knowingly destroy[], conceal[], remove[], confiscate[], 28 or possess[] any actual or purported passport or other 1 government identification document, of another person-- (1) in the course of a violation of [§ 1589] . . . ; (2) 2 with intent to violate [§ 1589] . . . ; or (3) to prevent or restrict or to attempt to prevent or restrict, without 3 lawful authority, the person’s liberty to move or travel, in order to maintain the labor or services of 4 that person, when the person is or has been a victim of a severe form of trafficking in persons, as defined in 5 section 103 of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000. . . . 6 A violation of § 1592, referred to as “document servitude,” 7 also requires the defendant to have acted knowingly, i.e., the 8 defendant must have intended to obtain the plaintiff’s forced labor 9 by the withholding of the documents. Dann, 652 F.3d at 1173. 10 The defendants assert that the plaintiff has not alleged they 11 intentionally violated the relevant statutes. The defendants also 12 argue that no plausible claim of human trafficking has been pled. 13 The complaint alleges that the defendants obtained the 14 plaintiff’s labor “by a combination of force, threats of force 15 (including the threat, implicit or explicit, to use a firearm), 16 threats of deportation, mental abuse and isolation, [and] the 17 withholding of [his immigration] documents. . . .” (Compl. 3). It 18 further asserts the “[d]efendants knowingly, or with reckless 19 disregard, derived financial benefit from plaintiff’s labor, which 20 . . . was obtained through a combination of force, intimidation, 21 threats of serious harm, physical abuse, and the withholding of 22 plaintiff’s immigration documents in conjunction with threats of 23 deportation.” (Id.) The complaint later specifies that Roop Singh 24 “beat plaintiff; threatened plaintiff with a gun; refused 25 plaintiff access to him immigration documents . . . ; isolated 26 plaintiff; forced plaintiff to work excessive hours; and otherwise 27 physically and psychologically intimidated and terrorized 28 1 plaintiff – to the point at which plaintiff’s ability to function 2 as a rational and healthy person was markedly diminished.” (Id. at 3 4). It also later alleges that at least twice, Roop Singh 4 repeatedly struck “plaintiff in a violent manner for the purpose 5 of punishing plaintiff and/or terrorizing plaintiff, i.e., so as 6 to maintain and enhance his ability to control plaintiff,” on “a 7 number of occasions . . . caused plaintiff to apprehend he was 8 about to be struck,” and on “several occasions . . . threatened 9 plaintiff with a firearm.” (Compl. 5). 10 The complaint sufficiently alleges serious harm – that is, 11 threats or actions that, “considered from the vantage point of a 12 reasonable person in the place of the victim, [were] ‘sufficiently 13 serious’ to compel that person to remain” working for the 14 defendant. The defendants do not in fact dispute that serious harm 15 has been alleged. Rather, the defendants argue that the plaintiff’s 16 version of events is simply not true and that under the facts as 17 they actually were, the plaintiff cannot state a human trafficking 18 claim. A factual argument such as this, however, is not 19 appropriately resolved on a motion to dismiss and is not a proper 20 basis for dismissal of the claim. 21 As to scienter, the court concludes that this element has 22 been sufficiently alleged. The complaint asserts that the 23 defendants acted knowingly in order to control the plaintiff and 24 obtain his free or underpaid labor. Accordingly, the complaint 25 sufficiently sets forth claim of violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1589 and 26 § 1592. 27 The remainder of the defendants’ arguments, with respect to 28 both the human trafficking/peonage claim and the amount in 1|| controversy, depend on disputed facts that are not appropriately 2|| resolved on a motion to dismiss. 3 In accordance with the foregoing, the motion to dismiss (ECF No. 11) is hereby DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to renew at the close 5|| of discovery as a motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff’s motion to strike the motion to dismiss (ECF No. 16) is therefore DENIED AS MOOT. 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 DATED: this lith day of August, 2021. 10 11 bbvasof” 2 Wt SAL 42 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28