Muhr v. Bisignano

1 FILED IN THE 2 EASTER U N . S D . I S D T I R S I T C R T I C O T F C W O A U S R H T I NGTON Aug 17, 2026 3 SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6 7 LISA M., NO. 1:25-CV-3195-TOR 8 Plaintiff, ORDER OF REVERSAL AND 9 v. REMAND 10 FRANK BISIGNANO, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 11 SECURITY, 12 Defendant. 13 BEFORE THE COURT are Plaintiff’s Motion for judicial review of 14 Defendant’s denial of her application for Title XVI disability benefits under the 15 Social Security Act (ECF No. 13) and the Commissioner’s Brief (ECF No. 15). 16 These matters were submitted for consideration without oral argument. The Court 17 has reviewed the record and files herein and is fully informed. For the reasons 18 discussed below, Plaintiff’s Motion (ECF No. 13) is GRANTED, the 19 Commissioner’s Brief (ECF No. 15) is DENIED, and the Commissioner’s denial 20 of Plaintiff’s application for benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act is 1 REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings. 2 JURISDICTION 3 The Court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 4 1383(C)(3). 5 STANDARD OF REVIEW 6 It is the administrative law judge’s (ALJ) job to “determine credibility, 7 resolve conflicts in the testimony, and resolve ambiguities in the record.” Lambert 8 v. Saul, 980 F.3d 1266, 1277 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Treichler v. Comm'r of Soc. 9 Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1098 (9th Cir. 2014)). The Court will affirm the 10 Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits unless it “is not supported by substantial 11 evidence or is based on legal error.” Lambert, 980 F.3d at 1277 (quoting 12 Treichler., 775 F.3d at 1098) (internal quotations omitted). On that note, it is 13 important for the ALJ to provide sufficient reasons for the court to review the basis 14 of an administrative order and to identify where in the record those reasons are 15 reflected. Id. 16 The Court reviews the agency’s findings to determine whether they are 17 supported with substantial evidence. Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 99 (2019); 18 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). In this context, the threshold is not high. Biestek, 587 U.S. at 19 103. Substantial evidence is present when there is “‘more than a mere scintilla.’” 20 Biestek, 587 U.S. at 103. In other words, “such relevant evidence as a reasonable 1 mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Biestek, 587 U.S. at 103 2 (quoting Consol. Edison Co. of New York v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). 3 The Court will not reverse for errors that are harmless. Molina v. Astrue, 4 674 F.3d 1104, 1117 (9th Cir. 2012). An error is harmless if it is “inconsequential 5 to the ultimate nondisability determination.” Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115 (quoting 6 Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1162). To effectuate this, the Court reviews the record as a 7 whole to determine whether the error altered the result of the case. Molina, 674 8 F.3d at 1115. 9 FIVE STEP SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS 10 The Commissioner uses a five-step sequential process to decide whether a 11 claimant is considered disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(1). The Commissioner 12 considers all evidence in the record to make this determination. 20 C.F.R. § 13 416.920(a)(3). Disability is defined “as the inability to do any substantial gainful 14 activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment 15 which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to 16 last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.905(a). 17 This requires a severe impairment that makes the claimant unable to complete the 18 claimant’s past relevant work or any other substantial gainful work. 20 C.F.R. § 19 416.905(a). 20 At each step, the Commissioner may find a claimant either not disabled or 1 disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4). If the claimant is found disabled, then the 2 process stops, and the determination is made. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4). 3 However, step three to four, the Commissioner assesses residual function capacity 4 (“RFC”). Id. Then steps four and five the Commissioner evaluates the claimant’s 5 claim. Id. 6 At step one, the Commissioner considers the claimant’s work activity and if 7 the Commissioner decides that the claimant is doing substantial gainful activity, 8 then the Commissioner will find the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 9 416.920(a)(4)(i). Substantial gainful activity is both substantial and gainful work 10 activity. 20 C.F.R. § 416.972. Substantial work activity means “doing significant 11 physical or mental activities” and may be done on a part-time basis, with less pay, 12 or less responsibility than before. 20 C.F.R. § 416.972(a). Gainful work activity is 13 work done for pay or profit even if the profit is not realized. 20 C.F.R. § 14 416.972(b). Put together, “[s]ubstantial gainful activity means work that—(a) 15 [i]nvolves doing significant and productive physical or mental duties; and (b) [i]s 16 done (or intended) for pay or profit.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.910. 17 At step two, the Commissioner considers the claimant’s medical severity of 18 the claimant’s impairment(s). 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii). If the claimant does 19 not have either a physical or mental impairment that is severely medically 20 determinable, or a combination of impairments satisfying the requirements the 1 Commissioner will deem the claimant as not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 2 416.920(a)(4)(ii). 3 At step three, the Commissioner continues to consider the claimant’s 4 medical severity of claimant’s impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the 5 claimant falls under one of the listings in appendix 1, fulfills this subpart, and the 6 durational requirement, then the Commissioner will determine the claimant as 7 disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii). 8 At step four, the Commissioner shifts to address the claimant’s RFC and 9 work experience to see whether the claimant can make an adjustment to other 10 work. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If the Commissioner decides that the 11 claimant can still complete past relevant work, then the Commissioner rules the 12 claimant as not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv). 13 At step five, the Commissioner continues to review the claimant’s residual 14 functional capacity with the claimant’s age, education, and work experience to 15 settle on any possible adjustments to other work. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(v). If 16 this is possible, then the Commissioner will rule that the claimant is not disabled. 17 However, if the Commissioner establishes the opposite, then the claimant is 18 deemed as disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(v). 19 Once a claimant proves that: “(1) that she is not presently engaged in a 20 substantial gainful activity; (2) that her disability is severe, and (3) that her 1 impairment meets or equals one of the specific impairments described in the 2 regulations”, then the claimant must be found disabled. Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 3 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 955 4 (9th Cir. 2002)). However, if the stated impairment does not meet the requirement 5 listed in the regulations, the claimant may “still establish a prima facie case of 6 disability by proving at step four that ‘in addition to the first two requirements, ... 7 she is not able to perform any work that she has done in the past.’” Hoopai, 499 8 F.3d at 1074 (quoting Thomas, 278 F.3d at 955). After the claimant establishes 9 their prima facie case at step five, the burden shifts to the agency to prove that “the 10 claimant can perform a significant number of other jobs in the national economy.” 11 Hoopai, 499 F.3d at 1074–75 (quoting Thomas, 278 F.3d at 955). 12 ALJ FINDINGS 13 Plaintiff initially filed her application for supplemental security income 14 under Title XVI of the SSA on February 17, 2016. ECF No. 13 at 3; Tr. 20. After 15 multiple unfavorable decisions and remands from the Appeals Council, on June 23, 16 2025, the ALJ provided a partially favorable ruling finding the Plaintiff disabled as 17 of March 16, 2022. Tr. 14; 34. The Appeals Council denied review. Tr. 1. 18 First, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in any substantial activity 19 since February 17, 2016. Tr. 20. The ALJ determined that Plaintiff had severe 20 impairments including borderline personality disorder, depression, obesity, 1 thoracic spine disorder, left shoulder osteoarthritis, and fibromyalgia. Tr. 20. 2 However, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s impairments or combination thereof 3 did not meet the severity required under 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 4 1. Tr. 21. The ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s mental impairments or combination 5 did not meet the criteria required under 12.04 and 12.08. Tr. 21. 6 Plaintiff had moderate limitations in understanding, remembering, or 7 applying information; concentrating, persisting or maintaining pace; and adapting 8 or managing oneself. Tr. 21-22. Plaintiff had a mild limitation in interacting with 9 others. Tr. 21. As a result, Paragraph B and C criteria were not met. Tr. 21-22. 10 The ALJ determined that since April 1, 2009, Plaintiff’s RFC included the 11 ability to 12 perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(b) except that she can frequently climb ramps and stairs; can never climb ladders, ropes, or 13 scaffolds; can never stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl; can occasionally reach overhead on the left; can understand, remember and carry out 14 simple, repetitive tasks; and can perform no production or assembly line type work. 15 16 Tr. 23. 17 Finally, on March 16, 2022, Plaintiff’s age category changed from a younger 18 individual to advanced age. Tr. 33. Prior to March 16, 2022, considering 19 Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience and RFC, the ALJ decided that jobs 20 existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform. 1 Tr. 33. However, the ALJ found that beginning on March 16, 2022, there were no 2 jobs in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform. 3 Tr. 34. As a result, the ALJ found Plaintiff was disable from March 16, 2022, and 4 continues to be disabled through the date of the ALJ’s decision. Tr. 34. 5 ISSUES 6 Plaintiff identifies two issues and requests reversal and remand for further 7 proceedings. ECF No. 13 at 21-22. 8 I. Whether the ALJ failed to provide clear, convincing, and well- supported reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s testimony of her physical 9 ailments. 10 II. Whether the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the medical source opinion of John Ellision, M.D. 11 ECF No. 13 at 4. 12 DISCUSSION 13 I. The ALJ failed to provide clear, convincing and well-supported 14 reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s testimony of her physical 15 ailments. 16 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s rejection of Plaintiff’s testimony based on 17 inconsistency with the medical evidence and her daily activities was improper. 18 ECF No. 13 at 4. 19 “‘The credibility determination is exclusively the ALJ's to make,’ and ‘[w]e 20 are constrained to review the reasons the ALJ asserts.’” Lambert v. Saul, 980 F.3d 1 1266, 1278 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 494 2 (9th Cir. 2015)) (citation modified). When the ALJ determines the credibility of a 3 claimant’s subjective testimony, the ALJ uses a two-step process. Vasquez v. 4 Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009). The first step requires the ALJ to 5 “determine whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an 6 underlying impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or 7 other symptoms alleged.” Vasquez, 572 F.3d at 591 (quoting Lingenfelter v. 8 Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035–36 (9th Cir. 2007)). The claimant only needs to 9 “show that it could reasonably have caused some degree of the symptom.” 10 Vasquez, 572 F.3d at 591 (quoting Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1035–36). 11 The second step states when the ALJ 12 determines that a claimant for Social Security benefits is not malingering and has provided objective medical evidence of an 13 underlying impairment which might reasonably produce the pain or other symptoms she alleges, the ALJ may reject the claimant's 14 testimony about the severity of those symptoms only by providing specific, clear, and convincing reasons for doing so. 15 16 Lambert v. Saul, 980 F.3d 1266, 1277 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Brown-Hunter v. 17 Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 488–89 (9th Cir. 2015)) (citations omitted). “The clear and 18 convincing standard is the most demanding required in Social Security cases.” 19 Ferguson v. O'Malley, 95 F.4th 1194, 1199 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting Garrison v. 20 Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014-15 (9th Cir. 2014)). 1 Pursuant to this, the ALJ must “specifically identify the testimony [from a 2 claimant] she or he finds not to be credible and ... explain what evidence 3 undermines that testimony.” Lambert, 980 F.3d at 1277 (quoting Treichler v. 4 Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th Cir. 2014)) (citations 5 omitted). Determining the credibility of a claimant’s testimony about the severity 6 of symptoms allows considerations including things such as: 7 (1) ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation, such as the claimant's reputation for lying, prior inconsistent statements concerning the 8 symptoms, and other testimony by the claimant that appears less than candid; (2) unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek 9 treatment or to follow a prescribed course of treatment; and (3) the claimant's daily activities. 10 11 Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1284 (9th Cir. 1996). However, “[c]ontradiction 12 with the medical record is a sufficient basis for rejecting the claimant's subjective 13 testimony.” Carmickle v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 14 2008); Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 499 (9th Cir. 2022). 15 A. Clear and Convincing Reasons 16 First, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ provided a summary of the evidence 17 rather than demonstrating inconsistencies in the record and Plaintiff’s testimony 18 failing to meet the clear and convincing standard. ECF No. 13 at 11. Plaintiff cites 19 Tr. 23-28. Id. Plaintiff argues that her physical limitations limit her to, at least, 20 sedentary work not full-time competitive work. ECF No. 13 at 10. On Plaintiff’s 1 50th birthday she would have been considered disabled if she were limited to 2 sedentary work. ECF No. 13 at 4. 3 The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s testimony “about the intensity, persistence, 4 and limiting effects of her symptoms” was inconsistent with the evidence. Tr. 24. 5 Plaintiff was limited to light exertional work. Tr. 23. Light exertional work 6 requires 7 lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. Even though the weight lifted may 8 be very little, a job is in this category when it requires a good deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with 9 some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls. To be considered capable of performing a full or wide range of light work, you must have 10 the ability to do substantially all of these activities. If someone can do light work, we determine that he or she can also do sedentary work, 11 unless there are additional limiting factors such as loss of fine dexterity or inability to sit for long periods of time. 12 13 20 C.F.R. § 416.967. However, Plaintiff argues she instead should be limited to 14 sedentary work. ECF No. 13 at 4. Sedentary work requires “lifting no more than 15 10 pounds at a time and occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket files, 16 ledgers, and small tools.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.967. However, it is also noted that 17 some walking and standing are typically required. § 416.967. 18 The ALJ described Plaintiff’s alleged symptoms and capabilities stating, she 19 “could not walk long distances, kneel, squat, or crawl, and could not do a desk job 20 due to back and hip pain, and had to lie down periodically during the day 1 (B6A/13).” Tr. 23. Plaintiff claims she had a right foot fracture and she struggles 2 to walk. ECF No. 13 at 5. As support, she cites to the record stating that she used 3 a motorized scooter in the store, needed to take breaks, and shifted her legs while 4 standing. Id. Moreover, Plaintiff cites numerous portions of the medical record 5 evidencing rotator cuff tears, pain, issues with Plaintiff’s back, shoulders, hips, 6 knees, etc. ECF No. 13 at 7-10 (citing Tr. 1113-1114, 1104-1105, 1583, 1441). 7 Plaintiff cites to MRI results demonstrating tears and shoulder issues. ECF No. 13 8 at 7 (citing Tr. 1561, 67). 9 In the record, there was evidence of limited range of motion, tenderness and 10 pain. Tr. 1695. For example, in 2023 a provider noted a lack of ability to rise and 11 squat, and extreme pain parts of her spine, limited range of motion and elevation. 12 Tr. 1695. Plaintiff demonstrated a BMI of 47 with tenderness, muscle weakness 13 and limited range of motion. Tr. 1871. In 2022, Plaintiff had pack pain, limited 14 range of motion of the back, and cervical, thoracic and lumbar spine tenderness. 15 Tr. 27, 1712-13. In June of 2023, x-rays marked mild degenerative change of the 16 lumbosacral spine, moderate degenerative change of the thoracic spine but no 17 instability with flexion or extension. Tr. 27, 1877-11 18 After review of the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ failed to provide clear and 19 convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence. For example, the ALJ states 20 that her statements were inconsistent because she stated she could not “drive long 1 trips and could stand for only 5 minutes.” Tr. 24. The ALJ noted that Plaintiff 2 reported performing household activities that required lifting 40lbs at time, was 3 able to travel in a car for 3.5 to 4 hours, did not use a cane or walker, and 4 performed light exercises. Tr. 24, 1371, 1373, 1694, 1785. However, the only 5 evidence of long trips was one reference to travel. Tr. 24, 1682. Moreover, the 6 ALJ used Plaintiff’s household chores and some normal or unremarkable exams as 7 contradictory evidence of Plaintiff’s testimony of her inability to stand for more 8 than five minutes. Tr. 24, 1785, 1694. Additionally, the ALJ used this evidence to 9 support her finding of light work requiring the ability to lift 40lbs and a “good deal 10 of walking or standing.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.967. 11 As discussed, Plaintiff cited many portions of the record recognizing 12 Plaintiff’s limitations. While the ALJ is not required to consider every possible 13 alternative reason and explanation, the ALJ is required to consider the record as a 14 whole. Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1117 (9th Cir. 1975). 15 Accordingly, this is not more than a mere scintilla of evidence to support the 16 reasons provided by the ALJ’s for light work determination and properly note 17 Plaintiff’s alleged inconsistencies. 18 B. Daily Activities 19 Next, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s daily activities 20 show inconsistencies with Plaintiff’s claim that she could not drive long trips and 1 only stand for five minutes was improper. ECF No. 13 at 12. Plaintiff argues that 2 these activities cannot undermine credibility because the ALJ must show that these 3 activities fill a substantial part of her day and are translated to a work setting. ECF 4 No. 13 at 10. Additionally, Plaintiff argues that it is unclear how much rest she 5 needed from these activities demonstrating a material difference between a 6 potential workplace. ECF No. 13 at 11. Moreover, Plaintiff contends that Dr. 7 Genthe’s statements were not regarding her physical capabilities but activities in 8 support of her mental health. ECF No. 13 at 15. 9 Defendant responds that under Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112-13 10 (9th Cir. 2012), the ALJ may properly use daily activities to discredit Plaintiff’s 11 testimony if it contradictory to the limitation. This is true but it must be supported 12 with substantial evidence. As previously discussed, the ALJ failed to properly 13 support its basis for discrediting Plaintiff’s testimony by simply referencing only a 14 couple instances rather than considering the multitude of evidence stating 15 otherwise and the record as a whole. Even more, the ALJ cited references to her 16 household activities but failed to acknowledge her claim of multiple breaks and 17 complaints of pain from these activities. ECF Nos. 13 at 12-13; 16 at 11; Tr. 1372- 18 73. While the ALJ may have sufficient evidence or reasons to support her 19 determination, her reasons are not sufficient on their own. Nevertheless, the Court 20 cannot conclude that this is a harmless error because it would likely change 1 Plaintiff’s RFC. 2 C. Obesity Assessment 3 Moreover, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate her 4 obesity. ECF No. 13 at 13-14. However, Defendant responds that Plaintiff failed 5 to provide functional limitations that required consideration for Plaintiff’s RFC. 6 ECF No. 15 at 10. Regardless “it was the ALJ's burden to develop the record and 7 assess her multiple impairments once he was put on notice of Plaintiff's obesity.” 8 Stack v. Barnhart, 327 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1179 (C.D. Cal. 2004); Celaya v. Halter, 9 332 F.3d 1177, 1182 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Given the potential effect of obesity on 10 these conditions, the ALJ had a responsibility to consider their interactive effect.”). 11 In further support, the Celaya court stated that when there are impairments that are 12 likely to be affected by obesity, the ALJ is required to explain how obesity factors 13 into the RFC determination. Celaya v. Halter, 332 F.3d 1177, 1182 (9th Cir. 2003) 14 (“The ALJ was responsible for determining the effect of Celaya's obesity upon her 15 other impairments, and its effect on her ability to work and general health, given 16 the presence of those impairments.”). 17 The ALJ noted Plaintiff’s BMI throughout the record and cited visits where 18 issues such as fibromyalgia, thoracic spine disorder and left shoulder osteoarthritis 19 were present. Tr. 20, 1694. As previously discussed, in the record, there was 20 evidence of limited range of motion and elevation, tenderness and pain. Tr. 1695. 1 Additionally, as stated, Plaintiff had x-rays that marked mild degenerative change 2 of the lumbosacral spine, moderate degenerative change of the thoracic spine but 3 no instability with flexion or extension. Tr. 27; 1877-11. This should have raised 4 the need to consider obesity explicitly in the RFC determination. 5 The ALJ continued to cite that Plaintiff did not show problems with gait, 6 posture, range of motion etc. Tr. 27, 1723. However, this does not substantially 7 support the fact that Plaintiff’s BMI did not interact with the other symptoms or 8 relieve the ALJ from addressing the possible interaction when considering 9 Plaintiff’s RFC. The Court cannot rely on or assume grounds that the ALJ did not 10 specify or articulate. Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 495 (9th Cir. 2015) 11 (“[W]e cannot substitute our conclusions for the ALJ’s or speculate as to the 12 grounds for the ALJ's conclusion.”) (quoting Treichler v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. 13 Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1103 (9th Cir. 2014)). Accordingly, the Court cannot 14 conclude that this would not affect the outcome of the ALJ’s determination. As a 15 result, the ALJ committed error when failing to explain how Plaintiff’s obesity 16 factored into the RFC determination. 17 Remand is necessary to complete the record. Therefore, further proceedings 18 are appropriate. Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 496 (9th Cir. 2015) 19 (“Where there is conflicting evidence, and not all essential factual issues have been 20 resolved, a remand for an award of benefits is inappropriate.” (quoting Treichler v. 1 Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1101 (9th Cir. 2014)); Benecke, 379 2 F.3d at 593 (“Remand for further administrative proceedings is appropriate if 3 enhancement of the record would be useful.”). An order to remand to complete the 4 record is appropriate. Leon v. Berryhill, 880 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2017) 5 (“When the ALJ denies benefits and the court finds error, the court ordinarily must 6 remand to the agency for further proceedings before directing an award of 7 benefits.”). 8 Defendant responds that Plaintiff properly discredited Plaintiff’s testimony 9 because there was evidence of exaggeration. ECF No. 15 at 4-5. Exaggeration is a 10 proper reason to discredit a claimant’s testimony. See Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 11 F.3d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 2001). The ALJ cited a couple references from 12 providers suggesting that Plaintiff exaggerated symptoms. Tr. 25-26, 1309, 1695. 13 The ALJ did not err in this part of her assessment. However, this does not negate 14 the lack of substantial evidence in other parts of her analysis. 15 D. Medical Expert Opinion 16 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred because the ALJ found his opinion 17 consistent with the record but also inconsistent. ECF No. 13 at 15-16. Moreover, 18 that there was a latency error and that the ambiguity in his opinion mean the ALJ 19 must develop the record further and recontact the provider for clarification. ECF 20 No. 13 at 17. 1 Because the Court found harmful error and remands the case, the Court does 2 not find addressing the alternative errors at issue necessary. Hiler v. Astrue, 687 3 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Because we remand the case to the ALJ for the 4 reasons stated, we decline to reach this alternative ground for remand.”). 5 Accordingly, Plaintiff is not barred from raising this argument on a subsequent 6 appeal. Hecker v. O'Malley, 2024 WL 4766737, at *12 (D. Haw. Nov. 13, 2024). 7 Upon remand, the ALJ shall reassess accordingly based on this Order, 8 properly complete the record, provide clear and convincing reasons with references 9 to Plaintiff’s testimony and relevant medical evidence, explain how Plaintiff’s 10 obesity factors into her RFC determination, and conduct the sequential evaluation 11 to issue a new decision. 12 / 13 / 14 / 15 / 16 / 17 / 18 / 19 20 ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 2 1. Plaintiff's Opening Brief (ECF No. 13) is GRANTED. 3 2. Commissioner’s Brief (ECF No. 15) is DENIED. 4 3. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this action is REVERSED and 5 REMANDED to the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with 6 this Order. 7 The District Court Executive is directed to enter this Order, enter judgment 8 || for Plaintiff, furnish copies to counsel, and CLOSE the file. 9 DATED August 17, 2026. <=> United States District Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20