Walker v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Wilna Walker, No. CV-25-03721-PHX-JAT 10 Plaintiff, ORDER 11 v. 12 Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 13 14 Defendant. 15 Pending before the Court is the parties’ stipulation to an award of attorneys’ fees 16 under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). (Doc. 18). 17 “A litigant is entitled to attorneys’ fees under the EAJA if: ‘(1) he is the prevailing party; (2) the government fails to show that its position was 18 substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust; and (3) the requested fees and costs are reasonable.’ Carbonell v. I.N.S., 429 19 F.3d 894, 898 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Perez–Arellano v. Smith, 279 F.3d 791, 793 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).” 20 21 Michele M. v. Saul, No. 19-CV-00272-JLB, 2020 WL 5203375, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 22 2020). The Court will discuss each prong in turn. 23 Here, the parties’ discussion regarding Plaintiff’s entitlement to fees under the 24 EAJA is: “This stipulation constitutes a compromise settlement of Plaintiff’s request for 25 EAJA attorney fees and does not constitute an admission of liability on the part of 26 Defendant under the EAJA.” (Doc. 18 at 2–3). In other words, the parties do not discuss 27 the EAJA entitlement prongs. 28 Regarding prong one, this Court remanded this case to the social security 1 administration for further proceedings. (Docs. 13–14). Accordingly, the Court finds that 2 Plaintiff is the prevailing party. 3 Regarding prong two, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained: 4 Pursuant to the EAJA, we are required to award [Plaintiff] fees and other expenses incurred in connection with his civil action unless we find that the 5 position of the United States was “substantially justified” or that special circumstances make an award unjust. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). 6 The test for determining whether the Secretary’s position was substantially 7 justified under the EAJA is whether the position had a reasonable basis in both law and fact—that is, whether it was justified “to a degree that could 8 satisfy a reasonable person.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988); see also Barry v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 1324, 1330 (9th Cir. 1987). The 9 burden is on the Secretary to prove that his position was substantially justified. Id. 10 11 Russell v. Sullivan, 930 F.2d 1443, 1445 (9th Cir. 1991). 12 The Government’s stipulation to pay fees, while simultaneously not admitting it 13 owes the fees, is an ambiguous legal position. This case was remanded by stipulation of 14 the parties (Docs. 12–14), and this Court has never evaluated either party’s positions. 15 Nonetheless, applying the test articulated in Russell, the Court finds that the Government 16 has failed to carry its burden to prove that its position was substantially justified or that 17 special circumstances make an award unjust. Russell, 930 F.2d at 1445; see also Michele 18 M., 2020 WL 5203375, at *1. 19 Regarding prong three, the Court should award only reasonable fees. Here, the 20 Court has not been provided with a billing statement. Thus, the Court does not know the 21 rate charged or the hours expended. Nonetheless, the Court finds that the Government, by 22 the stipulation, has conceded that the amount of fees sought in this case are reasonable. 23 Plaintiff’s counsel states in the stipulation that Plaintiff has signed an assignment of 24 any award of fees to counsel. (Doc. 18 at 2). The Court has not been provided with a copy 25 of the assignment. Nonetheless, the Court will accept Plaintiff’s counsel’s representation 26 that such an assignment is available for review if this representation is ever disputed. 27 Based on the foregoing, 28 IT IS ORDERED granting the stipulation (Doc. 18) such that fees and expenses in || the amount of $1,750.00 as authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 2412, and costs in the amount of || $405.00 as authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1920, are awarded to Plaintiff subject to the terms of || the Stipulation. 4 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if, after receiving this Order, the Commissioner: 5 || (1) determines that Plaintiff does not owe a debt that is subject to offset under the Treasury 6|| Offset Program, and (2) agrees to waive the requirements of the Anti-Assignment Act, then || the fees awarded herein will be paid to Plaintiff's attorney pursuant to the assignment 8 || executed by Plaintiff. However, if there is a debt owed under the Treasury Offset Program, || the Commissioner cannot agree to waive the requirements of the Anti-Assignment Act, and any remaining Equal Access to Justice Act fees after offset will be paid to Plaintiff but delivered to Plaintiff's attorney. 12 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion for attorney fees (Doc. 15) is denied 13 || as moot. 14 Dated this 12th day of May, 2026. 15 17 James A. Teilborg 18 Senior United States District Judge 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 -3-