Opinions and documents
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 25-CV-61995-STRAUSS
LUC WILSEN JOSEPH,
Plaintiff,
v.
STEPHEN BEITING and
SWAGELOK COMPANY,
Defendants.
__________________________________/
ORDER
THIS MATTER came before the Court upon Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in District
Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs [DE 3] (the “IFP Motion”) and Plaintiff’s Motion for
Referral to Volunteer Attorney Program [DE 4] (the “Referral Motion”). For the reasons described
below, the IFP Motion and the Referral Motion are DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Further,
the Court will require Plaintiff to file an amended complaint no later than April 15, 2026, because
the Complaint, upon initial screening, fails to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed his Complaint on October 3, 2025. See generally [DE 1]. Plaintiff appears
to be alleging an employment discrimination claim against Defendant Swagelok Company (the
“Company”).1 See id. at 4, 10. According to Plaintiff, he experienced racial comments about his
hair, looks, and voice. Id. at 4. For example, Plaintiff alleges that he experienced racial comments
1 Plaintiff also names Stephen Beiting, esq., as a defendant. [DE 1] at 1. It is unclear from the
allegations whether Plaintiff intends to maintain an action against Beiting or if Beiting merely
represents the Company.
from his trainer a few weeks after he started working for the Company. Id. at 10. The trainer said,
“[W]hy they send this people [sic] over here, look at his hair, we’re not tolerate [sic] any slow
talking over here . . . .” Id. This comment was made to another maintenance worker as well as
“control machine operations (RX).” Id. Moreover, some of the Company’s workers allegedly
messed with Plaintiff in other ways, such as by tampering with his computer and pulling his chair
while Plaintiff was working. Id. at 4. At some point, Plaintiff raised concerns to the human
resources department (“HR”). Id. at 10. After a meeting with HR and some managers, Plaintiff
was moved to another work center. Id. The harassment continued, and Plaintiff’s supervisor kept
moving him from one work center to another. Id. The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) issued Plaintiff a right-to-sue-letter on September 22, 2025. Id. at 6.
Regarding his financial condition, Plaintiff alleges in the IFP Motion that he is employed
and makes $18 per hour. [DE 3] at 1. He does not have income from other sources. Id. Plaintiff
represents having $500 in a checking or savings account. Id. at 2. He also has a 2010 Mercedes
Benz. Id. In terms of expenses and liabilities, Plaintiff represents that he spends $350 per month
on utilities, $1,000 per month on rent, $73 per month on a loan, and $200 per month on
transportation. Id. Plaintiff also appears to represent that several people depend on him for
support. Id.
ANALYSIS
I. IFP MOTION
In the IFP Motion, Plaintiff seeks to proceed without prepaying fees and costs. See [DE 3]
at 1. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Court may, upon a finding of indigency, authorize the
commencement of an action without requiring the prepayment of fees or security. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a)(1). The granting of a motion to proceed in forma pauperis is discretionary. Pace v.
Evans, 709 F.2d 1428, 1429 (11th Cir. 1983). “When considering a motion filed under Section
1915(a), ‘[t]he only determination to be made by the court . . . is whether the statements in the
affidavit satisfy the requirement of poverty.’” Raftery v. Vt. Student Assistance Corp., 2016 WL
11579801, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 17, 2016) (quoting Martinez v. Kristi Kleaners, Inc., 364 F.3d
1305, 1307 (11th Cir. 2004)). “[A]n affidavit will be held sufficient if it represents that the litigant,
because of his poverty, is unable to pay for the court fees and costs, and to support and provide
necessities for himself and his dependents.” Martinez, 364 F.3d at 1307. A plaintiff, however,
need not be “absolutely destitute.” Id. Accordingly, a court must compare “the applicant’s assets
and liabilities in order to determine whether he has satisfied the poverty requirement.” Thomas v.
Chattahoochee Jud. Cir., 574 F. App’x 916, 917 (11th Cir. 2014).
In this case, Plaintiff has not yet satisfied that he cannot pay for the fees and costs of
maintaining this action and simultaneously pay for the necessary expenses of himself and his
dependents. While Plaintiff represents that he has only $500 in a savings or checking account and
three dependents, his listed income of $18 per hour exceeds the monthly expenses he lists
(assuming Plaintiff works a standard forty hours per week) by a fair margin. However, the IFP
Motion does not appear to give a full picture of Plaintiff’s expenses and is incomplete at various
points (e.g., it does not describe how much Plaintiff contributes per month to each of the three
dependents he lists). Therefore, the IFP Motion will be denied without prejudice. Plaintiff may
refile the IFP Motion by fully and accurately completing the “long form” IFP application2 when
or before he files an amended complaint, as directed below.
2 The appropriate form is available here: https://www.uscourts.gov/forms-rules/forms/application-
proceed-district-court-without-prepaying-fees-or-costs-long-form.
II. SCREENING OF COMPLAINT
Plaintiff must file an amended complaint. The screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)
apply here since Plaintiff has sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Under that statute, “the
court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . (i) is frivolous
or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief
against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). As discussed
below, Plaintiff’s Complaint [DE 1] is subject to dismissal for multiple reasons. However, rather
than dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint now, the Court will provide Plaintiff an opportunity to file
an amended complaint to see if Plaintiff can rectify the deficiencies with the current Complaint.
Failure to rectify the issues outlined below may result in dismissal without any further opportunity
to amend the Complaint.
Generally, in preparing his amended complaint, Plaintiff should ensure that he complies
with all applicable rules, including Rules 8 and 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.3 In
accordance with Rule 8, Plaintiff’s amended complaint must contain: “(1) a short and plain
statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction . . . ; (2) a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought, which
may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Although
3 Pro se pleadings are liberally construed and held to “less stringent standards” than pleadings
drafted by attorneys. Bilal v. Geo Care, LLC, 981 F.3d 903, 911 (11th Cir. 2020). “Yet even in
the case of pro se litigants this leniency does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel
for a party, or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” Campbell
v. Air Jam. Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168-69 (11th Cir. 2014). Moreover, pro se litigants are required
to comply with procedural rules. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) (“[W]e
have never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as
to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel.”); Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826,
829 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[A]lthough [courts] are to give liberal construction to the pleadings of pro
se litigants, ‘[courts] nevertheless have required them to conform to procedural rules.’” (citing
Loren v. Sasser, 309 F.3d 1296, 1304 (11th Cir. 2002))).
Rule 8(a) does not require “detailed factual allegations,” it does require “more than labels and
conclusions”; a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl.
Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level” and must be sufficient “to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Id. at 555, 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Here, an amended complaint is necessary because the current one is a “shotgun pleading.”
See Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015)
(“Complaints that violate either Rule 8(a)(2) or Rule 10(b), or both, are often disparagingly
referred to as ‘shotgun pleadings.’”). As stated earlier, Rule 8(a)(2) requires “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
Additionally, Rule 10(b) requires that “[a] party . . . state its claims or defenses in numbered
paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
10(b). A few types of shotgun pleadings exist, but “[t]he unifying characteristic of all types of
shotgun pleadings is that they fail to . . . give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against
them and the grounds upon which each claim rests.” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1323. One type of
shotgun pleading occurs when the complaint is “replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial
facts not obviously connected to any particular cause of action.” Id. at 1322. Another type occurs
when the complaint fails to separate each cause of action or claim for relief into different counts.
Id. at 1323. A third type occurs when the complaint “assert[s] multiple claims against multiple
defendants without specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions,
or which of the defendants the claim is brought against.” Id.
Plaintiff’s Complaint is a shotgun pleading. First, it does not contain consistently
numbered paragraphs with “each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). Second, it is unclear what cause of action Plaintiff is bringing, and the
allegations that do exist are vague and conclusory. Third, the Complaint appears to bring claims
against multiple Defendants without specifying which acts or omissions are attributable to which
Defendant. Specifically, Plaintiff does not name a particular cause of action or cite a particular
statute in his Complaint. Based on what can be gleaned from the allegations, the Court presumes
Plaintiff is attempting to bring some type of race discrimination or related claim against a former
employer. If so, Plaintiff must allege facts that would raise a plausible inference that he is entitled
to relief under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 1981, or some
other federal or state4 statute that provides a private right of action for workplace discrimination
due to a protected characteristic. Plaintiff must also make sure to separate the different causes of
action he may have under each statute (e.g., discrimination,5 retaliation,6 hostile work
4 Plaintiff must also clarify the basis on which he invokes this Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.
Plaintiff indicates that the basis for this Court’s jurisdiction is diversity jurisdiction, [DE 1] at 3,
but his allegations and the letter from the EEOC attached to the Complaint suggest that Plaintiff
may be bringing a cause of action based on federal employment law. See generally 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (federal-question jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (diversity jurisdiction).
5 “To state a race-discrimination claim under Title VII, a complaint need only ‘provide enough
factual matter (taken as true) to suggest intentional race discrimination.’” Surtain v. Hamlin
Terrace Found., 789 F.3d 1239, 1246 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.
Consol., 516 F.3d 955, 974 (11th Cir.2008)). In other words, the factual allegations of Plaintiff’s
amended complaint will be sufficient if they “plausibly suggest that the plaintiff suffered an
adverse employment action due to intentional racial discrimination.” Id.
6 To state a retaliation claim under Title VII, Plaintiff must show: “(1) that []he engaged in an
activity protected under Title VII; (2) []he suffered a materially adverse action; and (3) there was
a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action.” Kidd v. Mando Am.
Corp., 731 F.3d 1196, 1211 (11th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
environment,7 etc.) into different counts, naming each defendant that the count is brought against
and specifying what exactly each defendant did or failed to do.
In sum, Plaintiff must, at the very minimum, do the following things in any amended
complaint: (1) separate allegations into numbered paragraphs; (2) separate claims into different
counts that identify which Defendants (if more than one) each count is brought against; (3) explain
which Defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions; (4) provide supporting factual
allegations to support legal conclusions such that the factual content raises a plausible inference
that Defendants are liable.
These highlighted issues are only intended to provide some guidance to Plaintiff; they are
not necessarily an exhaustive list of all the deficiencies with Plaintiff’s Complaint. Because of the
Complaint’s deficiencies, the Court will require Plaintiff to file an amended complaint. Plaintiff
must rectify any deficiencies with his Complaint, including those outlined above.
III. REFERRAL MOTION
“A plaintiff in a civil case has no constitutional right to counsel.” Bass v. Perrin, 170 F.3d
1312, 1320 (11th Cir. 1999). And appointment of counsel in civil cases is usually reserved for
exceptional circumstances. See id. Plaintiff has not provided any exceptional circumstances, and
none can be gleaned from the Complaint. The Complaint is a shotgun pleading that does not enable
the Court to evaluate whether the legal claims are straightforward or exceedingly complicated.
7 “To state a claim for hostile work environment, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) []he belongs to a
protected group; (2) []he has been subject to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment must have
been based on a protected characteristic of the employee; (4) the harassment was sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of employment and create a discriminatorily
abusive working environment; and (5) the employer is responsible for such environment under
either a theory of vicarious or direct liability.” Usai v. Club Mgmt. Mia. II, LLC, 801 F. Supp. 3d
1295, 1321 (S.D. Fla. 2025).
Moreover, Plaintiff has not yet satisfied the poverty requirement to proceed in forma pauperis.
Therefore, the Referral Motion is due to be denied.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED that:
1. Plaintiff's IFP Motion [DE 3] is DENIED. Plaintiff may refile his IFP Motion
when he files his amended complaint. The refiled motion shall be complete and based on the “long
form” linked for Plaintiff above.
2. Plaintiff's Referral Motion [DE 4] is DENIED.
3. No later than April 15, 2026, Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint in
accordance with this Order (i.e., an amended complaint that rectifies the deficiencies with
Plaintiffs current complaint). Failure to do so may result in dismissal of this action without further
notice.
DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, this 25th day of March 2026.
United States Magistrate Judge
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