Ray v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Corrie M Ray, No. CV-25-03533-PHX-DJH 10 Plaintiff, ORDER 11 v. 12 Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 13 Defendant. 14 15 Plaintiff Corrie M. Ray (“Plaintiff”) seeks this Court’s review of the Social Security 16 Administration (“SSA”) Commissioner’s (the “Commissioner”) denial of her application 17 for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. (Doc. 14). The matter 18 is fully briefed. (Docs. 16, 22). Having reviewed the briefs and the Administrative Record 19 (Docs. 11-1–11-11, “AR.”) and for the reasons set out below, the Court concludes that this 20 matter shall be remanded for further proceedings. 21 I. Procedural Background 22 On December 10, 2020, Plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance 23 benefits, and on December 28, 2020, Plaintiff filed an application for supplemental security 24 income, alleging a disability onset of September 7, 2020. (AR. 17). Plaintiff’s claims were 25 first denied on April 27, 2022, then again upon reconsideration on August 11, 2022. (Id.) 26 After these denials, Plaintiff filed a request for a hearing, which was granted, and a 27 telephonic hearing was held before the ALJ on April 30, 2024. (Id.) Following the hearing, 28 the ALJ issued his decision, determining that Plaintiff was not disabled on July 24, 2024. 1 (Id. at 28). 2 The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review on July 31, 2025, causing 3 the ALJ’s July 24, 2024 to be adopted as a final agency decision. (Id. at 1). Upon receipt 4 of this denial, Plaintiff filed the present action, seeking Court review, on September 25, 5 2025. (See Doc. 1). 6 II. The ALJ’s Decision 7 To determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the Act, the ALJ 8 follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). First, the ALJ determines whether 9 the claimant is presently engaging in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 10 404.1520(a)(4)(i). Second, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has a “severe” 11 medically determinable physical or mental impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). 12 Third, the ALJ considers whether the claimant’s impairment or combination of 13 impairments meets or medically equals an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P 14 of 20 C.F.R. Part 404. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is automatically 15 found to be disabled. Id. At step four, the ALJ assesses the claimant’s residual functional 16 capacity (“RFC”) and determines whether the claimant is still capable of performing past 17 relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If not, the ALJ proceeds to the fifth step, 18 where they determine whether the claimant can perform any other work in the national 19 economy based on the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 20 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If the ALJ determines no such work is available, then the claimant is 21 disabled. Id. 22 Here, the ALJ first found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful 23 activity since September 7, 2020, the alleged onset date. (AR. 19). Second, the ALJ 24 determined that Plaintiff suffered from severe impairments in the form of “cervical and 25 lumbar degenerative disc disease; right knee degenerative joint disease; obesity; anxiety 26 disorder; and depressive disorder.” (Id.) And at the third step, the ALJ concluded that 27 Plaintiff does not have an impairment or a combination of impairments that met or 28 medically equaled an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Part 404. 1 (Id. at 20). 2 At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the RFC: 3 [T]o lift and/or carry 10 pounds occasionally and less than 10 pounds frequently, stand and/or walk for two hours in an 8 hour work day, sit for six 4 hours in an 8 hour work day, and push and pull is limited to the weights given 5 above. The claimant can occasionally climb, kneel, stoop, crouch, and crawl but never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. The claimant must avoid 6 concentrated exposure to hazardous machinery and unprotected heights. The 7 claimant is able to understand, remember, and apply detailed but not complex instructions, able to interact appropriately with supervisors, but only 8 occasionally with coworkers and the general public. The claimant can 9 concentrate, persist, and maintain pace for two hours at a time and manage herself and adapt to gradual changes in the workplace. 10 (Id. at 22). Fifth and finally, Plaintiff was found unable to perform any past relevant work. 11 (Id. at 26). Based on Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, the ALJ 12 determined that there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that 13 the claimant can perform. (Id. at 27). As a result, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not 14 disabled under the Social Security Act. (Id. at 28). 15 II. Standard of Review 16 In considering whether to reverse an ALJ’s decision, the district court reviews only 17 those issues raised by the party challenging the decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 18 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court may set aside the Commissioner’s disability 19 determination only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error. 20 Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is relevant evidence 21 that a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion considering the 22 record as a whole. Id. 23 To determine whether substantial evidence supports a decision, the Court must 24 consider the record as a whole and may not affirm simply by isolating a “specific quantum 25 of supporting evidence.” Orn, 495 F.3d at 630. The ALJ must “set forth the reasoning 26 behind its decisions in a way that allows for meaningful review.” Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 27 806 F.3d 487, 492 (9th Cir. 2015). The ALJ is responsible for resolving conflicts, 28 addressing ambiguity, and determining credibility. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1 1039 (9th Cir. 1995); Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989). While the 2 Court is required to examine the record as a whole, it may neither reweigh the evidence 3 nor substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 4 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). Generally, “[w]here the evidence is susceptible to more than one 5 rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion 6 must be upheld.” Id. at 954 (citations omitted). 7 III. Discussion 8 Plaintiff, initially, presents the issue here as whether this matter should be remanded 9 for further proceedings or an award of benefits. (Doc. 14 at 1). However, further reading 10 reveals that Plaintiff first challenges the ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s symptom 11 testimony, certain medical opinion testimony, and Plaintiff’s headaches. (See id. at 8–18). 12 Lastly, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in finding that a significant number of jobs 13 existed in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform. (Id. at 18). 14 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to give clear and convincing reasons supported 15 by substantial record evidence for rejecting her subjective symptom testimony. (Doc. 14 16 at 8–13). More specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s generalized findings and 17 recounting of waxing and waning symptoms do not satisfy the requirements to discredit 18 her testimony, and Plaintiff’s daily activities do not serve as reasons to disregard her 19 symptoms testimony. (Id.) The Commissioner disagrees, arguing that the ALJ reasonably 20 concluded that Plaintiff’s more extreme allegations of debilitating mental limitations were 21 inconsistent with objective evidence as well as her daily activities. (Doc. 16 at 3–8). 22 An ALJ must perform a two-step analysis when determining whether a claimant’s 23 testimony about subjective pain or symptoms is credible. Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1035– 24 1036 (9th Cir. 2007). First, the ALJ must determine whether Plaintiff presented objective 25 medical evidence of an impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the 26 symptoms alleged. Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1014. “In this analysis, the claimant is not 27 required to show ‘that her impairment could reasonably be expected to cause the severity 28 of the symptom she has alleged; she need only show that it could reasonably have caused 1 some degree of the symptom.’ ” Id. (quoting Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1282 (9th 2 Cir. 1996)). Second, if there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ may reject the 3 Plaintiff’s symptom testimony only by giving specific, clear, and convincing reasons. Id. 4 at 1015; Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 488–89. 5 “[T]he ALJ must specifically identify the testimony she or he finds not to be credible 6 and must explain what evidence undermines the testimony.” Holohan v. Massanari, 246 7 F.3d 1195, 1208 (9th Cir. 2001). General findings about the Plaintiff’s credibility are 8 insufficient. Id. “Although the ALJ’s analysis need not be extensive, the ALJ must provide 9 some reasoning in order for [the Court] to meaningfully determine whether the ALJ’s 10 conclusions were supported by substantial evidence.” Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 11 Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1099 (9th Cir. 2014). However, “an ALJ [is not] required to 12 believe every allegation of disabling pain, or else disability benefits would be available for 13 the asking, a result plainly contrary to 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A).” Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 14 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989). “[T]he ALJ may consider inconsistencies either in the claimant’s 15 testimony or between the testimony and the claimant’s conduct.” Molina, 674 F.3d at 16 1112. For instance, the ALJ may consider “whether the claimant engages in daily activities 17 inconsistent with the alleged symptoms.” Id (quoting Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1040). 18 Additionally, “[a]lthough [a] lack of medical evidence cannot form the sole basis 19 for discounting pain [or symptom] testimony, it is a factor that the ALJ can consider in his 20 credibility analysis.” Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005). Albeit an ALJ 21 may not “effectively render a claimant’s subjective symptom testimony superfluous by 22 demanding positive objective medical evidence fully corroborating every allegation within 23 the subjective testimony.” Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 495 (9th Cir. 2022). 24 Here, the ALJ outlined Plaintiff’s symptom testimony as follows: 25 The claimant premises her claim for disability on neck and back pain, knee pain, and migraines. She alleges a pain scale of 8/10 on an average day before 26 she takes medications which lowers the pain level to 5/10. She described 27 neck pain radiating up her head to shoulders and arms and causing headaches. She testified that she experiences headaches often when the pain level is 8 28 9/10. The pain allegedly limits her ability to use the upper extremities such 1 that she is unable to do things such as personal grooming. She also testified that she experiences sciatica and that she stretches out and lies down do 2 alleviate her discomfort. The claimant also testified that she has COPD with 3 difficulty breathing. In terms of standing and walking, she testified that she has great difficulty due to pain and difficulty breathing and can only sit for 4 about 15 minutes due to pain. She estimated that she can walk only a very 5 limited distance. Mentally, the claimant alleges a lot of depression, impaired memory, lack of motivation, and difficulty getting along with others. The 6 claimant also alleges medication side effects including memory loss and 7 feeling light headed. 8 (AR. 23). As to the first step, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s impairments could 9 reasonably be expected to produce the symptoms alleged. (Id.) Nonetheless, the ALJ 10 determined that Plaintiff’s “statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects 11 of her symptoms, they are inconsistent because the evidence reports a number of normal 12 examination findings that are in contrast to allegations.” (Id.) 13 The ALJ recounts Plaintiff’s medical records at length. (Id. at 23–24). However, 14 the issue with the ALJ’s summary of the records is that it is just that–a summary of waxing 15 and waning symptoms. Indeed, the ALJ takes “note” of many pieces of record evidence in 16 this summary without explaining how it either supports or does not support any 17 particularized conclusion he is reaching. Not to mention, the ALJ vacillates between 18 medical evidence concerning Plaintiff’s physical and mental symptoms without coming to 19 a clear conclusion on any one symptom. Gayle P. v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 2022 WL 20 17485556, at *3 (D. Or. 2022) (“Plaintiff, however, reported a range and variety of 21 symptoms and the ALJ failed to link any of his observations about the medical evidence to 22 any specific testimony given by plaintiff about those symptoms.”). “[P]roviding a 23 summary of medical evidence . . . is not the same as providing clear and convincing reasons 24 for finding the claimant’s symptom testimony not credible.” Lambert v. Saul, 980 F.3d 25 1266, 1278 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 494). The ALJ neglected 26 to “identify what testimony [was] not credible and what evidence undermine[d] the 27 claimant’s complaints.” Ghanim, 763 F.3d at 1163. 28 For example, the ALJ neither explained (a) why smatterings of normal findings did 1 not support Plaintiff’s symptom testimony; nor (b) why the normal findings should be 2 given more weight than the abnormal findings to discredit her symptom testimony. See 3 Curtis v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 2018 WL 6418486, *7 (D. Ariz. 2018) (citing 4 Garrison, 59 F.3d at 1009); see also Sonya S. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2022 WL 420824, 5 at *2 (W.D. Wash. 2022) (“The ALJ here noted some normal findings relating to Plaintiff's 6 lower extremities, but failed to explain why those findings were more relevant or 7 persuasive than the abnormal findings in the record.”). The ALJ’s discussion of the 8 objective medical evidence, absent any reasons for credibility determinations, is 9 insufficient to reject seemingly all of Plaintiff’s testimony under the clear and convincing 10 standard. See Lambert, 980 F.3d at 1277–78; Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 1137–38 11 (9th Cir. 2014). 12 The only time the ALJ provides any specific explanation for discrediting Plaintiff’s 13 symptom testimony is in mentioning email correspondence concerning Plaintiff driving for 14 Uber/Lyft. The ALJ stated: 15 The undersigned has also reviewed the records in 31F showing email correspondences in 2024. The undersigned takes note of an email in January 16 2024 reporting that the claimant was working as an Uber/Lyft driver which 17 is in contrast to her allegations of disabling pain (31F p.7). 18 (AR. 24). Yet, “the ALJ failed to specify how Plaintiff’s work as an Uber driver 19 contradicted her symptom testimony or otherwise indicated that she was able to undertake 20 the physical and mental functions that would be required on a sustained basis in a work 21 setting.” Laurie A. W. v. O’Malley, 2024 WL 6901364, at *4 (C.D. Cal. 2024). Moreover, 22 while the Court will not reconsider the evidence, Plaintiff shows that she only worked as a 23 driver for two weeks. (AR. 428). There is no indication that the ALJ considered the very 24 limited timeframe of Plaintiff’s driving, and regardless, Plaintiff’s “[s]poradic ability to 25 work” was not necessarily “inconsistent with disability.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 26 724 (9th Cir. 1998). Therefore, Plaintiff’s short stint as an Uber/Lyft driver is not a clear 27 and convincing reason for discrediting her testimony. 28 Additionally, though not mentioned in this particular portion of the ALJ’s analysis, 1 the Commissioner states that the ALJ also “pointed out, elsewhere in the decision, Plaintiff 2 reported she shopped for groceries, prepared meals, and had no problems maintaining her 3 hygiene.” (Doc. 16 at 7). However, these actions noted by the Commissioner are some of 4 the most basic functions of life. And “the mere fact that a plaintiff has carried on certain 5 daily activities, such as grocery shopping, driving a car, or limited walking for exercise, 6 does not in any way detract from her credibility as to her overall disability [o]ne does not 7 need to be utterly incapacitated in order to be disabled.” Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 8 1049–50 (9th Cir. 2001). Therefore, the Court does not find that these activities serve as 9 clear and convincing reasons to reject Plaintiff’s testimony. 10 Lastly, the ALJ seems to partially rely on the fact that, after an inpatient stay for 11 suicidal ideations, Plaintiff “followed up with her primary care provider and reported that 12 she felt much better after a medication adjustment.” (AR. 24). But it is not clear which 13 symptoms the ALJ is using this statement to discredit, nor is there any indication of 14 sustained improvement from medication. Further, there is no other mention of Plaintiff’s 15 response to medication. This vague assertion is not a sufficient basis for discounting 16 Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. 17 Overall, the ALJ’s discrediting of Plaintiff’s symptom testimony was not supported 18 by clear and convincing reasons. All the same, an ALJ’s decision will not be reversed for 19 errors that are harmless. Stout v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 2006) 20 (citing Curry v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 1990)). However, a reviewing 21 court cannot consider an error harmless “unless it can confidently conclude that no 22 reasonable ALJ … could have reached a different disability determination.” Id. at 1056. 23 In other words, legal errors are harmless only if they are inconsequential to the non- 24 disability decision. Id. at 1055. 25 Here, the Court is unable to conclude that the ALJ’s failure to state legally sufficient 26 reasons for discounting Plaintiff's subjective symptom testimony or Dr. White’s medical 27 opinion was harmless. The ALJ’s RFC determination necessarily relied on the ALJ’s 28 rejection of Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. The Court realizes that the RFC accounted for 1 some of Plaintiff’s symptoms, but it did not take into consideration the other discredited 2 portions of her testimony, which included a broad finding as to the severity and persistence 3 of apparently all of Plaintiff’s alleged symptoms. Thus, the error was not harmless. 4 Because the Court finds that the ALJ erred in his assessment of Plaintiff’s symptom 5 testimony, the Court does not reach her remaining arguments. Indeed, the Court cannot 6 address whether the ALJ properly found that a significant number of jobs that Plaintiff can 7 perform exist in the national economy. This is because reevaluation of Plaintiff’s symptom 8 testimony may lead to a different RFC determination, and therefore the number of jobs, if 9 any, that Plaintiff can perform may be reconsidered. 10 V. Remand 11 Once a court has determined an ALJ’s decision contains harmful error, it maintains 12 discretion to remand the case for additional proceedings or for an award of benefits. 13 Reddick, 157 F.3d at 728 (citing Swenson v. Sullivan, 876 F.2d 683, 689 (9th Cir. 1989)). 14 Remand for further administrative proceedings is appropriate if enhancement of the record 15 would be useful. See Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2000). This is “the 16 proper course, except in rare circumstances[.]” Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 17 775 F.3d 1090, 1099 (9th Cir. 2014). Conversely, under the “credit-as-true” rule, the court 18 has discretion to remand for an award of benefits where “(1) the record has been fully 19 developed and further administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose; (2) the 20 ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, whether 21 claimant testimony or medical opinion; and (3) if the improperly discredited evidence were 22 credited as true, the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled on remand.” 23 Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1020 (citations omitted). 24 Plaintiff argues her case meets the credit-as-true standard. (Doc. 14 at 4–8). 25 However, the Court finds it is not clear from the record that the ALJ would be required to 26 find Plaintiff disabled if all the evidence were properly evaluated and explained. Further 27 analysis of Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony alongside other pertinent record 28 evidence is necessary before a proper determination of Plaintiff’s disability can be made. 1 || Therefore, the Court, in its discretion, finds that a remand for further proceedings is || appropriate here. 3 Accordingly, 4 IT IS ORDERED that Administrative Law Judge’s July 24, 2024, decision is 5 || reversed and remanded for additional proceedings consistent with this Order. 6 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is kindly directed to enter || judgment accordingly and terminate this action. 8 Dated this 28th day of September, 2026. 9 10 oC. . oe □ norable' Diané4. Hurtetewa 2 United States District Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 -10-