Opinions and documents
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 KIMBERLY MARY ZAPALAC, Case No. 1:25-cv-01264-CDB (SS)
12 Plaintiff, ORDER ON STIPULATION FOR AWARD
OF ATTORNEY FEES PURSUANT TO
13 v. THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT,
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)
14 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
(Doc. 18)
15 Defendant.
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17 Pending before the Court is the stipulated request of Plaintiff Kimberly Mary Zapalac
18 (“Plaintiff”) for the award of attorney’s fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”),
19 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d), in the amount of $9,497.36 to counsel for Plaintiff, Francesco Benavides.1
20 (Doc. 18).
21 The parties agree that an award of attorney’s fees to counsel for Plaintiff should be made
22 payable to Plaintiff, but if the Department of the Treasury determines that Plaintiff does not owe a
23 federal debt, then the Commissioner shall cause the payment of fees, expenses, and costs to be made
24 directly to Plaintiff’s counsel, Francesco Benavides. Id. at 2.
25 On February 24, 2026, the Court granted the parties’ stipulation to voluntary remand and
26 remanded the case pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to the Commissioner for further
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1 Both parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a U.S. magistrate judge for all
1 proceedings. (Doc. 16). Judgment was entered the same day. (Doc. 17). On March 3, 2026,
2 Plaintiff filed the pending stipulation for attorney’s fees as a prevailing party. (Doc. 18). See
3 Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 300-02 (1993) (concluding that a party who wins a sentence-four
4 remand order under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) is a prevailing party). Plaintiff’s filing is timely. Van v.
5 Barnhart, 483 F.3d 600, 607 (9th Cir. 2007).
6 The EAJA provides for an award of attorney fees to private litigants who both prevail in civil
7 actions (other than tort) against the United States and timely file a petition for fees. 28 U.S.C. §
8 2412(d)(1)(A). Under the EAJA, a court shall award attorney fees to the prevailing party unless it
9 finds the government’s position was “substantially justified or that special circumstances make such
10 an award unjust.” Id. Here, the government did not show its position was substantially justified
11 and the Court finds there are not special circumstances that would make an award unjust. Moreover,
12 the Commissioner does not oppose the requested relief. (Doc. 18). See Sanchez v. Berryhill, No.
13 1:16-cv-01081-SKO, 2018 WL 509817, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2018) (finding position of the
14 government was not substantially justified in view of the Commissioner’s assent to remand);
15 Knyazhina v. Colvin, No. 2:12–cv–2726 DAD, 2014 WL 5324302, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2014)
16 (same).
17 Plaintiff requests an award of $9,497.36 in EAJA fees as authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d).
18 (Doc. 18). The Ninth Circuit maintains a list of the statutory maximum hourly rates authorized by
19 the EAJA, adjusted for increases in the cost of living, on its website.2 See Thangaraja v. Gonzales,
20 428 F.3d 870, 876-77 (9th Cir. 2005). Under the applicable rate of $251.84, the requested award
21 would amount to approximately 38 hours of attorney time (not accounting for any paralegal time
22 expended). The Court finds this reasonable and commensurate with the number of hours an attorney
23 would need to have spent reviewing the certified administrative record in this case (approximately
24 1,369 pages; Doc. 10) and preparing a motion for summary judgment that includes 14 pages of
25 argument (Doc. 11 at 9-22). With respect to the results obtained, Plaintiff’s counsel obtained a
26 favorable judgment remanding the case for further proceedings. (Docs. 16, 17).
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2 Statutory Maximum Rates Under the Equal Access to Justice, available at
https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/attorneys/statutory-maximum-rates/ (last visited November 17,
] EAJA fees, expenses, and costs are subject to any offsets allowed under the Treasury Offset
2 | Program (“TOP”), as discussed in Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586 (2010). If the Commissioner
3 | determines upon effectuation of this order that Plaintiff's EAJA fees are not subject to any offset
4 | allowed under the TOP, the fees shall be delivered or otherwise transmitted to Plaintiffs counsel.
5 Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED:
6 1. Plaintiff's stipulated request for attorney’s fees pursuant to the EAJA (Doc. 18) is
7 GRANTED; and
8 2. The Commissioner is directed to pay to Plaintiff as the prevailing party attorney’s fees in
9 the amount of $9,497.36, pursuant to the terms set forth in the parties’ stipulation. (Doc.
10 18). Fees shall be made payable to Plaintiff, but if the Department of the Treasury
11 determines that Plaintiff does not owe a federal debt, then the government shall cause the
12 payment of fees, expenses, and costs to be made directly to Plaintiffs counsel, as set forth
13 in the stipulation.
14 [T IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: _ March 6, 2026 | Wr bY
16 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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