Mayfield v. Bisignano

1 May 13, 2026 SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 7 LADY M.1, No. 4:25-CV-05128-RLP 8 Plaintiff, ORDER REVERSING AND REMANDING THE 9 v. COMMISSIONER’S DECISION FOR FURTHER ADMINISTRATIVE 10 FRANK BISIGNANO PROCEEDINGS COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 11 SECURITY, 12 Defendant. 13 BEFORE THE COURT is an appeal from an Administrative Law Judge 14 (ALJ) final decision denying supplemental security income under Title XVI of the 15 Social Security Act. ECF No. 12. The Court considered the matter without oral 16 argument. For the reasons discussed below, the Court concludes the ALJ 17 committed harmful legal error in assessing whether Ms. M. met or medically 18 equaled a Listing and in evaluating Ms. M.’s symptom testimony. Therefore, Ms. 19 20 1 Plaintiff’s first name and last initial are used to protect her privacy. 1 M.’s brief, ECF No. 12, is granted and the Commissioner’s brief, ECF No. 16, is 2 denied. 3 BACKGROUND 4 Ms. M. was seven years old on the alleged onset date of May 1, 2008. Tr. 5 201. Ms. M. graduated from a special education high school. Tr. 46. She briefly 6 worked at Goodwill and Wal-Mart in 2019 and 2020 respectively. Tr. 212-13. She 7 has no other work history. Tr. 208-14. 8 Ms. M. filed this claim for supplemental security income on April 1, 2022. 9 Tr. 201-06. The claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration. Tr. 63-72, 74- 10 82. A hearing occurred on January 16, 2025, at which Ms. M. testified as to her 11 symptoms. Tr. 39-62. On January 29, 2025, the ALJ issued an unfavorable 12 decision. Tr. 17-29. The Appeals Council denied a request for review. Tr. 1-3. The 13 matter is now before this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 14 STANDARD OF REVIEW 15 This Court’s review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social 16 Security is governed by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The scope of review is limited; the 17 Commissioner’s decision will be disturbed “only if it is not supported by 18 substantial evidence or is based on legal error.” Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1158 19 (9th Cir. 2012). If the evidence in the record “is susceptible to more than one 20 1 rational interpretation, [the Court] must uphold the ALJ’s findings if they are 2 supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the record.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 3 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012). 4 Further, a district court “may not reverse an ALJ’s decision on account of an 5 error that is harmless.” Id. An error is harmless “where it is inconsequential to the 6 [ALJ’s] ultimate nondisability determination.” Id. at 1115 (quotation and citation 7 omitted). The party appealing the ALJ’s decision generally bears the burden of 8 establishing that it was harmed. Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409-10, 129 S. 9 Ct. 1696 (2009). 10 FIVE-STEP EVALUATION PROCESS 11 A claimant must satisfy two conditions to be considered “disabled” within 12 the meaning of the Social Security Act. First, the claimant must be “unable to 13 engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 14 physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which 15 has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve 16 months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). Second, the claimant’s 17 impairment must be “of such severity that he is not only unable to do [his or her] 18 previous work[,] but cannot, considering [his or her] age, education, and work 19 experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in 20 the national economy.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3(B). 1 The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential analysis to 2 determine whether a claimant satisfies the above criteria. See 20 C.F.R. § 3 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v). At step one, if the claimant is engaged in “substantial gainful 4 activity,” the Commissioner must find that the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 5 416.920(b). At step two, the Commissioner considers the severity of the claimant’s 6 impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii). If the claimant suffers from “any 7 impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits [his or her] 8 physical or mental ability to do basic work activities,” the analysis proceeds to step 9 three. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). At step three, the Commissioner compares the 10 claimant’s impairment to severe impairments recognized by the Commissioner to 11 be so severe as to preclude a person from engaging in substantial gainful activity. 12 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii). 13 If the severity of the claimant’s impairment does not meet or exceed the 14 severity of the enumerated impairments, the Commissioner must assess the 15 claimant’s residual functional capacity (RFC), which is the claimant’s ability to 16 perform physical and mental work activities on a sustained basis despite his or her 17 limitations, 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1). 18 At step four, the Commissioner considers whether, in view of the claimant’s 19 RFC, the claimant is capable of performing work that he or she has performed in 20 the past (past relevant work). 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If not, the analysis 1 proceeds to step five and the Commissioner considers whether, in view of the 2 claimant’s RFC, the claimant is capable of performing other work in the national 3 economy. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(v). 4 The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four above. 5 Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). If the analysis proceeds to 6 step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to establish that (1) the claimant is 7 capable of performing other work; and (2) such work “exists in significant 8 numbers in the national economy.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.960(c)(2); Beltran v. Astrue, 9 700 F.3d 386, 389 (9th Cir. 2012). 10 ALJ’S FINDINGS 11 At step one, the ALJ found Ms. M. had not engaged in substantial gainful 12 activity since April 6, 2022. Tr. 19. At step two, the ALJ found Ms. M. had the 13 following severe impairments: Major Depressive Disorder, ADHD, Autism 14 Spectrum Disorder, and Mild obesity. Id. 15 At step three, the ALJ found Ms. M. did not have an impairment or 16 combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of a listing. 17 Tr. 21. Specifically, the ALJ considered Listings 12.04 Depressive, Bipolar and 18 Related Disorders, 12.10 Autism Spectrum Disorder, and 12.11 19 Neurodevelopmental Disorders. Id. The ALJ found Ms. M. did not satisfy the B 20 Criteria for these listings because she had only mild limitations in her ability to 1 understand, remember, or apply information, and adapting and managing herself. 2 Tr. 21-22. The ALJ found moderate limitations in her ability to interact with 3 others, and concentrate, persist, or maintain pace. Id. As to the C Criteria for 4 Listing 12.04, the ALJ found the criteria were not met because Ms. M. did not 5 participate in highly structured or inpatient care. Tr. 22. 6 After finding Ms. M. did not meet or medically equal the severity of one of 7 the listed impairments, the ALJ assessed her RFC. Tr. 22-27. With regards to Ms. 8 M.’s own statements concerning her symptoms, the ALJ found Ms. M.’s 9 impairments could reasonably be expected to cause her alleged symptoms, but her 10 testimony was not entirely consistent with the medical evidence or the evidence in 11 the record. Tr. 23. 12 The ALJ then evaluated the medical opinions in the record. Tr. 25-27. The 13 ALJ found the opinions of Drs. Jan Lewis, Steven Haney, Bradley Stephan, and 14 Amit J. persuasive. Tr. 25-26. These doctors all found Ms. M. was not disabled. Id. 15 The ALJ found the opinion of Dr. Linda Wolcott partially persuasive. Tr. 26. The 16 ALJ found persuasive Dr. Wolcott’s opinions as to Ms. M. mild to moderate 17 limitations in sustained concentration, persistence, or pace and interaction with 18 others. Id. Otherwise, the ALJ found Dr. Wolcott’s opinions unpersuasive. Id. at 19 26-27. 20 1 The ALJ also considered an opinion from Ms. M’s counselor, Kathy Breese, 2 MSW. Tr. 27. The ALJ found Ms. Breese’s opinion unpersuasive. Tr. 27. This was 3 because Ms. Breese was not an acceptable medical source, she had a limited time 4 treating Ms. M., there was inconsistency with Ms. M.’s medical notes, and a lack 5 of support by Ms. Breese’s own findings and chart notes. Id. 6 The ALJ found Ms. M. had the following RFC: 7 [T]o perform medium work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(c) except climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds and crawling is limited 8 to frequent, and the claimant would need to avoid concentrated exposure to extreme temperatures, vibration, respiratory irritants, 9 and hazards. From a psychological perspective, the claimant is able to understand, remember, and carry out simple, routine tasks, is 10 able to maintain concentration, persistence and pace for two-hour intervals between regularly scheduled breaks, and can have only 11 occasional and superficial interactions with the public, coworkers, and supervisors. 12 Tr. 22-23. 13 At step four, the ALJ found Ms. M. had no past relevant work. Tr. 27. At 14 step five, the ALJ found Ms. M. capable of performing other work available in 15 significant numbers in the national economy such as a kitchen helper, laundry 16 worker, or cook helper. Tr. 28. Based on these adverse findings, the ALJ 17 determined Ms. M. has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social 18 Security Act, from April 6, 2022, through the date of the decision. Tr. 29. 19 // 20 1 ANALYSIS 2 Ms. M. does not contest the ALJ’s findings on steps one and two of the five 3 step evaluation process. She argues the ALJ erred at step three by failing to assess 4 more than moderate limitations on any of the four areas of mental functioning 5 contained in the B Criteria for Listings 12.04, 12.10, and 12.11, as the record 6 supports higher limitations. She also contends the ALJ failed to adequately 7 consider the C Criteria for Listing 12.04. Ms. M. asserts the ALJ improperly 8 rejected Ms. Breese’s opinion, and that if her opinion were credited as true the ALJ 9 would be required to find she satisfies the B and C Criteria for the above Listings. 10 Ms. M. also contends the ALJ improperly rejected her symptom testimony, 11 and that of her mother. Ms. M argues the improper rejection of evidence from Ms. 12 Breese, herself, and her mother meant the ALJ formulated an incomplete RFC. Ms. 13 M. further argues the ALJ’s incomplete RFC led to error at step five where the 14 ALJ found her capable of performing work available in significant numbers in the 15 national economy. Alternatively, Ms. M. argues the ALJ erred at step five by 16 inconsistently finding her capable of jobs requiring the ability to carry out detailed 17 instructions, but also that she could only perform simple, routine tasks. 18 A. Kathy Breese, MSW 19 Ms. M. contends the ALJ improperly evaluated the opinion of Ms. Breese, 20 as her findings are supported by her treatment notes and the notes of other 1 providers. Ms. M argues that if this opinion were properly credited, the ALJ would 2 have found her to have marked or extreme limitations satisfying the B Criteria for 3 Listings 12.04, 12.10, and 12.11, as well as the C Criteria for Listing 12.04. She 4 alternatively contends that crediting Ms. Breese’s testimony would have led to 5 more limitations being assessed to Ms. M.’s RFC. 6 The regulations provide that an ALJ must consider and evaluate the 7 persuasiveness of all medical opinions or prior administrative medical findings 8 from medical sources. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c. However, Ms. Breese, a counselor 9 with a master’s degree in social work, is not an acceptable medical source. 20 10 C.F.R. § 416.902(a); Cody B. v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 2022 WL 252752, at 11 *8 (D. Or. Jan. 27, 2022). 12 For claims filed on or after March 27, 2017, 20 C.F.R. § 416.9520c indicates 13 that an ALJ must evaluate evidence from medical sources and clarifies how an ALJ 14 should evaluate nonmedical lay testimony. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(d). The 15 regulations indicate ALJs should consider “all of the available evidence” in 16 evaluating the intensity and persistence of symptoms, including evidence from 17 “medical sources and nonmedical sources” about the effect of a claimant’s 18 symptoms. 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(1); see also SSR 16-3p (requiring ALJs to 19 consider other evidence such as other nonmedical sources to evaluate symptoms). 20 However, an ALJ is not required to articulate how evidence from nonmedical 1 sources was considered using the requirements applicable to evaluations of 2 medical opinions. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(d). 3 The Ninth Circuit has not yet determined whether the revised regulations no 4 longer require an ALJ to articulate any reason for rejecting lay testimony. See 5 Williams v. O’Malley, 2024 WL 3519774, at *3 n.4 (9th Cir. July 24, 2024). 6 Whether an ALJ must still provide germane reasons to reject a nonmedical 7 statement remains an open question. See Donnelly, v. Commissioner of Social 8 Security, 2025 WL 1473954, at *14 (E.D. Cal. May 22, 2025). 9 Regardless, the ALJ did provide germane reasons to reject Ms. Breese’s 10 testimony. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 511 (9th Cir. 2001) (conflict with 11 medical evidence is a germane reason to reject nonmedical testimony). In addition 12 to not being an acceptable medical source, the ALJ found Ms. Breese’s opinions 13 unpersuasive because they were inconsistent with the longitudinal record and 14 based off a limited history of treatment. 15 The ALJ’s observation that Ms. Breese’s opinion was inconsistent with the 16 medical record is supported by substantial evidence. While the ALJ’s findings on 17 Ms. Breese’s opinion are focused on Ms. M.’s anxiety and depression symptoms, 18 not her autism, the ALJ’s findings on lower limitations and improvement with 19 medication are nevertheless supported by the evidence she cited. It is worth noting 20 that many of the mental status examinations and clinical assessments cited by the 1 ALJ as evidence come from medication follow up appointments, or appointments 2 for physical concerns, and are usually repetitive of findings from prior evaluations. 3 This is not particularly strong or convincing evidence. Nevertheless, it is the ALJ’s 4 job to weigh the competing evidence in the record. The fact Ms. M. can argue for a 5 different conclusion using other evidence in the record is irrelevant. See 6 Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989) (ALJ “responsible for 7 resolving ambiguities” in the record). 8 Finally, the ALJ’s observation that Ms. Breese had only treated Ms. M. for 9 less than a year was accurate. Length of treatment relationship is a valid factor for 10 evaluating medical source opinions, 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c), and therefore is a 11 valid factor for evaluating nonmedical source opinions. 12 For all the above reasons, the ALJ’s rejection of Ms. Breese’s opinion was 13 not error. 14 B. The Listings 15 Ms. M. contends the ALJ erred at step three by failing to assess more than 16 moderate limitations on any point of the B Criteria for Listings 12.04, 12.10, and 17 12.11, as the record supports higher limitations. She also contends that the ALJ 18 failed to adequately consider the C Criteria for Listing 12.04. 19 The B Criteria for Listings 12.04, 12.10, and 12.11 all require: 20 Extreme limitation of one, or marked limitation of two, of the following areas of mental functioning (see 12.00F): 1 1. Understand, remember, or apply information (see 12.00E1). 2. Interact with others (see 12.00E2). 2 3. Concentrate, persist, or maintain pace (see 12.00E3). 4. Adapt or manage oneself (see 12.00E4). 3 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, 12.04, 12.10, 12.1. 4 Alternatively, Listing 12.04 can be satisfied by demonstrating the C Criteria 5 are present. The C Criteria for Listings 12.04 requires: 6 Your mental disorder in this listing category is “serious and persistent;” that is, you have a medically documented history of the 7 existence of the disorder over a period of at least 2 years, and there is evidence of both: 8 1. Medical treatment, mental health therapy, psychosocial support(s), or a highly structured setting(s) that is ongoing 9 and that diminishes the symptoms and signs of your mental disorder (see 12.00G2b); and 10 2. Marginal adjustment, that is, you have minimal capacity to adapt to changes in your environment or to demands that are 11 not already part of your daily life (see 12.00G2c). 12 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, 12.04. 13 Ms. M. claims the ALJ erred by finding she did not satisfy the B Criteria, as 14 the record contains evidence in support of marked limitations on all criteria. Again, 15 Ms. M. fails to appreciate the applicable standard of review. The evidence cited by 16 the ALJ in her decision is substantial evidence in support of only mild or moderate 17 limitations in the four areas of mental functioning contained within the B criteria. 18 The fact Ms. M. can argue for a different conclusion than the ALJ’s using other 19 evidence in the record is irrelevant. To the extent Ms. M.’s argument relies upon 20 Ms. Breese’s opinion, as discussed above, the ALJ did not err by finding her 1 opinion unpersuasive.2 To the extent her argument relies on her own subjective 2 symptom testimony, this cannot establish she meets or medically equals a Listing. 3 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(a). 4 Ms. M. also contends the ALJ erred by failing to adequately consider the C 5 Criteria for Listing 12.04. While Ms. M. failed to raise this argument before the 6 ALJ, the ALJ’s findings are nevertheless incomplete. 7 The C Criteria require both evidence of (1) medical treatment, mental health 8 therapy, psychosocial support(s), or a highly structured setting(s) that is ongoing 9 and that diminishes the symptoms and signs of your mental disorder; and (2) 10 marginal adjustment. The ALJ properly found there was no evidence Ms. M. lived 11 in a highly structured setting, but this is not the only way to satisfy criterion (1). 12 The ALJ did not make findings on whether Ms. M. underwent medical treatments, 13 mental health therapy, or psychosocial support on an ongoing basis that diminished 14 the symptoms and signs of her disorder. Nor did the ALJ make findings on 15 criterion (2), whether Ms. M. showed marginal adjustment. 16 However, an ALJ is not required to discuss the combined effects of a 17 claimant’s impairments or compare them to any listing in an equivalency 18 19 2 Likewise, Ms. Breese’s opinion that Ms. M. satisfied the C Criteria cannot 20 be credited as true as Ms. M. requests. 1 determination, unless the claimant presents evidence in an effort to establish 2 equivalence. See Lewis, 236 F.3d at 514; see also Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 3 683 (9th Cir. 2005) (ALJ’s failure to consider equivalence not reversible error 4 because the claimant did not offer any theory as to how his impairments combined 5 to equal a Listing). 6 It is the claimant’s burden to demonstrate the C Criteria are met. Ms. M. did 7 not present any argument as to the C Criteria to the ALJ. The ALJ can hardly be 8 expected to make findings on an argument a claimant did not make. Nevertheless, 9 the ALJ did make findings on the C Criteria. These findings are incomplete, as the 10 ALJ did not consider all the ways to satisfy the first C criterion, or the second C 11 criterion (marginal adjustment). The fact Ms. M. did not reside in a highly 12 structured setting does not mean she cannot meet the C Criteria. As remand is 13 required to re-evaluate Ms. M.’s symptom testimony (see below), on remand the 14 Court also directs the ALJ to make complete findings on the C Criteria. 15 C. Lay Witness Testimony 16 Ms. M. contends the ALJ erred by failing to provide germane reasons to 17 reject her mother’s statements. She contends that if these statements had not been 18 rejected, the ALJ would have assessed greater limitations to her RFC that would 19 have rendered her disabled. 20 1 As stated above, ALJs “are not required to articulate how [they] considered 2 evidence from nonmedical sources.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(d). Nevertheless, the 3 ALJ made findings on Ms. M.’s mother’s statements. The ALJ credited some 4 statements made by Ms. M.’s mother, and assessed limitations to occasional 5 interactions with others, and simple, routine tasks as a consequence. Tr. 27. The 6 ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence. Ms. M. cites no law which 7 required the ALJ to credit more of her mother’s statements, or why the ALJ was 8 required to assess more limitations to her RFC. Yet again, Ms. M. does not appear 9 to appreciate the relevant standard of review. It is the role of the ALJ, not this 10 Court, to weigh the evidence. Del Cielo v. Astrue, 737 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1276 11 (E.D. Wash. 2010). If the evidence will support more than one rational 12 interpretation, this Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. Id. 13 The ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence. This Court will 14 not disturb them on appeal. 15 D. Symptom Testimony 16 Ms. M. contends the ALJ improperly rejected her subjective complaints, as 17 the ALJ simply recited the medical evidence without specifying inconsistencies. 18 The Court agrees. 19 An ALJ engages in a two-step analysis to determine whether to discount a 20 claimant’s testimony regarding subjective symptoms. SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1 1119029, at *2. “First, the ALJ must determine whether there is ‘objective medical 2 evidence of an underlying impairment which could reasonably be expected to 3 produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.’ ” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 4 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 5 2009)). “The claimant is not required to show that [the claimant’s] impairment 6 ‘could reasonably be expected to cause the severity of the symptom [the claimant] 7 has alleged; [the claimant] need only show that it could reasonably have caused 8 some degree of the symptom.’ ” Vasquez, 572 F.3d at 591 (quoting Lingenfelter v. 9 Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2007)). 10 Second, “[i]f the claimant meets the first test and there is no evidence of 11 malingering, the ALJ can only reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity of 12 the symptoms if [the ALJ] gives ‘specific, clear and convincing reasons’ for the 13 rejection.” Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1163 (9th Cir. 2014) (citations 14 omitted). General findings are insufficient; rather, the ALJ must identify what 15 symptom claims are being discounted and what evidence undermines these claims. 16 Id. (quoting Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995)); Thomas v. 17 Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958 (9th Cir. 2002) (requiring the ALJ to sufficiently 18 explain why he or she discounted claimant's symptom claims). “The clear and 19 convincing [evidence] standard is the most demanding required in Social Security 20 1 cases.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1015 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Moore v. 2 Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 278 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 2002)). 3 Factors to be considered in evaluating the intensity, persistence, and limiting 4 effects of a claimant’s symptoms include the claimant’s daily activities and the 5 location, duration, frequency, and intensity symptoms. SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 6 1119029, at *7-*8; 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(3). The ALJ is instructed to “consider 7 all of the evidence in an individual’s record,” “to determine how symptoms limit 8 ability to perform work-related activities.” SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, at *2. 9 The consistency of a claimant’s statements with the rest of the record are another 10 factor to be considered. 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(4). 11 An ALJ must identify what testimony is being discounted, and what 12 evidence undermines these claims. See Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 13 1208 (9th Cir. 2001). While the ALJ is not required to perform a line-by-line 14 analysis of the claimant’s testimony, the ALJ is still required to do more than offer 15 “non-specific conclusions that [claimant’s] testimony was inconsistent with her 16 medical treatment.” Lambert v. Saul, 980 F.3d 1266, 1277 (9th Cir. 2020). 17 The ALJ’s findings generally summarize Ms. M.’s testimony and then 18 summarize the medical record, rejecting her testimony for being contrary to the 19 20 1 record without identifying what testimony is being discounted by what evidence.3 2 The ALJ conclusory asserts that “[Ms. M.’s] statements about the intensity, 3 persistence, and limiting effects of his or her symptoms [] are inconsistent because 4 her allegations regarding the intensity or severity of her symptoms and limitations 5 are not supported by the medical evidence record and other evidence,” Tr. 23, and 6 “The severity of these conditions, as reported to the Agency, is not consistent with 7 the severity reported to providers.” Tr. 24. These statements are followed by 8 summaries of the medical record. 9 While it is possible to infer what portions of Ms. M.’s testimony are being 10 discounted by the ALJ’s description of the medical record, “[i]nferred reasons 11 fail[] to meet the specific, clear and convincing standard.” Juan G. v. Kijakazi, 12 13 14 3 In formulating a limitation to occasional and superficial interactions with 15 others, the ALJ appears to credit Ms. M.’s testimony on self-isolation and struggles 16 with communication and taking criticism. Tr. 24. The ALJ cites to her testimony in 17 contrast to the otherwise unremarkable medical record. Id. This credited testimony 18 is the only instance where specific testimony is identified as being contrary to the 19 record. At no point does the ALJ identify rejected testimony that is contrary to the 20 record. 1 2021 WL 5240498, at *5 (E.D. Wash. Aug. 19, 2021). The ALJ’s failure to specify 2 what testimony was being discounted is error requiring remand.4 3 In particular, the Court takes note that the ALJ’s decision focuses on Ms. 4 M.’s depression and anxiety symptoms, but with little to no explanation appears to 5 reject much of her testimony that is suggestive of autism. Among other symptoms, 6 Ms. M. testified to an inability to understand social cues, Tr. 54, struggles with 7 focus in a noisy environment, Tr. 49-50, and a need for encouragement, assistance, 8 and reminders to perform tasks. Tr. 48-49, 51-54. The ALJ failed to provide any 9 specific, clear, and convincing reasons to discredit this testimony. On remand, the 10 ALJ is directed to fully evaluate Ms. M.’s autism symptoms. 11 E. Step Five 12 Ms. M. contends the ALJ erred at step five by finding her capable of 13 performing jobs requiring the ability to carry out detailed instructions, but also that 14 she could only perform simple, routine tasks.5 At the hearing, a vocational expert 15 4 Beyond the ALJ’s failure to adequately identify what symptom statements 16 are being rejected, Ms. M. raises other challenges to the ALJ’s treatment of her 17 statements. As this case must be remanded for the ALJ to properly reconsider Ms. 18 M.’s symptom claims, the Court declines to address these other challenges. 19 20 5 Ms. M. also contends the ALJ erred at step five by finding her capable of 1 testified that a person with Ms. M.’s RFC, including a limitation to simple, routine 2 tasks, could perform work as a kitchen helper, laundry worker, and cook helper. 3 Tr. 28, 57-58. According to the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT), these 4 jobs require a GED Reasoning Level of Two. DOT (4th ed. 1991) § 318.687-010 5 Kitchen Helper (also cited as cook helper), § 361.684-014 Laundry Worker. The 6 Ninth Circuit has held that an individual limited to simple, routine tasks can 7 perform work requiring Level Two reasoning. See Zavalin v. Colvin, 778 F.3d 842, 8 847 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Hackett v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1168, 1176 (10th Cir. 9 2005) (noting that Level Two “appears more consistent” than Level Three for a 10 claimant limited to simple, routine tasks). Therefore, the ALJ did not err by finding 11 Ms. M. could perform work requiring Level Two reasoning. 12 F. Remedy 13 Ms. M contends that her statements should be credited as true, and remand 14 for payment of benefits is warranted. 15 16 performing work under an incomplete hypothetical that did not accurately account 17 for her RFC. This argument is derivative of her previous arguments as to the 18 assessment of her RFC. On remand, the Commissioner will have a second 19 opportunity to assess Ms. M.’s RFC and ascertain whether she is capable of 20 performing jobs that exist in the economy in significant numbers. 1 Generally, an ALJ’s failure to make adequate findings necessitates a remand 2 for additional proceedings to make such findings. Lewin v. Schweiker, 654 F.2d 3 631, 635 (9th Cir. 1981). However, the Court has the power to affirm, modify, or 4 reverse a decision with or without remanding for a rehearing. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 5 “Courts have generally exercised this power when it is clear from the record that a 6 claimant is entitled to benefits.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1019. 7 Courts apply the three-part credit-as-true standard to determine when to 8 remand to an ALJ with instructions to calculate and award benefits: 9 (1) the record has been fully developed and further administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose; (2) the ALJ has failed 10 to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, whether claimant testimony or medical opinion; and (3) if the 11 improperly discredited evidence were credited as true, the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled on remand. 12 Id. at 1020. 13 Where the ALJ makes a legal error, but there is a need to resolve conflicting 14 evidence and ambiguities in the record, a remand for an award of benefits is 15 inappropriate. Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1101 (9th 16 Cir. 2014). Only where there are no outstanding issues requiring resolution can a 17 witnesses’ testimony be credited as true without further proceedings. Id. at 1105- 18 06. 19 Here, the record has not been fully developed. The ALJ made insufficient 20 findings as to the C Criteria of Listing 12.04, and Ms. M.’s subjective testimony. Remand would serve a useful purpose by having the ALJ adequately analyze and 2|| make findings on these issues. 3 Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED: 4 1. Ms. M’s Brief, ECF No. 12, is GRANTED. 5 2. The Commissioner’s Brief, ECF No. 16, is DENIED. 6 3. This is case is REVERSED and REMANDED for further 7|| administrative proceedings consistent with this Order pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. The District Court Executive is directed to enter this 10|| Order and provide copies to counsel. Judgment shall be entered for Plaintiff and the file shall be CLOSED. 12 DATED May 13, 2026. I 14 "REBECCA L.PENNELL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 15 16 17 18 19 20 ORDER REVERSING AND REMANDING THE COMMISSIONER’S NECTCIONI PAR ETIR TUBER ADNMINTOCTR ATIVE PROCERBNINGSE * 99