Young v. County of Alameda

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 WALTER LEE YOUNG, Case No. 25-cv-07739-PCP 8 Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH 9 v. FURTHER LEAVE TO AMEND 10 COUNTY OF ALAMEDA, et al., Defendants. 11 12 13 Walter Young, an inmate at Santa Rita Jail in Dublin, California, filed a pro se civil rights 14 action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Dkt. No. 1 (“Compl.”). The Court reviewed the original pleading 15 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915A and dismissed it with partial leave to amend. Dkt. No. 11. 16 Mr. Young has filed a First Amended Complaint. Dkt. No. 13 (“FAC”). For the reasons 17 stated below, the FAC is dismissed with further leave to amend. If Mr. Young chooses to file a 18 second amended complaint, he must follow the instructions in this order. 19 Background 20 Mr. Young repeatedly referenced a class action that was filed before United States 21 Magistrate Judge Cousins, accusing Santa Rita Jail of mistreating inmates with mental health 22 diagnoses. See Dkt. No. 1; see also Babu v. Ahern, 18-cv-07677-NC (N.D. Cal.). A consent decree 23 was entered in that action. See Dkt. No. 436, Babu v. Ahern, 18-cv-07677-NC (N.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 24 2022). The Court dismissed without leave to amend Mr. Young’s claims for violation of the Babu 25 consent decree. Dkt. No. 11 at 4. The Court explained to Mr. Young that these claims must be 26 pursued with class counsel. See id. In the FAC, Mr. Young states that he has “worked with class 27 counsel and ha[s] followed the Consent Decree’s procedures for dispute resolutions and[/]or 1 In his original complaint, Mr. Young complained that he was “sexually assaulted multiple 2 times,” and that he was “locked down,” “targeted,” “discriminated against,” and “illegally strip[] 3 searched.” Dkt. No. 1. at 2. The FAC refers to these claims but does not provide any facts to 4 support them. See generally FAC. The original complaint likewise did not provide any facts to 5 support these claims, instead attaching dozens of pages of grievances. See generally Dkt. No. 1. 6 As defendants, Mr. Young for the second time names only the County of Alameda, the 7 Santa Rita Jail, and the Alameda County Sheriff’s Office. See FAC at 1. 8 Legal Standard 9 Federal courts must screen any case in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental 10 entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must 11 identify cognizable claims and dismiss claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim 12 upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant immune from such 13 relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. 14 Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 15 Analysis 16 Mr. Young again has not stated any cognizable claim. Indeed, the FAC refers to claims for 17 “‘targeted,’ ‘discrimination,’ ‘illegal[] strip search[]’, mentally, sexually, emotionall[y] and 18 physically assaulted” without providing any supporting facts. See FAC at 2. Although Mr. Young 19 argues that “all claims stated in [his] suit are cognizable,” he does not provide any facts to support 20 any claim. See generally id. If he chooses to amend, Mr. Young must provide facts to support his 21 allegations. For each claim, Mr. Young must state what happened that caused him harm, when it 22 happened, name the person who caused him that harm, and explain why that harm gives rise to a 23 claim. 24 For the second time, Mr. Young has not identified any proper defendant. Mr. Young sues 25 the County of Alameda, the Santa Rita Jail, and the Alameda County Sheriff’s Office. FAC at 1. 26 As the Court previously explained, to sue these entities on the claims alleged, Mr. Young must 27 establish: “(1) that he possessed a constitutional right of which he [] was deprived; (2) that 1 plaintiff’s constitutional rights; and (4) that the policy [was] the moving force behind the 2 constitutional violation.” Oviatt By and Through Waugh v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 3 1992) (citations and quotation marks omitted) (explaining how a government agency may be held 4 liable under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). If a plaintiff 5 cannot identify an unconstitutional policy of the government agency, the plaintiff must “produce 6 evidence creating a triable issue of fact regarding the existence of an unconstitutional practice or 7 custom.” Gordon v. Orange County, 6 F.4th 961, 974 (9th Cir. 2021) (concluding no custom or 8 practice was shown where the record lacked evidence of any other event involving similar conduct 9 or constitutional violations). “[A] single incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to 10 impose liability under Monell.” Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823–24 (1985). Here, Mr. 11 Young has not identified any policy or practice which caused the alleged deprivations of his 12 constitutional rights. If he chooses to amend his claims against the currently named entity- 13 defendants, he must identify such a policy or practice as to each defendant and each claim. 14 Alternatively, Mr. Young may identify the individual officers who he believes caused him harm. 15 Mr. Young alleges that all his claims were grieved and were fully exhausted to the highest 16 administrative level. See FAC at 2-3. For screening purposes, the Court will assume that all claims 17 have been exhausted. 18 Mr. Young is reminded that he cannot pursue claims in this action which duplicate those 19 raised in the Babu class action. Cf. FAC at 2 (referring to Babu class claims). 20 Conclusion 21 1. The First Amended Complaint is dismissed with leave to amend only as to claims 22 which are stated against proper defendants, and which do not concern violations of the Consent 23 Decree entered in the Babu class action. If he chooses to amend, Mr. Young must provide facts to 24 support every claim he wishes to pursue and must identify a proper defendant to each claim. 25 2. Within thirty-five days of the date this order is filed, Mr. Young may file a 26 SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT. The second amended complaint must include the caption 27 and civil case number used in this order (CV 25-7739-PCP (PR)) and the words SECOND ] must allege facts that demonstrate he is entitled to relief on each claim. An amended complaint 2 || supersedes the original complaint. See London v. Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 3 1981) (“[A] plaintiff waives all causes of action alleged in the original complaint which are not 4 || alleged in the amended complaint.”); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1992) 5 (where an amended complaint did not name all the defendants to an action, they were no longer 6 || defendants). 7 3. Failure to file an amended complaint within the allotted time and in 8 accordance with this order will result in a finding that further leave to amend would be 9 || futile, and this action will be dismissed. If Mr. Young needs an extension of time to amend his 10 || complaint, the extension must be requested before the deadline to amend has passed. 11 4. It is Mr. Young’s responsibility to prosecute this case. Mr. Young must keep the 12 || Court informed of any change of address by filing a separate paper with the Clerk headed “Notice 13 of Change of Address,” and must comply with the Court’s orders in a timely fashion. Failure to do 14 || so will result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of 3 15 Civil Procedure 41(b). 16 17 IT IS SO ORDERED. Z 18 || Dated: September 9, 2026 19 P. Casey Pitts 2] United States District Judge 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA INSTRUCTIONS FOR PAYMENT OF PRISONER’S FILING FEE 3 4 The prisoner shown as the plaintiff or petitioner on the attached order has filed a civil 5 action in forma pauperis in this court and owes to the court a filing fee. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the fee is to be paid as follows: 6 The initial partial filing fee listed on the attached order should be deducted by the prison 7 trust account office from the prisoner’s trust account and forwarded to the clerk of the court as the 8 first installment payment on the filing fee. This amount is twenty percent of the greater of (a) the average monthly deposits to the prisoner’s account for the 6-month period immediately preceding 9 the filing of the complaint/petition or (b) the average monthly balance in the prisoner’s account for the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint/petition. 10 Thereafter, on a monthly basis, 20 percent of the preceding month’s income credited to the 11 prisoner’s trust account should be deducted and forwarded to the court each time the amount in the 12 account exceeds ten dollars ($10.00). The prison trust account office should continue to do this until the filing fee has been paid in full. 13 If the prisoner does not have sufficient funds in his/her account to pay the initial partial 14 filing fee, the prison trust account office should forward the available funds, and carry the balance forward each month until the amount is fully paid. If the prisoner has filed more than one 15 complaint, (s)he is required to pay a filing fee for each case. The trust account office should make 16 the monthly calculations and payments for each case in which it receives an order granting in forma pauperis and these instructions. 17 The prisoner’s name and case number must be noted on each remittance. The initial partial 18 filing fee is due within thirty days of the date of the attached order. Checks should be made payable to Clerk, U.S. District Court and sent to Prisoner Accounts Receivable, U.S. District 19 Court, 450 Golden Gate Avenue, Box 36060, San Francisco, CA 94102. 20 cc: Plaintiff/Petitioner 21 Court’s Finance Office United States District Judge 22 23 24 25 26 27