Opinions and documents
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
BRUNSWICK DIVISION
JUAN SEBASTIAN MANCERA,
Petitioner, CIVIL ACTION NO.: 2:25-cv-114
v.
WARDEN H.L. RAY,
Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss, and I directed Petitioner Juan Mancera
(“Mancera”) to show cause why the Court should not grant the Motion to Dismiss on or before
January 26, 2026. Docs. 4, 7. Mancera has not responded to the Motion to Dismiss or this
Court’s show cause Order, and the times to do so have elapsed. As discussed below in more
detail, I RECOMMEND the Court GRANT as unopposed Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss,
DISMISS without prejudice Mancera’s 28 U.S.C. § 2241 Petition, doc. 1, for failure to follow
this Court’s Orders, DIRECT the Clerk of Court to CLOSE this case and enter the appropriate
judgment of dismissal, and DENY Mancera leave to appeal in forma pauperis.
BACKGROUND
On September 15, 2025, Mancera brought his § 2241 Petition and contends the State of
Florida violated his rights to a speedy trial and the interstate agreement on detainers. Doc. 1.
After I ordered service of Mancera’s Petition, Respondent filed this Motion to Dismiss. Docs. 3,
4.
Respondent states Mancera failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing
his Petition. Doc. 4 at 2. In addition, Respondent states Mancera did not name the proper party
as the Respondent and has no liberty interest in the location of his detention or in participation in
the Residential Drug Abuse Treatment Program. Id.
When Mancera failed to respond to the Motion to Dismiss within 14 days of service, id.
at 7, the Court ordered Mancera to show cause why the Court should not grant the Motion to
Dismiss as unopposed and dismiss Mancera’s Petition based on his failure to follow this Court’s
Orders and Local Rules. Doc. 7. The Court informed Mancera he could show cause by either
responding to the Motion or by informing the Court he does not oppose the Motion. Mancera’s
response was due on or before January 26, 2026. Id. Mancera has not responded to the Motion
to Dismiss or this Court’s Order, and the times to do so have elapsed.1
DISCUSSION
The Court must now determine how to address Mancera’s failure to comply with this
Court’s Orders. For the reasons set forth below, I RECOMMEND the Court DISMISS without
prejudice Mancera’s Petition and DENY Mancera leave to appeal in forma pauperis.
I. Dismissal for Failure to Follow This Court’s Orders
A district court may dismiss a petitioner’s claims for failure to prosecute based on
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) and the court’s inherent authority to manage its docket.
Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962);2 Coleman v. St. Lucie Cnty. Jail, 433 F. App’x
1 One of this Court’s mailings was returned as undeliverable. Doc. 8 at 3. Indeed, a search for
Mancera using the Bureau of Prisons’ (“BOP”) website reveals Mancera was no longer in the BOP’s
custody as of December 23, 2025. https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/, search using ID Number (last visited
Feb. 12, 2026). Mancera’s failure to update his mailing address provides another reason to dismiss
Mancera’s Petition. Local R. 11.1.
2 In Wabash, the Court held a trial court may dismiss an action for failure to prosecute “even
without affording notice of its intention to do so.” 370 U.S. at 633. However, in this case, Mancera was
716, 718 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) and Betty K Agencies, Ltd. v. M/V
MONADA, 432 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2005)). In particular, Rule 41(b) allows for the
involuntary dismissal of a petitioner’s claims where he has failed to prosecute those claims,
comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or local rules, or follow a court order. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 41(b); see also Coleman, 433 F. App’x at 718; Sanders v. Barrett, No. 05-12660, 2005
WL 2640979, at *1 (11th Cir. Oct. 17, 2005) (citing Kilgo v. Ricks, 983 F.2d 189, 192 (11th Cir.
1993)); cf. Local R. 41.1(b) (“[T]he assigned Judge may, after notice to counsel of record, sua
sponte . . . dismiss any action for want of prosecution, with or without prejudice[,] . . . [based on]
willful disobedience or neglect of any order of the Court.” (emphasis omitted)). Additionally, a
district court’s “power to dismiss is an inherent aspect of its authority to enforce its orders and
ensure prompt disposition of lawsuits.” Brown v. Tallahassee Police Dep’t, 205 F. App’x 802,
802 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Jones v. Graham, 709 F.2d 1457, 1458 (11th Cir. 1983)).
It is true dismissal with prejudice for failure to prosecute is a “sanction . . . to be utilized
only in extreme situations” and requires a court to “(1) conclud[e] a clear record of delay or
willful contempt exists; and (2) mak[e] an implicit or explicit finding that lesser sanctions would
not suffice.” Thomas v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 170 F. App’x 623, 625–26 (11th Cir.
2006) (quoting Morewitz v. West of Eng. Ship Owners Mut. Prot. & Indem. Ass’n (Lux.), 62
F.3d 1356, 1366 (11th Cir. 1995)); see also Taylor v. Spaziano, 251 F. App’x 616, 619 (11th Cir.
2007) (citing Morewitz, 62 F.3d at 1366). By contrast, dismissal without prejudice for failure to
prosecute is not an adjudication on the merits and, therefore, courts are afforded greater
forewarned of the consequences of failing to respond to Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss. Doc. 7;
see also Local R. 7.5 (“Failure to respond within the applicable time period shall indicate . . . there is no
opposition to a motion.”).
discretion in dismissing claims in this manner. Taylor, 251 F. App’x at 619; see also Coleman,
433 F. App’x at 719; Brown, 205 F. App’x at 802–03.
While the Court exercises its discretion to dismiss cases with caution, dismissal of this
action without prejudice is warranted. See Coleman, 433 F. App’x at 719 (upholding dismissal
without prejudice for failure to prosecute, where plaintiff did not respond to court order to supply
defendant’s current address for purpose of service); Brown, 205 F. App’x at 802–03 (upholding
dismissal without prejudice for failure to prosecute, where plaintiff failed to follow court order to
file amended complaint and court had informed plaintiff non-compliance could lead to
dismissal).
Mancera failed to follow this Court’s Orders, despite having ample opportunity to do so
and being forewarned of the consequences of his failure to do so. Doc. 7; Local R. 7.5. Thus,
the Court should GRANT as unopposed Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss and DISMISS
without prejudice Mancera’s § 2241 Petition. Docs. 1, 4.
II. Leave to Appeal in Forma Pauperis
The Court should also deny Mancera leave to appeal in forma pauperis. Though
Mancera has not yet filed a notice of appeal, it would be appropriate to address that issue in the
Court’s order of dismissal. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3) (noting trial court may certify appeal is
not taken in good faith “before or after the notice of appeal is filed”).
An appeal cannot be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies, either before or
after the notice of appeal is filed, the appeal is not taken in good faith. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3);
Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3). Good faith in this context must be judged by an objective standard.
Busch v. County of Volusia, 189 F.R.D. 687, 691 (M.D. Fla. 1999). A party does not proceed in
good faith when he seeks to advance a frivolous claim or argument. See Coppedge v. United
States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). A claim or argument is frivolous when it appears the factual
allegations are clearly baseless or the legal theories are indisputably meritless. Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993). Thus,
a claim is frivolous and not brought in good faith if it is “without arguable merit either in law or
fact.” Moore v. Bargstedt, 203 F. App’x 321, 323 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Bilal v. Driver, 251
F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001)); see also Brown v. United States, Nos. 407CV085, 403CR001,
2009 WL 307872, at *1–2 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 9, 2009).
Based on the above analysis of Mancera’s failure to follow this Court’s Orders or to
respond to the Motion to Dismiss, there are no non-frivolous issues to raise on appeal, and an
appeal would not be taken in good faith. Thus, the Court should DENY Mancera in forma
pauperis status on appeal.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, I RECOMMEND the Court GRANT as unopposed
Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss, DISMISS without prejudice Mancera’s 28 U.S.C. § 2241
Petition for failure to follow the Court’s Orders, DIRECT the Clerk of Court to CLOSE this
case and enter the appropriate judgment of dismissal, and DENY Mancera leave to appeal in
forma pauperis.
Any objections to this Report and Recommendation shall be filed within 14 days of
today’s date. Objections shall be specific and in writing. Any objection that the Magistrate
Judge failed to address a contention raised in the Complaint must be included. Failure to file
timely, written objections will bar any later challenge or review of the Magistrate Judge’s factual
findings and legal conclusions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Harrigan v. Metro Dade Police Dep’t
Station #4, 977 F.3d 1185, 1192–93 (11th Cir. 2020). To be clear, a party waives all rights to
challenge the Magistrate Judge’s factual findings and legal conclusions on appeal by failing to
file timely, written objections. Harrigan, 977 F.3d at 1192-93; 11th Cir. R. 3-1. A copy of the
objections must be served upon all other parties to the action.
Upon receipt of objections meeting the specificity requirement set out above, a United
States District Judge will make a de novo determination of those portions of the report, proposed
findings, or recommendation to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in
whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein. Objections not meeting the
specificity requirement set out above will not be considered by the District Judge. A party may
not appeal a Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation directly to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Appeals may be made only from a final judgment entered by
or at the direction of a District Judge.
SO REPORTED and RECOMMENDED, this 12th day of February, 2026.
BOL
BENJAMIN W. CHEESBRO
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
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