Greenfield v. Commissioner of Social Security

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 5 AT TACOMA 6 HEATHER G., Case No. 3:25-cv-05817-TLF 7 Plaintiff, v. ORDER REVERSING AND 8 REMANDING DEFENDANT’S COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL DECISION TO DENY BENEFITS 9 SECURITY, 10 Defendant. 11 12 Plaintiff seeks judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the Administrative Law 13 Judge’s (“ALJ”) decision affirming defendant’s denial of her application for benefits. 14 Dkts. 4, 17. 15 Plaintiff asserts two issues. First, she asserts a claim under the Administrative 16 Procedure Act (“APA”), arguing Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 24-3p is contrary to law 17 and promulgated in excess of Agency authority. E.g., Dkt. 17 at 3. Second, she argues 18 the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the medical opinions of two state agency 19 consultants, Dr. Renee E. and Dr. Lisa H. E.g., Dkt. 17 at 14, 16. 20 The parties unanimously consent to the jurisdiction of a Magistrate Judge. Dkt. 2. 21 For the reasons below, the Court REVERSES and REMANDS the ALJ’s decision for 22 further administrative proceedings. The Court declines to address plaintiff’s challenge to 23 SSR 24-3p on jurisdictional grounds. Even so, the ALJ erred when evaluating the 24 medical opinions of Dr. Renee E. and Dr. Lisa H., necessitating a remand. 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiff applied for disability benefits, ultimately asserting an amended onset 3 date of December 19, 2023. AR 56. Defendant denied plaintiff’s application initially and 4 on reconsideration. AR 97-98, 119-20. Plaintiff appealed to an ALJ who held a hearing 5 on April 17, 2025, and issued an unfavorable decision on April 24, 2025. AR 14, 52. The 6 Appeals Council then denied review on July 23, 2025. AR 1. 7 The ALJ resolved the required five-step analysis as follows. 8 For the first step, the ALJ found plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful 9 activity since December 19, 2023, the asserted amended onset date. AR 20. 10 For the second step, the ALJ found plaintiff had the following severe 11 impairments: “right shoulder arthritis status post surgery; asthma; obstructive sleep 12 apnea; obesity; migraines, a bipolar disorder; and anxiety. . .” AR 20. 13 For the third step, the ALJ found plaintiff did not have an impairment or 14 combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of listed 15 impairments. AR 21. 16 For the fourth step, the ALJ formulated plaintiff’s RFC, finding in relevant part that 17 she “can carry out simple and detailed instructions that can be learned in 30 days or 18 less and can have occasional interaction with the general public, coworkers and 19 supervisors.” AR 24. 20 When formulating plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ considered medical evidence, including 21 the opinions of two state agency consultants, Dr. Renee E. and Dr. Lisa H. AR 28-29. 22 As discussed below, both experts opined on plaintiff’s ability to follow instructions and 23 interact with others. The ALJ found these opinions were “generally persuasive because 24 they are mostly consistent with the record and supported by the evidence.” AR 29. 1 For the fifth step, while the ALJ found plaintiff was unable to perform any past 2 relevant work, she could still perform certain jobs that exist in significant numbers in the 3 national economy. AR 30-31. 4 II. DISCUSSION 5 A. SSR 24-3p 6 Plaintiff challenges SSR 24-3p as being contrary to law and promulgated in 7 excess of Agency authority. E.g., Dkt. 17 at 3. For the reasons below, the Court 8 declines to consider plaintiff’s challenge on jurisdictional grounds. 9 SSR 24-3p superseded SR 00-4p, primarily expanding the permissible sources a 10 vocational expert (“VE”) could use beyond the traditionally used Dictionary of 11 Occupational Titles. See Benjamin C. v. Bisignano, No. 1:25-cv-01341-RLH, 2026 WL 12 1682580, at *3 (C.D. Ill. Jun. 10, 2026), aff’d on reconsideration, 2026 WL 2111719 (Jul. 13 22, 2026). 14 Plaintiff however focuses on SSR 24-3p’s statement that “‘[a]t the hearing level, 15 when the claimant is represented, we expect the representative to raise any relevant 16 questions or challenges about the VE’s testimony at the time of the hearing . . .’” Dkt. 17 17 at 4 (quoting SSR 24-3p). 18 Plaintiff argues this language requires the claimant’s representative to raise 19 challenges to VE’s testimony at the ALJ’s hearing, or else the challenge is forfeited. 20 E.g., Dkt. 17 at 6. Plaintiff frames this requirement as a significant shift in Social 21 Security litigation, arguing a claimant’s representative could previously check a VE’s 22 testimony post-hearing and raise any challenges thereafter or on appeal. E.g., Dkt. 17 23 at 5, 11. Plaintiff concludes that as SSR 24-3p essentially creates a ‘whole new 24 framework,’ it is properly construed as a ‘substantive rule,’ and thus should have been 1 subject to the APA’s notice-and-comment requirements for new rules. E.g., Dkt. 17 at 2 11, 13-14. Conversely, plaintiff asserts defendant improperly construes SSR 24-3p as 3 merely explaining existing law as an ‘interpretive rule,’ which would be exempt from the 4 APA’s notice-and-comment requirements. E.g. Dkt. 17 at 7, 9, 11, 13. 5 As a preliminary note, it appears plaintiff’s counsel brought very similar 6 challenges to SSR 24-3p in at least two other District Courts. See, e.g., Benjamin C., 7 2026 WL 1682580; see also Lisa W. v. Bisignano, No. 8:25-cv-02804-JMC, 2026 WL 8 2024675 (D. Md. Jul. 14, 2026). 9 Both challenges were unsuccessful. The Court in Benjamin C. refused to 10 consider a challenge to SSR 24-3p on jurisdictional grounds. The Benjamin C. Court 11 reasoned plaintiff failed to “anchor his challenge to the facts of this case,” and thus 12 failed Article III’s ‘case or controversy’ requirement, lacked standing, and failed the 13 APA’s ‘injury in fact’ requirement, among other reasons. 2026 WL 1682580, at *3-*5. 14 The Court in Lisa W. 2026 WL 2024675, at *5, adopted the reasoning from Benjamin C. 15 As pointed out by defendant, plaintiff’s opening brief presents no direct or 16 substantive challenge regarding the VE’s actual testimony, and instead focuses on the 17 ALJ’s evaluation of medical opinion evidence. E.g., Dkt. 17 at 14 (emphasis added) 18 (seeking “judicial input” on SSR 24-3p, and arguing it replacing SSR 00-4p “potentially 19 alter[ed]” the VE’s answers to the ALJ’s hypotheticals); Dkt. 21 at 7. The generalized 20 responses in plaintiff’s reply brief confirm her failure to connect her SSR 24-3p 21 challenge to the facts.1 See, e.g., Dkt. 22 at 2-4 (citing Dkt. 17 at 14) (asserting that the 22 “ALJ questioned the VE under SSR 24-3p” which “impact[ed] . . . the representative’s 23 1 Regardless, claims asserted for the first time in a reply brief are improper. See Anderson v. Colvin, 223 24 F. Supp. 3d 1108, 1131 (D. Or. 2016). 1 ability to meaningfully engage in questioning the [VE]” and “will hinder any claimant.”). 2 Plaintiff’s arguments align considerably with those presented by her counsel and 3 rejected in Benjamin C., 2026 WL 1682580, and Lisa W., 2026 WL 2024675. 4 The Court agrees with the reasoning from Benjamin C. as the plaintiff here 5 similarly “makes no showing that the result would be any different if the Court orders the 6 ALJ to ignore SSR 24–3p on remand” as she “failed to demonstrate a causal connection 7 between the adoption of SSR 24–3p and the denial of [her] application.” 2026 WL 8 1682580, at *4-*5. 9 First, plaintiff fails to satisfy Article III’s case or controversy requirement. Judicial 10 power under Article III “depends on the existence of a case or controversy.” Preiser v. 11 Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975). This Court’s judgments “must resolve ‘a real and 12 substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive 13 character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a 14 hypothetical state of facts.’” Id. (quoting North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 15 (1971)). As described above, that is the sort of relief plaintiff seeks here. See Benjamin 16 C., 2026 WL 1682580, at *4. 17 Second, plaintiff lacks standing. To establish standing, plaintiff must show she (1) 18 “has suffered or likely will suffer an injury in fact,” (2) “the injury likely was caused or will 19 be caused by the defendant,” and (3) “the injury likely would be redressed by the 20 requested judicial relief.” Food & Drug Admin. v. All. For Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 21 367, 380 (2024). Plaintiff may meet the first requirement, as she arguably suffered a 22 generalized injury when defendant denied her application. Regardless, plaintiff still fails 23 to show a likelihood, as opposed to a speculative possibility, that her alleged injury from 24 1 SSR 24-3p could be redressed by this Court. See Benjamin C., 2026 WL 1682580, at 2 *5. 3 And finally, the APA does not appear to authorize plaintiff’s challenge. The APA 4 authorizes suits by “[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency action” or by a 5 person “adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a 6 relevant statute.” 5 U.S.C. § 702. Stated otherwise, a litigant must show she “‘is injured 7 in fact by agency action’” and “cannot bring an APA claim unless and until she suffers 8 an injury.” Corner Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Rsrv. Sys., 603 U.S. 799, 807- 9 08 (2024) (quoting Dir., Off. of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. Newport News Shipbuilding 10 & Dry Dock Co., 514 U.S. 122, 127 (1995)). Again, plaintiff’s speculative and 11 generalized claim fails to show she suffered a specific injury in fact owing to SSR 24-3p, 12 and thus fails to meet this requirement. 13 Accordingly, the Court declines to consider plaintiff’s challenge to SSR 24-3p. 14 B. RFC 15 Plaintiff next argues “the ALJ wholly failed to provide any explanation as to why 16 he did not include the limitation to less than occasional contact with the public opined at 17 both the initial and reconsideration levels or the limitation to short and simple 18 instructions opined at the initial level.” Dkt. 17 at 15 (citing AR 24, 28-29). 19 Plaintiff refers to two state agency consultants, including Dr. Reene E. who 20 opined at the initial level, and Dr. Lisa H. who opined on reconsideration. Dkt. 17 at 16 21 (citing AR 99, 109, 121, 130). 22 The “ALJ is responsible for translating and incorporating clinical findings into a 23 succinct RFC.” Rounds v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 807 F.3d 996, 1006 (9th Cir. 24 2015). “In doing so, the ALJ need not adopt any opinion verbatim and may translate 1 clinical findings into work-related limitations.” Bryant L. v. Brisignano, No. 5:25-cv- 2 01671-SB-KES, 2026 WL 2201144, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jul. 29, 2026) (citing Rounds, 807 3 F.3d at 1006). 4 An ALJ must base their RFC finding on “all of the relevant medical and other 5 evidence.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3). “‘If the RFC assessment conflicts with an 6 opinion from a medical source, the adjudicator must explain why the opinion was not 7 adopted.’” John S. v. Saul, No. 5:19-cv-01561-MAA, 2020 WL 5880462, at *2 (C.D. Cal. 8 Oct. 2, 2020) (quoting SSR 96-8P). The “ALJ must provide enough reasoning to permit 9 meaningful review of whether the RFC and the evaluation of the medical evidence are 10 supported by substantial evidence.” Bryant L., 2026 WL 2201144, at *1 (citing Treichler 11 v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1103 (9th Cir. 2014)). 12 In August 2024, Dr. Reene E. provided two reports for plaintiff’s DI and DIB 13 claims at the initial level, but each appears largely identical concerning plaintiff’s ability 14 to follow instructions and interact with others. AR 99, 109. 15 Dr. Reene E. concluded plaintiff is “is capable of understanding carrying out and 16 remembering short, simple instructions on a regular basis in a competitive work 17 environment.” AR 102, 112. She found a moderate limitation for the “ability to carry out 18 detailed instructions” and no significant limitation for the ”ability to carry out very short 19 and simple instructions.” AR 106, 116. 20 Dr. Reene E. also concluded plaintiff “requires a work setting w/very little to no 21 public contact and occasional contact w/coworkers.” AR 102, 112. She found a 22 moderate limitation for both the ability to “[i]nteract with others” and to interact with the 23 “general public.” AR 103, 107, 113, 117. However, she found plaintiff was not 24 significantly limited in interactions with supervisors or coworkers/peers. AR 107, 117. 1 In sum, Dr. Renne E. found “Clmt is limited to SRT2 w/little to no public contact.” 2 AR 102, 112. 3 In October 2024, Dr. Lisa H. also provided two reports for plaintiff’s DI and DIB 4 claims at the reconsideration level. AR 121, 130. Dr. Lisa H. found plaintiff was “not 5 significantly limited” in her ability to “carry out detailed instructions.” AR 127, 136. 6 Otherwise, Dr. Lisa H’s assessed limitation ratings were the same as those provided by 7 Dr. Reene E. E.g., AR 127-28, 136-37 (finding also “Clmt requires a setting w/very little 8 to no public contact and occasional contact w/coworkers.”). 9 In considering Dr. Reene E. and Dr. Lisa H., the ALJ found “the State agency 10 mental consultants, initially and upon consideration, are generally persuasive because 11 they are mostly consistent with the record and supported by the evidence.” AR 28-29. 12 The ALJ, beyond recounting each expert’s findings, did not specifically elaborate on the 13 persuasiveness of either experts’ individual findings. AR 28-29. 14 The ALJ’s RFC determination then found in pertinent part that plaintiff “can carry 15 out simple and detailed instructions that can be learned in 30 days or less and plaintiff 16 can have occasional interaction with the general public, coworkers and supervisors.” AR 17 24. 18 Turning to the merits, the Court first considers the ALJ’s RFC finding that plaintiff 19 could perform “simple and detailed instructions . . .” AR 24. The ALJ failed to explain the 20 apparent decision to follow the opinion of Dr. Lisa H., who found plaintiff was not 21 significantly limited in carrying out detailed instructions (AR 127, 136), as opposed to Dr. 22 23 2 This acronym appears to stand for “simple repetitive tasks.” See Sue L. v. Berryhill, No. 2:17-cv-04728- 24 KES, 2018 WL 3753002, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2018). 1 Reese E.’s opinion, who found plaintiff was moderately limited in the same category (AR 2 106, 116). 3 Defendant’s comparison to Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1174 4 (9th Cir. 2008) is inapposite. Dkt. 21 at 17. Defendant presents Stubbs-Danielson as an 5 analogous example of an ALJ properly incorporating two “consistent” medical opinions 6 but “adopt[ing] the more succinct assessment prepared by the second doctor.” Dkt. 21 7 at 17. 8 In Stubbs-Danielson however, both expert opinions were consistent in that they 9 supported the plaintiff’s ability to perform only simple tasks. Stubbs-Danielson, 539 F.3d 10 at 1173-74. Here, both experts expressly distinguished “simple” versus “detailed” 11 instructions, and presented materially different opinions on plaintiff’s limitations when 12 performing detailed tasks. AR 102, 112, 127, 136; see also Meissl v. Barnhart, 403 F. 13 Supp. 2d 981, 984 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (distinguishing “short and simple instructions” 14 versus “detailed” instructions). 15 As for the ALJ’s RFC finding that plaintiff “can have occasional interaction with 16 the general public, coworkers and supervisors,” (AR 24) the ALJ failed to explain the 17 decision to omit both experts’ opinions that plaintiff requires ”very little to no” contact 18 with the public, versus “occasional” contact with her co-workers or supervisors. AR 102, 19 107, 112, 117, 128, 137. 20 Defendant argues the ALJ’s usage of “occasional” encompasses both experts’ 21 opinions as to public and co-workers. Dkt. 21 at 17-18. It appears that “[g]enerally, 22 courts have concluded limiting a claimant to occasional social interactions adequately 23 encompasses moderate limitations with respect to social functioning.” Ishtarai P. v. 24 O’Malley, No. 5:23-cv-00640-MAA, 2024 WL 6895981, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2024) 1 (collecting cases). “And, at least in the context of physical exertion, both the Dictionary 2 of Occupational Titles and a Social Security Ruling have defined ‘occasionally’ to mean 3 ‘from very little up to one-third of the time.’” Leach v. Kijakazi, 70 F.4th 1251, 1258 (9th 4 Cir. Jun. 15, 2023) (quoting SSR 96-9p, 1996 WL 374185, at *8 (July 2, 1996)). 5 However, the term “occasional” is not a term with a static meaning untethered to 6 the record across every Social Security matter. See, e.g., Robert H. v. O’Malley, No. 7 2:23-cv-01855-SSC, 2024 WL 7128120, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2024) (noting the 8 Leach Court “was not extending this specialized definition from the physical exertion 9 realm to every use of the term ‘occasional’ in a social security context . . .”). 10 On the specific record of this case, both experts expressly used contrasting 11 terms, i.e. “very little to no public contact” versus “occasional contact w/coworkers.” AR 12 107, 117, 128, 137. Had both experts intended to find “occasional” exposure to both the 13 public and co-workers was within plaintiff’s limits, they likely would have said so. See 14 Otto v. Astrue, No. EDCV 11–1925–JEM, 2012 WL 3150827, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 15 2012). 16 The ALJ, who generally addressed the persuasiveness of state agency 17 consultants collectively, not individually, failed to explain either of these apparent 18 differences between the expert opinions. AR 28-29. This, despite finding both experts 19 “generally persuasive.” AR 28-29. 20 This was harmful error, because if the ALJ had properly evaluated the experts’ 21 opinion evidence, the RFC may have included more limitations regarding ability to follow 22 detailed instructions, and more limitations concerning contact with the public. See Stacy 23 A. B. v. O’Malley, No. SACV 23-0920 AGR, 2024 WL 3221728, at *2 (finding the “ALJ’s 24 1 decision gives no reason for any rejection,” and “declin[ing] to speculate as to whether 2 the omission was an oversight or deliberate.”).3 3 III. CONCLUSION 4 For the reasons above, the Court REVERSES and REMANDS this matter for 5 further administrative proceedings. On remand, the ALJ shall reevaluate the medical 6 opinions of Dr. Reene E. and Dr. Lisa H. 7 Dated this 21st day of August, 2026. 8 A 9 Theresa L. Fricke United States Magistrate Judge 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 3 To the extent plaintiff assumes this error would provide a factual basis for her generalized challenge to 23 SSR 24-3p, this error concerns the ALJ’s evaluation of the medical evidence and RFC, not the vocational expert’s testimony or their sources used at the hearing itself. See SSR 24-3p (“[a]t the hearing level, when the claimant is represented, we expect the representative to raise any relevant questions or 24 challenges about the VE’s testimony . . .”).