Jensen v. Google LLC

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Jason Adam Jensen, No. CV-25-00424-TUC-JGZ 10 Plaintiff, ORDER 11 v. 12 Google LLC, et al., 13 Defendants. 14 15 On July 29, 2025, pro se Plaintiff Jason Adam Jensen filed a Complaint. (Doc. 1.) 16 In its December 15, 2025 Order, the Court dismissed the Complaint for failure to state a 17 claim. (Doc. 8.) The Court found that, except for one allegation concerning Google’s Pixel- 18 branded devices, Plaintiff had made vague and conclusory allegations against Defendants 19 as a group without identifying with sufficient specificity what each Defendant did or failed 20 to do. 21 In the Order, the Court gave Plaintiff an opportunity to file a First Amended 22 Complaint and provided him with information to assist him in doing so. The Court advised 23 Plaintiff that a Title III claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 24 U.S.C. § 12182, requires a defendant to own, lease, or operate a place of public 25 accommodation and explained that, under Ninth Circuit law, such public accommodations 26 are actual, physical places. The Court also informed Plaintiff that 47 U.S.C. § 255 does not 27 confer a private right of action and that the Federal Communications Commission has 28 exclusive jurisdiction over complaints brought under that provision. 1 On January 13, 2026, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). (Doc. 9.) 2 The Court will dismiss the FAC without leave to amend because it again fails to state a 3 claim and further amendment would be futile. 4 I. Statutory Screening of In Forma Pauperis Complaints 5 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), in a case in which a plaintiff has been granted 6 in forma pauperis status, the Court shall dismiss the case “if the court determines that . . . 7 (B) the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may 8 be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such 9 relief.” 10 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 11 pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does 12 not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the- 13 defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 14 “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 15 statements, do not suffice.” Id. “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 16 accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell 17 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 18 Courts must “construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 19 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se litigant] ‘must be held to less stringent 20 standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 21 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). But the Court is not required “to accept as true a legal 22 conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 23 II. First Amended Complaint 24 In the FAC, Plaintiff sues Google LLC (“Google”), Motorola Mobility LLC 25 (“Motorola”), The Open Handset Alliance (“OHA”), Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. 26 (“Samsung”), and OnePlus Technology (Shenzhen) Co., Ltd. (“OnePlus”). Plaintiff alleges 27 that he has functional impairments that cause extreme stress and post-meltdown memory 28 fog and that, to manage those symptoms, he relies on the ability to record voice 1 conversations on his mobile device as an assistive tool. (Doc. 9 at 3.) 2 Plaintiff alleges that Google controls technical standards and permissible 3 functionality within the Android ecosystem and, in May 2022, changed its Play Store 4 Developer Program Policies to prohibit use of the Accessibility API1 for remote call audio 5 recording. Plaintiff further alleges that Samsung, Motorola, and OnePlus enforce or adhere 6 to Google’s restrictions on their devices, while OHA establishes Android compatibility 7 standards. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff alleges, “[b]y defining the technical parameters of this global 8 digital platform, Defendant OHA operates and controls the ‘service establishment’ through 9 which all Android services are standardized and delivered to the public.” (Id. at 10.) 10 The FAC asserts ten counts. Counts I through V allege violations of Title III of the 11 ADA against Google, Samsung, Motorola, OnePlus, and OHA, respectively. Counts VI 12 through X allege violations of 47 U.S.C. § 255 against the same Defendants. 13 Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction requiring Defendants to modify their 14 operating systems and devices to make recording of voice call audio streams available for 15 assistive purposes, as well as actual, compensatory, and statutory damages, attorneys’ fees 16 and litigation costs, and other appropriate relief. 17 III. Failure to State a Claim 18 Although the FAC now identifies the conduct allegedly attributable to each 19 Defendant, it does not cure the substantive deficiencies identified in the Court’s prior 20 Order. 21 A. Americans with Disabilities Act Claims 22 Title III of the ADA provides that “[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on 23 the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, 24 privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation” by a 25 person who owns, leases, or operates such a place. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 26 To state a claim under Title III, a plaintiff must allege that “(1) [h]e is disabled 27 1 According to the FAC, an Application Programming Interface (API) “is a set of protocols that allows different software components to communicate. The ‘Accessibility API’ is 28 specifically designed to allow services to assist users with disabilities by interacting with and modifying the user interface and system events.” (Doc. 9 ¶ 13.) 1 within the meaning of the ADA; (2) the defendant is a private entity that owns, leases, or 2 operates a place of public accommodation; and (3) the plaintiff was denied public 3 accommodations by the defendant because of [his] disability.” Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 4 481 F.3d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 2007). Places of public accommodation are “actual, physical 5 places where goods or services are open to the public, and places where the public gets 6 those goods or services.” Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1114 7 (9th Cir. 2000). There must be “some connection between the good or service complained 8 of and an actual physical place.” Id. 9 Title III may also reach a website or application when there is a sufficient nexus 10 between the challenged service and the goods or services of an actual, physical place of 11 public accommodation. See Robles v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 913 F.3d 898, 904–05 (9th 12 Cir. 2019) (“The statute applies to the services of a place of public accommodation, not 13 services in a place of public accommodation.” (quoting Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Target 14 Corp., 452 F.Supp.2d 946, 953 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (emphasis in original))). In Robles, the 15 Ninth Circuit held Title III applied to Domino’s website and mobile application because 16 their alleged inaccessibility impeded access to the goods and services of Domino’s physical 17 restaurants. Id. at 905. The court emphasized that customers used the website and 18 application to locate nearby restaurants and order pizzas for delivery or in–store pickup. 19 Id. 20 The allegations in the FAC do not satisfy the nexus requirement. In Counts I through 21 V, Plaintiff identifies the Google Play Store and Android ecosystem, Samsung’s Galaxy 22 Store and One UI, Motorola’s digital service ecosystem, OnePlus’s OxygenOS, and OHA’s 23 Android Compatibility Definition Document and related standards as the relevant “service 24 establishments” or places of public accommodation. (Doc. 9 at 7–10.) He alleges that each 25 Defendant should modify its respective policies, software, firmware, or standards to permit 26 assistive call recording. But Plaintiff does not allege that any of these challenged digital 27 services facilitates access to, or that the alleged call recording restrictions impede his access 28 to, the goods or services of an actual, physical place of public accommodation. Unlike the 1 website and application in Robles, which connected customers to the goods and services of 2 Domino’s physical restaurants, the digital services identified here are alleged to provide 3 software functionality independent of any physical location. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not 4 alleged the nexus to an actual, physical place required by Weyer and Robles. 5 Plaintiff’s ADA claims fail for an additional reason. Title III prohibits 6 discrimination in the enjoyment of the goods and services that a place of public 7 accommodation provides, but it does not require the provision of different goods or 8 services. Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1115. As the Ninth Circuit explained, a bookstore may not 9 discriminate against individuals with disabilities in granting access to its goods, but it need 10 not provide books in Braille in addition to print. Id. Likewise, an insurance office must be 11 physically accessible but need not offer insurance policies containing different substantive 12 terms for disabled individuals. Id. Here, Plaintiff does not allege that he was denied access 13 to Defendants’ mobile devices, operating systems, applications, or other products because 14 of his disability. Rather, he alleges that those products should provide or permit an 15 additional feature—call recording—for use as an assistive tool. His claims therefore seek 16 to alter the substantive features of the goods or services Defendants provide, rather than 17 obtain nondiscriminatory enjoyment of the goods or services already offered. See id. 18 Accordingly, Counts I through V fail to state a claim upon which relief may be 19 granted. 20 B. Telecommunications Act Claims 21 Counts VI through X allege violations of 47 U.S.C. § 255. Plaintiff alleges that 22 Defendants failed to ensure that their telecommunications equipment or software was 23 accessible to individuals with cognitive or memory disabilities, that providing call 24 recording was readily achievable, and that Defendants failed to ensure compatibility with 25 assistive technology. (Doc. 9 at 11–16.) 26 The Court previously advised Plaintiff that § 255 does not authorize a private right 27 of action and that the Federal Communications Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over 28 complaints brought under that provision. 47 U.S.C. § 255(f). (Doc. 8 at 7.) 1 Plaintiff nevertheless reasserts § 255 claims against each Defendant. Additional 2 factual allegations regarding Defendants’ equipment, software, technical capabilities, or 3 accessibility practices cannot create a private cause of action where the statute does not 4 provide one. 5 Accordingly, Counts VI through X fail to state a claim upon which relief may be 6 granted. 7 IV. Leave to Amend 8 Here, further amendment would be futile. Plaintiff has already been afforded an 9 opportunity to amend after the Court specifically identified the deficiencies in his original 10 Complaint. The FAC confirms that the remaining deficiencies in Plaintiff’s ADA claims 11 are legal rather than factual. Plaintiff alleges discrimination in the functionality of 12 Defendants’ digital products and services and does not allege a nexus between that 13 challenged functionality and the goods or services of an actual, physical place of public 14 accommodation. Moreover, even if Plaintiff could amend to identify an actual, physical 15 place of public accommodation associated with one or more Defendants, his claims would 16 still seek to alter the features of the products offered—specifically, the absence or 17 restriction of call recording capability—rather than obtain nondiscriminatory enjoyment of 18 the goods or services already provided. Under Weyer, Title III requires nondiscriminatory 19 enjoyment of the goods and services a public accommodation provides, but does not 20 require the provision of different goods or services. 198 F.3d at 1115. Further amendment 21 therefore would not cure the deficiencies in Plaintiff’s ADA claims. 22 Amendment of the Telecommunications Act claims would likewise be futile 23 because no additional factual allegations could create a private right of action under § 255. 24 Because Plaintiff has already received notice of the deficiencies and an opportunity 25 to cure them, and because further factual amendment would not cure the remaining defects, 26 the Court will dismiss the FAC without leave to amend. 27 Accordingly, 28 IT IS ORDERED: 1 (1) The First Amended Complaint (Doc. 9) is dismissed for failure to state a || claim without leave to amend. 3 (2) The Clerk of Court must enter judgment accordingly and close this case. 4 Dated this 31st day of August, 2026. 5 6 La is Aye □□□ ; 8 Chiet United States District Judge 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 -7-