Barba v. Commissioner of Social Security

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DANIEL B., Case No.: 25-CV-1858 TWR (KSC) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER AFFIRMING DECISION OF 13 v. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE 14 FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner of (ECF No. 13) Social Security 15 Defendant. 16 17 18 Presently before the Court is the Joint Motion for Judicial Review (“Jt. Mot.,” ECF 19 No. 13) filed by Plaintiff Daniel B. and Defendant Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of 20 Social Security, which the Court took under submission without oral argument pursuant to 21 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78 and Civil Local Rule 7.1(e)(6)(f). (See ECF No. 8 at 22 4.) Having carefully considered the Joint Motion, the Administrative Record (“AR,” ECF 23 No. 7), and the relevant law, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Administrative Law 24 Judge (“ALJ”). 25 BACKGROUND 26 Plaintiff filed a Title II application for disability insurance benefits on June 7, 2021, 27 alleging a disability beginning on June 17, 2019. (See AR at 17.) His claim was denied 28 initially on January 4, 2022, and upon reconsideration on June 9, 2022. (See id.) He then 1 requested a hearing, which was held telephonically before the Honorable Robert Iafe on 2 July 25, 2023. (See id.) 3 The ALJ denied Plaintiff’s claim by written order dated August 28, 2024. (See id. 4 at 17–28.) First, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had last met the insured status requirements 5 of the Social Security Act on December 31, 2023. (See id. at 19.) 6 The ALJ then moved to the five-step sequential evaluation process established by 7 the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) for determining whether an individual is 8 disabled. (See id. at 18 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)); see also id. at 19–26.) 9 At step one, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b), the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not 10 engaged in substantial gainful activity during the period from his alleged onset date of 11 June 17, 2019, through his date last insured of December 31, 2023. (See AR at 19 (citing 12 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1517, et seq.).) 13 At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: 14 major depressive disorder, anxiety disorder, and posttraumatic stress disorder. (See id. 15 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c)).) 16 At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or 17 combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed 18 impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (See AR at 20 (citing 20 C.F.R. 19 §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526).) 20 Before moving to step four, the ALJ determined Plaintiff’s residual functional 21 capacity (“RFC”) pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e), (see AR at 18–19, 21–26), which 22 is “[a]n individual’s . . . ability to do physical and mental work activities on a sustained 23 basis despite limitations from his impairments.” (See id. at 18.) Specifically, the ALJ 24 found that Plaintiff 25 had the residual functional capacity to perform a range of work at all exertional levels, as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567, and can understand, 26 remember, and carry out simple instructions; can tolerate occasional and non- 27 collaborative interaction with coworkers; can tolerate no interaction with the general public; and can tolerate occasional workplace changes. 28 1 (See AR at 21.) In determining Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s “medically 2 determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms; 3 however, [Plaintiff]’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects 4 of these symptoms [we]re not consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in 5 the record.” (See id. at 22.) The ALJ specifically considered Plaintiff’s testimony, (see 6 id.), as well as the opinions of an independent psychological consultative examination by 7 Dr. Kim Chronister, Psy.D.; psychiatrist Tonya Masino, Psy.D., and social worker Dimitriy 8 Zelikman, LCSW, of the VA San Diego Healthcare System; therapist Kimthu Trinh, Ph.D. 9 of the Energy Psychological & Wellness Center; Disability Determination Services 10 (“DDS”) psychological consultant H. Amado, M.D.; and DDS psychological consultant 11 John Petzelt, Ph.D. (See id. at 22–25.) 12 At step four, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f), the ALJ found that, through the date last 13 insured, Plaintiff did not have the residual functional capacity to perform the requirements 14 of his past relevant work as a truck driver and security guard. (See AR at 26 (citing 20 15 C.F.R. § 404.1565).) 16 Finally, the ALJ determined whether Plaintiff was able to do any other work 17 considering his RFC, age, education, and work experience. (See AR at 19 (citing 20 C.F.R. 18 § 404.1520(g)).) Here, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was a “younger individual” on the date 19 last insured, (see id. at 26 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563)); that Plaintiff had “at least a high 20 school education[,]” (see id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1564)); and that “[t]ransferability of 21 job skills [wa]s not material to the determination of disability because using the Medical- 22 Vocational Rules as a framework support[ed] a finding that the claimant is ‘not disabled,’ 23 whether or not the claimant ha[d] transferable job skills[,]” (see id. (citing SSR 82-41; 20 24 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2)). Upon consideration of Plaintiff’s age, education, 25 work experience, and RFC, the ALJ found that “there were jobs that existed in significant 26 numbers in the national economy that the claimant could have performed[,]” (see id. (citing 27 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1569, 404.1569a)), including “Laundry worker II,” “Hospital cleaner,” 28 and “Pie bakery laborer.” (See id. at 27.) The ALJ therefore concluded that Plaintiff “was 1 not under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, at any time from June 17, 2019, 2 the alleged onset date, through December 31, 2023, the date last insured[.]” (See id. (citing 3 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g)).) 4 On May 30, 2025, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review of the 5 ALJ’s decision. (See id. at 1.) Plaintiff filed the instant action seeking judicial review 6 under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) on July 22, 2025, (see generally ECF No. 1), and, in accordance 7 with the Court’s directives, (see generally ECF No. 8), and following a brief stay as a result 8 of the fall 2025 lapse in federal appropriations, see In re Federal Lapse in Appropriations, 9 Gen. Order No. 766 (S.D. Cal. filed Oct. 7, 2025); (see also ECF Nos. 9–10), the Parties 10 filed the instant Joint Motion on January 26, 2026. (See generally ECF No. 13.) 11 STANDARD OF REVIEW 12 The Court has jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and “will not overturn the 13 Commissioner’s decision ‘unless it is either not supported by substantial evidence or is 14 based upon legal error.’” Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 788 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting 15 Luther v. Berryhill, 891 F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2018)). “Overall, the standard of review 16 is highly deferential.” Kitchen v. Kijakazi, 82 F.4th 732, 738 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting 17 Lambert v. Saul, 980 F.3d 1266, 1270 (9th Cir. 2020)). 18 “Under the substantial-evidence standard, [the reviewing court] look[s] to the 19 existing administrative record and ask whether it contains sufficient evidence to support 20 the agency’s factual determinations.” Woods, 32 F.4th at 788 (internal quotation marks 21 omitted) (quoting Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 102 (2019)). “‘Substantial’ means 22 ‘more than a mere scintilla’ but only ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might 23 accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Id. (quoting Biestek, 587 U.S. at 103). 24 “Where evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ’s 25 conclusion that must be upheld.” Id. (quoting Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th 26 Cir. 2005)). 27 Although the reviewing court also may overturn the Commissioner’s denial of 28 benefits if the denial is based on legal error, “[a] decision of the ALJ will not be reversed 1 for errors that are harmless.” Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing 2 Curry v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 1991)). An error is “harmless” when it is 3 “clear from the record that the ALJ’s error was inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability 4 determination.” See Garcia v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 768 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 2014) 5 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 6 (9th Cir. 2008)). 7 ANALYSIS 8 The instant appeal presents a single issue, i.e., “[w]hether the ALJ’s mental RFC 9 finding properly accounts for [Plaintiff’s] social interaction deficits.” (See Jt. Mot. at 5.) 10 Plaintiff contends that “[t]he ALJ’s mental RFC finding is contrary to law as it does not 11 fully account for Plaintiff’s social interaction deficits.” (See id. at 6; see also generally id. 12 at 6–20.) Specifically, in addition to the “global defect in the ALJ’s RFC, the exclusion of 13 any limitation related to Plaintiff’s ability to interact with supervisors[,]” (see id. at 14 12–13), Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in evaluating the assessments of both 15 Dr. Chronister, (see id. at 13–16), and Dr. Trinh, (see id. at 16–19), and in rejecting 16 Plaintiff’s own description of his symptoms and limitations. (See id. at 19–20.) Defendant, 17 on the other hand, argues that “the ALJ properly assessed an RFC that is consistent with 18 the record as a whole and Plaintiff fails to demonstrate harmful legal error to warrant 19 reversal.” (See id. at 21 (emphasis omitted and cleaned up); see also generally id. at 20 21–29.) 21 I. Exclusion of Limitation Regarding Plaintiff’s Ability to Interact with Supervisors 22 23 Plaintiff first contends that “the ALJ’s RFC illogically, and unsupported in the 24 record, omits Plaintiff’s ability to interact with supervisors from discussion.” (See Jt. Mot. 25 at 12 (emphasis in original). “[T]o demonstrate that an ALJ erred by failing to incorporate 26 mental limitations in the RFC, a plaintiff has to ‘identify . . . particular evidence that the 27 ALJ failed to consider or explain why the record does not support the ALJ’s findings’ 28 regarding mental functioning.” Marie Beth D. v. King, No. 3:24-CV-00525-W-AHG, 2025 1 WL 504368, at *11 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 14) (alteration in original) (quoting Woods, 32 F.4th at 2 794), report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 1703509 (S.D. Cal. June 18, 2025). 3 Here, Dr. Trinh was the only source to opine that Plaintiff had any “restrictions in 4 [his] ability to accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors.” 5 (See AR at 25; see also generally id. at 17–28.) As discussed below, see infra Section II.B, 6 the ALJ did not err in concluding that Dr. Trinh’s opinions were “not persuasive” because 7 they were “overly restrictive based on [her] own treatment notes[]” and “not consistent 8 with the balance of the objective medical evidence.” (See id. at 25.) The only other opinion 9 in the record—which the ALJ found unpersuasive for being “under restrictive based on the 10 objective mental health evidence[,]” (see id.)—was that of Dr. Chronister, who opined that 11 Plaintiff’s “ability to accept instructions from supervisors [wa]s unimpaired.” (See id.) In 12 short, the ALJ considered but did not find persuasive any of the opinion evidence that was 13 introduced regarding Plaintiff’s ability to interact with supervisors. Accordingly, the ALJ 14 did not err in declining to include a limitation regarding Plaintiff’s ability to interact with 15 supervisors in the RFC. See, e.g., Marie Beth D., 2025 WL 504368, at *11 (concluding 16 that ALJ did not err where “there [wa]s substantial evidence in the record to support the 17 ALJ’s decision not to include Plaintiff’s mild mental limitations expressly in the RFC”). 18 II. Assessment of Medical Opinions 19 Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ erred in assessing the medical opinions of 20 Drs. Chronister and Trinh. (See Jt. Mot. at 13–19.) “When determining whether a claimant 21 is eligible for benefits, an ALJ need not take every medical opinion at ‘face value.’” Cross 22 v. O’Malley, 89 F.4th 1211, 1213 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 23 1155 (9th Cir. 2020)). “Rather, the ALJ must scrutinize the various—often conflicting— 24 medical opinions to determine how much weight to afford each opinion.” Id. at 1213–14 25 (citing Ford, 950 F.3d at 1155 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(3))). “ALJs must explain 26 how persuasive they find the medical opinion by expressly considering the two most 27 important factors for evaluating such opinions: ‘supportability’ and ‘consistency.’” Id. at 28 1214 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(2)). “[A]n ALJ cannot reject an examining or 1 treating doctor’s opinion as unsupported or inconsistent without providing an explanation 2 supported by substantial evidence.” Id. (quoting Woods, 32 F.4th at 792). “Supportability 3 means the extent to which a medical source supports the medical opinion by explaining the 4 ‘relevant . . . objective medical evidence.’” Woods, 32 F.4th at 791–92 (alteration in 5 original) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1)). “Consistency means the extent to which 6 a medical opinion is ‘consistent . . . with the evidence from other medical sources and 7 nonmedical sources in the claim.’” Id. at 792 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(2)). 8 “An ALJ may discuss other factors, such as the medical source’s ‘relationship with 9 the claimant’ or ‘specialization,’ but generally has no obligation to do so.” Cross, 89 F.4th 10 at 1214 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(2)). “Only if the ALJ finds two or more 11 contradictory medical opinions ‘both equally well-supported . . . and consistent with the 12 record’ must the ALJ then articulate how he or she considered these other factors.” Id. 13 (alteration in original) (quoting 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920c(b)(3), (c)(3)–(5)). 14 A. Dr. Chronister 15 The ALJ found that “[t]he opinion of Dr. Chronister [wa]s not persuasive because 16 the limitations [we]re under restrictive based on the objective mental health evidence.” 17 (See AR at 25.) The Court agrees with Defendant that “Plaintiff fails to demonstrate 18 harmful legal error in the ALJ’s evaluation of Dr. Chronister, as she found less restrictive 19 limitations than what the ALJ assessed.” (See Jt. Mot. at 24); see also, e.g., Burch, 400 20 F.3d at 679 (“A decision of the ALJ will not be reversed for errors that are harmless.”). 21 Plaintiff therefore fails to establish that the ALJ erred in discounting Dr. Chronister’s 22 opinions regarding mild or non-impairments because Plaintiff’s testimony and the 23 objective medical evidence in the record supported the ALJ’s assessment of several more 24 severe mental health impairments. 25 B. Dr. Trinh 26 The ALJ concluded that “[t]he opinion of [Dr.] Trinh is not persuasive because the 27 conclusions [we]re overly restrictive based on [Dr.] Trinh’s own treatment notes” and 28 because “[Dr.] Trinh’s conclusions [we]re not consistent with the balance of the objective 1 medical evidence in the record.” (See AR at 25.) Specifically, the ALJ noted that 2 Dr. Trinh’s treatment notes “reported [Plaintiff]’s stream of consciousness was clear and 3 coherent and reported the claimant displayed no abnormalities of thought and no perceptual 4 disturbances.” (See id. (citing id. at 1393).) Similarly, Dr. Chronister “reported 5 [Plaintiff]’s stream of mental activity was linear, organized, articulated clearly, normal rate 6 of speech[;]” “[Plaintiff] was alert and oriented as to person, place, and situation and . . . 7 [Plaintiiff]’s level of intelligence was average and [he] had good concentration[;]” 8 “[Plaintiff] was able to perform simple mathematical calculations and . . . to complete digit 9 span forward and backward 1–10[.]” (See id. (citing id. at 682–83).) 10 Plaintiff faults the “inherent illogic in the ALJ’s invocation of Dr. Chronister’s 11 (unpersuasive) opinion as a basis to find Dr. Trinh’s opinion unpersuasive on the basis that 12 the former undermines the latter particularly where, as here, Dr. Chronister never saw 13 Dr. Trinh’s office records.” (See Jt. Mot. at 17–18.) The ALJ, however, does not rely on 14 Dr. Chronister’s opinions, but rather her clinical observations of Plaintiff, i.e., “the 15 objective medical evidence.” (See AR at 25 (discussing Dr. Chronister’s assessment of 16 Plaintiff’s “stream of mental activity,” “rate of speech,” “alert[ness],” “orient[ation],” 17 “intelligence,” and “concentration”).) There is no “inherent illogic” in the ALJ’s 18 assessment that Dr. Chronister’s treatment notes are consistent with Dr. Trinh’s. Indeed, 19 they are also consistent with those of several others, including Dr. Masino, (see AR at 23), 20 and Mr. Zelikman, (see AR at 24). 21 Plaintiff also argues that “the ALJ’s analysis is at best incomplete since comparing 22 Dr. Trinh’s opinion to Dr. Chronister’s is only the consistency analysis required under 23 § 404.1520c, not the also required supportability analysis.” (See Jt. Mot. at 18 (emphasis 24 in original).) The ALJ’s supportability analysis, however, was his comparison of 25 Dr. Trinh’s opinions with her “own treatment notes[,]” which the ALJ concluded did not 26 support the restrictiveness of her medical opinions. (See AR 25 (citing id. at 1393).) 27 Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in discounting Dr. Trinh’s opinions given that they were 28 inconsistent with her own clinical findings. See, e.g., Kitchen, 82 F.4th at 740 (holding 1 that “[s]ubstantial evidence support[ed] the ALJ’s finding that [a doctor]’s opinion 2 regarding [the claimant]’s mental impairments was not persuasive” where “[t]he ALJ 3 reasoned that [the doctor]’s assessment of severe limitations was inconsistent with the 4 medical record and with [the doctor]’s ‘own unremarkable mental status examinations[]’” 5 (citing Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F. 3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008))). 6 III. Evaluation of Plaintiff’s Testimony 7 Finally, Plaintiff faults the ALJ’s evaluation of Plaintiff’s own testimony. (See Jt. 8 Mot. at 19–20.) “To determine whether a claimant’s subjective symptom testimony is 9 credible, the ALJ must engage in a two-step analysis[.]” Ferguson v. O'Malley, 95 F.4th 10 1194, 1199 (9th Cir. 2024). “First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has 11 presented objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment which could reasonably 12 be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.” Id. (quoting Garrison v. 13 Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014 (9th Cir. 2014)). “If the claimant satisfies the first step of this 14 analysis, and there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ can reject the claimant’s 15 testimony about the severity of [their] symptoms only by offering specific, clear and 16 convincing reasons for doing so.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Garrison, 759 F.3d 17 at 1014–15). 18 In assessing a claimant’s credibility, the ALJ may consider, inter alia, (1) inconsistencies in the claimant’s testimony or between her testimony and 19 her conduct; (2) the claimant’s daily living activities; (3) the claimant’s work 20 record; and (4) testimony from physicians or third parties concerning the nature, severity, and effect of the claimant’s condition. 21 22 Tahnee M. v. Kijakazi, No. 22-CV-00257-BEN-JLB, 2023 WL 4624698, at *12 (S.D. Cal. 23 July 19, 2023) (emphasis in original) (first citing Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 24 958–59 (9th Cir. 2002); then citing Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1163 (9th Cir. 25 2014)). “If an ALJ’s evaluation of a claimant’s statements is reasonable and is supported 26 by substantial evidence, it is not the court’s role to engage in second-guessing.” Id. (first 27 citing Thomas, 278 F.3d at 959; then citing Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 28 F.3d 1190, 1196 (9th Cir. 2004)). 1 Here, the ALJ determined that “[Plaintiff]’s medically determinable impairments 2 could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however, the claimant’s 3 statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms 4 [we]re not consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record.” (See 5 AR at 22.) The Court therefore must determine whether the ALJ offered “specific, clear 6 and convincing reasons” for discrediting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. 7 As an initial matter, “Plaintiff does not identify which part of his symptom testimony 8 the ALJ improperly rejected or provide any meaningful analysis[,] . . . [and t]he Court 9 cannot manufacture arguments for Plaintiff.” See Richard R. v. Bisignano, No. 25CV894- 10 CAB(LR), 2026 WL 1847874, at *7 (S.D. Cal. June 26, 2026) (report and 11 recommendation) (citing Indep. Towers of Wash. v. Washington, 350 F.3d 925, 929–30 12 (9th Cir. 2003); Souzan H. v. O’Malley, No. 3:23-CV-00031-VET, 2024 WL 4307199, at 13 *7 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2024)). A review of the ALJ’s decision, however, reveals that his 14 decision to discount Plaintiff’s testimony was based on two primary factors. 15 First, the ALJ began by comparing Plaintiff’s testimony to the medical findings and 16 notes provided by Dr. Chronister, Dr. Masino, Dr. Trinh, and Mr. Zelikman, (see id. at 17 22–24), concluding that, “while the record show[ed] [Plaintiff] experience[d] some 18 symptoms, the evidence in the record fail[ed] to demonstrate functional deficits that 19 exceed[ed] the limitations of the” RFC found by the ALJ. (See id. at 22; see also id. at 24.) 20 “When objective medical evidence in the record is inconsistent with the claimant’s 21 subjective testimony, the ALJ may indeed weigh it as undercutting such testimony.” 22 Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 498 (9th Cir. 2022); see also Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. 23 Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Contradiction with the medical record 24 is a sufficient basis for rejecting the claimant’s subjective testimony.”); 20 C.F.R. 25 § 404.1529(c)(4) (explaining that, in assessing symptom testimony, ALJs are to consider 26 “inconsistencies in the evidence and the extent to which there are conflicts between [the 27 claimant’s] statements and the rest of the evidence”). 28 / / / 1 The ALJ then considered Plaintiff’s activities of daily living as recorded by 2 Drs. Trinh and Chronister, including independent self-care, driving, going to the gym for 3 leisure activities, fixing things around the house, doing household chores, and leaving the 4 house twice a week for groceries, which he found were “not consistent with [Plaintiff’s] 5 allegations of disabling symptoms and limitations.” (See AR at 24 (citing id. at 413, 683).) 6 “Engaging in daily activities that are incompatible with the severity of symptoms alleged 7 can support an adverse credibility determination.” Ghanim, 763 F.3d at 1165 (citing Orn 8 v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 639 (9th Cir. 2007); Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 9 F.3d 1190, 1196 (9th Cir. 2004)); see also, e.g., Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680 (9th 10 Cir. 2005) (upholding ALJ’s interpretation of daily activities as “suggest[ing] that [the 11 claimant] [wa]s quite functional” where she was “able to care for her own personal needs, 12 cooks, clean and shop[;]” “interact[] with her nephew and boyfriend[;]” and “manage her 13 own finances and those of her nephew”). “Daily activities may also be grounds for an 14 adverse credibility finding if a claimant is able to spend a substantial part of his day 15 engaged in pursuits involving the performance of physical functions that are transferable 16 to a work setting.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Orn, 495 F.3d at 639). 17 “Ultimately, the ‘clear and convincing’ standard requires an ALJ to show his work.” 18 Smartt, 53 F.4th at 499. “The standard isn’t whether [the reviewing] court is convinced, 19 but instead whether the ALJ’s rationale is clear enough that it has the power to convince.” 20 See id. In other words, as long as the ALJ’s interpretation is reasonable and supported by 21 substantial evidence, “it is not [the reviewing court’s] role to second-guess it.” See Rollins 22 v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001). Because the Court concludes that the 23 ALJ “cited specific, clear, and convincing examples . . . contrasting [Plaintiff]’s subjective 24 [symptom] testimony with objective medical evidence” and Plaintiff’s daily activities, the 25 Court finds that the ALJ did not err in discounting Plaintiff’s testimony regarding the 26 intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of his subjective symptoms. See Smartt, 53 F.4th 27 at 499; see also, e.g., Kitchen, 82 F.4th at 739 (concluding the ALJ’s explanation for 28 discounting the claimant’s testimony “was ‘specific, clear and convincing[]’” where “[t]he 1 ALJ reasoned that most of [the claimant]’s physicians opined that his mental impairments 2 were ‘mild[]’ or ‘moderate,’ rather than disabling[]” and the claimant “[e]xperienced ‘a 3 gradual improvement in his functioning with prescribed medication and psychotherapy 4 sessions[]’” (fourth alteration in original) (first quoting Warre v. Comm’r, 439 F.3d 1001, 5 1006 (9th Cir. 2006); then quoting Treichler v. Comm’r, 775 F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th Cir. 6 2014)) (citing Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1161)); Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 7 1175 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding “[t]he ALJ sufficiently explained his reasons for 8 discrediting claimant’s testimony” where the ALJ explained “[t]he record reflect[ed] that 9 the claimant ha[d] normal activities of daily living, including cooking, house cleaning, 10 doing laundry, and helping her husband in managing finances[]” and “the medical evidence 11 . . . found [the claimant] could perform a limited rand of work”); Morgan v. Comm’r of 12 Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599–600 (9th Cir. 1999) (concluding that ALJ provided 13 clear and convincing reasons for rejecting claimant’s testimony where medical records 14 “undermined [the claimant]’s complaints” and the claimant was able “to fix meals, do 15 laundry, work in the yard, and occasionally care for his friend’s child”).1 16 / / / 17 18 1 Additional recent, unpublished decisions from the Ninth Circuit—while not binding—support the 19 Court’s conclusion. See, e.g., Regalado v. O’Malley, No. 23-15693, 2024 WL 3439586, at *1 (9th Cir. July 17, 2024) (finding that “[s]ubstantial evidence supported the ALJ’s reasons for not relying on [the 20 claimant]’s testimony and other descriptions related to her RFC” where “[t]he ALJ reasonably declined 21 to rely on [the claimant]’s symptom testimony based on the contradictions between her testimony and the medical record[;]” “reasonably weighed [the claimant]’s treatment course against her allegedly disabling 22 symptoms[;]” and the claimant “could go out in public, shop in stores, . . . interact appropriately with her treatment providers[,] . . . prepare simple meals, drive, shop, pay bills, . . . read as a hobby[,] . . . [and] 23 was functionally independent, including doing housework and going on walks”); Scott v. Kijakazi, No. 21-35503, 2022 WL 2702734, at *1 (9th Cir. July 12, 2022) (concluding that ALJ provided clear and 24 convincing reasons for discounting claimant’s testimony where claimant reported “to medical providers 25 that she participated in activities such as two quarter-mile walks daily, two 90-minute yoga classes weekly, pool therapy, and was learning how to quilt” and “had sought relatively conservative treatment”); Drayton 26 v. Kijakazi, No. 18-16846, 2022 WL 1500797, at *1 (9th Cir. May 12, 2022) (“The ALJ provided specific, clear, and convincing reasons to discount [the claimant]’s testimony, citing factors including lack of 27 corroborating objective medical evidence, inconsistent claimant testimony, and inconsistent behavior.” (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(4), 416.929(c)(4); Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1161; Burch v. Barnhart, 400 28 I CONCLUSION 2 For the reasons set forth above, the Court AFFIRMS the final decision of the 3 |}Commissioner. Accordingly, the Court DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to issue a final 4 || Judgment and close this case. 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 Dated: July 14, 2026 —— 7 [ odd (a re 8 Honorable Todd W. Robinson 9 United States District Judge 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28