Fuamatu v. Commissioner of Social Security

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 5 AT TACOMA/ SEATTLE 6 LUTI F., Case No. 3:25-cv-05580-TLF 7 Plaintiff, v. ORDER AFFIRMING 8 DEFENDANT’S DECISION TO ACTING COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL DENY BENEFITS 9 SECURITY, 10 Defendant. 11 … 12 Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for judicial review of 13 defendant’s denial of plaintiff’s application for supplemental security income (“SSI”) and] 14 disability insurance benefits (“DIB”). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Federal Rule of 15 Civil Procedure 73, and Local Rule MJR 13, the parties have consented to have this 16 matter heard by the undersigned Magistrate Judge. Dkt. 2. Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s 17 decision finding that plaintiff was not disabled. Dkt. 5, Complaint. 18 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court may set aside the Commissioner's 19 denial of Social Security benefits if the ALJ's findings are based on legal error or not 20 supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Revels v. Berryhill, 874 21 F.3d 648, 654 (9th Cir. 2017) (internal citations omitted). Substantial evidence is “‘such 22 relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 23 conclusion.’” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (internal citations 24 1 omitted). The Court must consider the administrative record as a whole. Garrison v. 2 Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1009 (9th Cir. 2014). The Court also must weigh both the 3 evidence that supports and evidence that does not support the ALJ’s conclusion. Id. 4 The Court may not affirm the decision of the ALJ for a reason upon which the ALJ did 5 not rely. Id. Rather, only the reasons identified by the ALJ are considered in the scope 6 of the Court’s review. Id. 7 Plaintiff filed applications for DIB and SSI on September 13, 2021. AR 8 (“Administrative Record”) 17. The alleged date of onset is October 31, 2018, and his 9 date last insured was December 31, 2023. AR 19. Both applications were denied initially 10 and on reconsideration, and hearing was held before ALJ (“Administrative Law Judge”) 11 Joseph R. Doyle. AR 16-32. ALJ Doyle found plaintiff not disabled. Id. The Appeals 12 Council denied plaintiff’s request for review, making the ALJ’s decision the final decision 13 of the Commissioner of Social Security. AR 1-4. 14 ALJ Doyle found plaintiff to have the following severe impairments: cervical and 15 lumbar degenerative disc disease; right knee degenerative joint disease; and 16 hypertension. AR19. As a result, the ALJ determined that plaintiff had the residual 17 functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform a range of medium work as defined in 20 CFR 18 404.1567(c) and 416.967(c) such that he can 19 only occasionally climb; can frequently stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl; and can have only occasional exposure to extreme cold, vibration, and hazards, 20 defined as work with machinery having moving mechanical parts, use of commercial vehicles, and exposure to unprotected heights. 21 22 AR 22. 23 24 1 The ALJ determined at step four that plaintiff can perform past relevant work; and 2 in the alternative, the ALJ found at step five that plaintiff can perform other work as a 3 meat clerk, warehouse worker, or coffee maker. AR 30-31. 4 DISCUSSION 5 1. Plaintiff’s statements regarding subjective symptoms 6 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to provide clear and convincing reasons for 7 discounting his allegations regarding disabling back, neck, hip, knee, and headache 8 pain. Dkt. 9 at 4. Plaintiff contends the ALJ only discussed and cited medical evidence, 9 and this general conclusion was not sufficiently clear to reject plaintiff’s testimony under 10 Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487 (9th Cir. 2015) and Ferguson v. O’Malley, 95 11 F.4th 1194 (9th Cir. 2024). Id. at 6-7. 12 The Commissioner contends that the ALJ reasonably found plaintiff’s allegations 13 inconsistent with objective medical findings showing largely normal strength, gait, 14 sensation, reflexes, coordination, and functional abilities. See generally Dkt. 11. 15 The ALJ’s determinations regarding a claimant’s statements about limitations 16 “must be supported by specific, cogent reasons.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 17 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Rashad v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1229, 1231 (9th Cir. 1990)). In 18 assessing a plaintiff’s credibility, the ALJ must determine whether plaintiff has presented 19 objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment. If such evidence is present and 20 there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ can only reject plaintiff’s testimony 21 regarding the severity of his symptoms for specific, clear and convincing reasons. 22 Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1163 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 23 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007)). 24 1 “Contradiction with the medical record is a sufficient basis for rejecting the 2 claimant’s subjective testimony.” Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 3 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1434 (9th 4 Cir.1995)). But an ALJ may not reject a claimant’s subjective symptom testimony “solely 5 on a lack of objective medical evidence to fully corroborate the alleged severity of pain.” 6 Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 345 (9th Cir. 1991); Byrnes v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 639, 7 641-42 (9th Cir. 1995) (applying rule to subjective complaints other than pain). The ALJ 8 must consider a particular record of treatment in light of the overall diagnostic record, 9 and not cherry-pick the medical records. Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d at 1164. 10 The ALJ summarized plaintiff’s allegations and acknowledged that his medically 11 determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to produce the alleged 12 symptoms. AR 27. The ALJ then explained that plaintiff’s allegations regarding the 13 intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of those symptoms were not entirely 14 consistent with the medical evidence. AR 28. 15 The ALJ acknowledged abnormal findings, such as cervical and lumbar 16 degenerative changes, lumbar tenderness, reduced lumbar range of motion, reduced 17 hip and knee range of motion, positive tenderness findings, and some strength deficits 18 noted during physical therapy. Id. In concluding that the overall record demonstrated 19 greater functional capacity than plaintiff alleged, the ALJ reviewed the medical evidence 20 and cited evidence, such as: 21 no murmurs, rubs, or gallops, no edema, no back spasm or malalignment, equal and present pulses, no joint deformities, 5/5 strength in all muscle 22 groups, the ability to grasp and open a medication bottle without difficulty, intact sensation, 2+ knee reflexes, the ability to get up and down from the 23 examination table without difficulty, no difficulty with tandem walking, walking on heels, walking on toes, or finger-to-nose testing, normal gait 24 1 without use of an assistive device, negative straight leg raise, and normal range of motion throughout…. 2 AR 27. The ALJ pointed to negative straight-leg-raise testing during multiple 3 examinations, normal coordination and neurological findings, and repeated observations 4 that plaintiff was in no acute distress and ambulated normally. Id. 5 The ALJ contrasted abnormal findings with numerous normal findings and 6 concluded that the weight of the evidence did not support the degree of limitation 7 alleged. AR 27-28. Plaintiff alleged limitations in lifting, standing, walking, and 8 functioning due to pain, but repeated examinations documented normal strength, 9 normal gait, intact neurological functioning, and largely preserved physical abilities. See, 10 e.g., AR 306, 310, 429, 434-5, 462, 477, 480, 484, 502, 506, 509, 520, 547, 552, 627, 11 647, 652, 655, 725, 748, 768, 790. 12 Under Ferguson, an ALJ may not reject symptom testimony merely because it is 13 not fully corroborated by medical evidence. Ferguson, 95 F.4th at 1200. Here, the ALJ 14 did not demand objective confirmation of every allegation; the ALJ found that plaintiff’s 15 allegations were inconsistent with specific findings documented throughout the record. 16 AR 27. The Ninth Circuit has recognized that inconsistency with objective medical 17 evidence remains a permissible basis for discounting subjective symptom testimony. 18 Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1161. 19 This case is also distinguishable from the facts in Brown-Hunter, where “the ALJ 20 stated only that she found, based on unspecified claimant testimony and a summary of 21 medical evidence, that ‘the functional limitations from the claimant's impairments were 22 less serious than she has alleged.’” Brown, 806 F.3d at 492. The ALJ discussed 23 plaintiff’s allegations and then identified numerous examination findings that the ALJ 24 1 found inconsistent with the alleged degree of limitation. While the ALJ’s explanation was 2 not extensive, the Court “must uphold it if the agency’s path may reasonably be 3 discerned.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012). The Court is able to 4 reasonably discern the ALJ’s reasoning. 5 Plaintiff points to other evidence supporting his allegations, including chronic pain 6 complaints, physical therapy records, tenderness findings, reduced range of motion, 7 positive straight-leg-raise testing on one occasion, and ongoing treatment. Dkt. 9 at 7-8. 8 The existence of an alternative interpretation of the evidence does not show that the 9 ALJ erred. Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004). 10 Because the record contains substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s finding that 11 plaintiff’s allegations were inconsistent with repeated normal clinical findings, the Court 12 affirms the ALJ. 13 CONCLUSION 14 For these reasons, the Court concludes the ALJ properly determined plaintiff to 15 be not disabled. Therefore, the ALJ’s decision is affirmed. 16 17 Dated this 29th day of June, 2026. A 18 Theresa L. Fricke 19 United States Magistrate Judge 20 21 22 23 24