Hill v. Albertsons LLC

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6 AT SEATTLE 7 JEFFREY HILL, individually and on 8 behalf of all others similarly situated, CASE NO. 2:25-cv-01216-RSL 9 Plaintiff, 10 v. ORDER OF REMAND 11 ALBERTSONS LLC, a foreign limited liability company, et al., 12 13 Defendants. 14 15 This matter comes before the Court on plaintiff’s motion to remand (Dkt. 13), 16 defendants’ response (Dkt. 15), and plaintiff’s reply (Dkt. 17). Having reviewed these 17 filings, the related declaration (Dkt. 16), and the record herein, the Court GRANTS the 18 19 motion for the reasons explained below. 20 I. Background 21 Plaintiff Jeffrey Hill filed this putative class action in King County Superior Court 22 on May 30, 2025. Dkt. 1-1. Plaintiff’s complaint alleges defendants violated Washington’s 23 Equal Pay and Opportunity Act (“EPOA”), RCW 49.58.110, by posting job openings that 24 25 “did not include the wage scale or salary range being offered.” Id. at ¶ 10. “Plaintiff and 26 the Class seek injunctive relief to address Defendants’ refusal to include a wage scale or ORDER OF REMAND - 1 1 salary range in their job postings, and statutory damages pursuant to RCW 49.58.070 and 2 RCW 49.58.110.” Id. at ¶ 11. 3 Plaintiff specifically alleges that on or about May 20, 2025, he “applied for a job 4 5 opening in King County, Washington with Defendants.” Id. at ¶ 32. The job posting that 6 plaintiff responded to allegedly “did not disclose the wage scale or salary range.” Id. at 7 ¶ 33. Although plaintiff alleges he “expected” to learn the pay range for the open position 8 “at some point” as he worked through the job application, defendants allegedly “withheld 9 10 the pay range for the open position in the job posting and throughout the application 11 process, forcing Plaintiff to complete the entire application without learning the pay 12 range.” Id. at ¶¶ 34–35. 13 Plaintiff alleges that as a result, he (1) “was unable to determine the pay range for 14 15 the position”; (2) “remains unable to evaluate the pay for the position and compare that 16 pay to other available positions in the marketplace, which negatively impacts [his] current 17 and lifetime wages”; (3) “remains adversely affected” in his “ability to negotiate pay”; (4) 18 “lost valuable time applying for a position for which the wage scale or salary range being 19 offered was not disclosed”; and (5) “experienced economic and non-economic harm.” Id. 20 21 at ¶¶ 37–41. 22 Plaintiff further alleges that his experience reflects “a common course of conduct” 23 and “systemic violations” of the EPOA by defendants, and thus there is a class of 24 individuals who have “experienced harm identical to that experienced by Plaintiff.” Id. at 25 26 ORDER OF REMAND - 2 1 ¶¶ 42–44. “Plaintiff and each Class member seek statutory damages of $5,000, plus their 2 reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.” Id. at ¶ 45. 3 Defendants removed this matter to federal court on June 27, 2025, citing “28 U.S.C. 4 5 §§ 1332(d), 1441, 1446 and 1453 and specifically the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 6 (‘CAFA’).” Dkt. 1 at ¶ 5. On July 17, 2025, plaintiff moved to remand this matter based on 7 plaintiff’s alleged lack of Article III standing and, alternatively, because defendants 8 “cannot establish federal jurisdiction is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), the Class 9 10 Action Fairness Act of 2005 (‘CAFA’).” Dkt. 13 at 1–2. 11 On Sept. 4, 2025, the Washington State Supreme Court answered a certified 12 question from Western District of Washington Judge John H. Chun concerning the EPOA. 13 Branson v. Washington Fine Wine & Spirits, LLC, 5 Wn.3d 289 (Sept. 4, 2025). In its 14 15 answer, the court held that in order to be deemed a “job applicant” under the EPOA, “a 16 plaintiff must apply to a specific job posting but is not required to prove they are a ‘bona 17 fide’ or ‘good faith’ applicant to obtain remedies under the statute.” Id. at 292. 18 II. Discussion 19 As noted by Western District of Washington Judge Kymberly K. Evanson in a 20 21 recent and similar case, plaintiff’s argument that remand is required because he lacks 22 Article III standing represents “something of a role reversal from the typical case.” Davis 23 v. Delta Air Lines Inc., No. C24-0954-KKE, 2026 WL 914781, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 3, 24 2026). That said, lack of Article III standing has become a familiar argument from 25 26 plaintiffs in EPOA removal cases in this district, and judges, including Judge Evanson, ORDER OF REMAND - 3 1 have responded to the argument by granting remand. See id. at * 1 (granting remand for 2 lack of Article III standing). See also Roberts v. Brightview Landscapes, LLC, No. 25-CV- 3 5894-BJR, 2026 WL 44824 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 7, 2026) (same); Wright v. BlueLinx Corp., 4 5 No. 2:25-CV-01645-LK, 2025 WL 3771239 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 31, 2025) (same); Hill v. 6 Hydromax USA LLC, No. 2:25-CV-1621-JNW, 2025 WL 3677481 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 18, 7 2025) (same); Hill v. Airgas USA LLC, No. 2:25-CV-01531-TMC, 2025 WL 3640901 8 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 16, 2025) (same); Milito v. Lucid Grp. USA Inc., No. C25-1664-JLR, 9 10 2025 WL 3640898 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 16, 2025) (same). The preceding decisions granting 11 remand for lack of Article III standing in EPOA removal cases were all issued post- 12 Branson, 5 Wn.3d 289, and as these decisions indicate the Washington State Supreme 13 Court’s answer to Judge Chun’s certified question in Branson does not change the Article 14 15 III standing analysis. See Davis No. C24-0954-KKE, 2026 WL 914781, at *7 (“Nothing in 16 the Washington Supreme Court’s decision in Branson changes this Court’s standing 17 analysis.”). 18 A. Plaintiff Lacks Article III Standing 19 This Court adopts the well-reasoned approach of Judge Evanson in Davis. Id. Here, 20 21 as in Davis, defendants have the burden to show the existence of standing because they are 22 the party invoking federal jurisdiction. Id. (citing Smelt v. Cnty. of Orange, 447 F.3d 673, 23 682 (9th Cir. 2006)). Because Washington’s EPOA protects concrete, non-procedural 24 rights, the Court’s standing analysis asks whether the specific EPOA violations alleged 25 26 here “actually harm, or present a material risk of harm to,” plaintiff. Davis, No. C24-0954- ORDER OF REMAND - 4 1 KKE, 2026 WL 914781, at *7 (citing Magadia v. Wal-Mart Assocs., Inc., 999 F.3d 668, 2 679 (9th Cir. 2021)). As in Davis, defendants here point to plaintiff’s complaint and argue 3 that plaintiff’s “own allegations of harm establish standing.” No. C24-0954-KKE, 2026 4 5 WL 914781, at *7. See also Dkt. 15 at 9:21–10:5. But plaintiff’s allegations of harm are 6 nearly identical to the allegations of harm at issue in Davis, where the court found 7 plaintiff’s allegations of harm “insufficient” to establish that plaintiff was a “bona fide” job 8 applicant who could experience the kind of concrete injury-in-fact necessary for standing. 9 10 Compare No. C24-0954-KKE, 2026 WL 914781, at *7, with Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 37–41. As the 11 Davis court summarized, “[a]lthough he applied for a position, [plaintiff] never alleges he 12 was genuinely interested in gaining employment with [defendants]. Accordingly, he fails 13 to plead a cognizable injury resulting from [defendants’] alleged violation of the pay 14 15 disclosure requirement.” No. C24-0954-KKE, 2026 WL 914781, at *1. The same is true 16 here. Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 37–41. Thus, plaintiff lacks Article III standing and the Court must 17 remand. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975); 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 18 B. The Futility Exception Does Not Apply 19 As in Davis, defendants here argue that because plaintiff has contended he was not 20 21 a “bona fide” applicant and suffered no injury-in-fact for the purposes of the Article III 22 standing analysis, remand to state court could be futile (in which case dismissal by this 23 Court could be appropriate). No. C24-0954-KKE, 2026 WL 914781, at *8. See also Dkt. 24 15 at 11:10–12:12. Defendants’ theory of futility, offered pre-Branson, was premised on a 25 26 now-counterfactual scenario in which the Branson court held that a claim cannot be stated ORDER OF REMAND - 5 1 under the EPOA by a person who is not “a bona fide applicant who applied to the job 2 posting in good faith.” Dkt. 15 at 12:1–12. As discussed, Branson held the opposite. 5 3 Wn.3d 289. In addition, even after considering plaintiff’s contention that he was not a 4 5 “bona fide” applicant, Dkt. 13 at 1, and analyzing that contention in light of Branson, this 6 Court lacks the required “absolute certainty” that plaintiff’s case would be dismissed on 7 remand. Davis, No. C24-0954-KKE, 2026 WL 914781, at *8 (quoting Polo v. 8 Innoventions Int’l, LLC, 833 F.3d 1193, 1196 (9th Cir. 2016)). Therefore remand pursuant 9 10 to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), not dismissal, is the appropriate remedy. 11 III. Conclusion 12 For all the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS plaintiff’s motion to remand 13 (Dkt. 13). This case is remanded to King County Superior Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 14 15 § 1447(c). 16 17 IT IS SO ORDERED. 18 19 Dated this 26th day of May, 2026. 20 21 Robert S. Lasnik 22 United States District Judge 23 24 25 26 ORDER OF REMAND - 6