Elizondo-Nunez v. Bisignano

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ANTHONY MARK E.,1 Case No.: 25cv1393-LR 12 Plaintiff, ORDER REGARDING JOINT 13 v. MOTION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 14 FRANK J. BISIGNANO, Commissioner [ECF No. 14] of Social Security, 15 Defendant. 16 17 18 On June 2, 2025, Plaintiff Anthony Mark E. (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint 19 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking judicial review of a decision by the 20 Commissioner of Social Security (“Defendant”) denying Plaintiff’s application for social 21 security disability benefits and supplemental security income benefits. (ECF No. 1.) 22 Now pending before the Court is the parties’ “Joint Motion for Judicial Review” seeking 23 judicial review. (ECF No. 14 (“J. Mot.”).) For the reasons discussed below, the Court 24 25 26 27 1 Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(e)(6)(b), the Court’s opinions in Social Security cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) “refer to any non-government parties by using only their first name and last initial.” 28 1 ORDERS that judgment be entered affirming the decision of the Commissioner and 2 dismissing this action with prejudice. 3 I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 4 On May 6, 2021, Plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance benefits 5 under Title II of the Social Security Act and supplemental security income benefits under 6 Title XVI of the Social Security Act, alleging disability beginning on January 1, 2008. 7 (ECF No. 8 (“AR”)2 at 274–88.) After his application was denied initially and upon 8 reconsideration, Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing before an Administrative 9 Law Judge (“ALJ”). (Id. at 181–90, 197–204, 208–09.) An administrative hearing was 10 held on April 27, 2023. (Id. at 77–111.) Plaintiff appeared at the hearing with counsel, 11 and testimony was taken from him and a vocational expert (“VE”). (See id.) 12 On April 2, 2024, the ALJ issued a written decision finding that Plaintiff had not 13 been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from January 1, 2008, 14 through the date of the decision. (Id. at 54–71.) The ALJ’s decision became the final 15 decision of the Commissioner on August 23, 2023, when the appeals council denied 16 Plaintiff’s request for review. (Id. at 1–6.) This timely civil action followed. (See ECF 17 No. 1.) 18 II. SUMMARY OF THE ALJ’S FINDINGS 19 The ALJ followed the Commissioner’s five-step sequential evaluation process. 20 See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not 21 engaged in substantial gainful activity since January 1, 2008, Plaintiff’s alleged onset 22 date. (AR at 57.) At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe 23 impairments: attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”); learning disability, not 24 25 26 2 “AR” refers to the Administrative Record filed on August 1, 2025. (ECF No. 9.) The Court’s citations to the AR in this Order are to the page numbers listed on the original document rather than the 27 page numbers designated by the Court’s Case Management/Electronic Case Filing System (“CM/ECF”). For all other documents, the Court’s citations are to the page numbers affixed by CM/ECF. 28 1 otherwise specified (“NOS”); anxiety; depression; and obesity. (Id.) At step three, the 2 ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that 3 met or medically equaled the severity of one of the impairments listed in the 4 Commissioner’s Listing of Impairments. (Id. at 58.) 5 Next, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity 6 (“RFC”) to perform medium work, as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(c) and 20 C.F.R. 7 § 416.967(c), with the following additional nonexertional limitations: 8 The claimant can frequently balance, stoop, or crouch. He can occasionally kneel or crawl. He can frequently reach, handle, finger, and feel bilaterally. 9 The claimant is limited to work involving simple repetitive tasks and only 10 occasional work-related interactions with supervisors, coworkers, or the public. The claimant requires a habitual work environment. He must avoid 11 work requiring driving a motor vehicle as a duty of the job. 12 13 (Id. at 60.) 14 At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have past relevant work. (Id. at 15 68.) The ALJ then proceeded to step five of the sequential evaluation process. The ALJ 16 classified Plaintiff as a younger individual on the alleged onset date for whom 17 transferability of skills was not an issue. (Id.) Based on the VE’s testimony that a 18 hypothetical person with Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC,3 could 19 perform the requirements of occupations that existed in significant numbers in the 20 national economy, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not been disabled from January 1, 21 22 23 3 The VE testified that a hypothetical person with Plaintiff’s age (twenty-seven years old at the time of the hearing), education, work experience, and RFC to perform the full range of medium work with 24 additional nonexertional limitations enumerated in the RFC the ALJ assessed for Plaintiff, could 25 perform the requirements of occupations that existed in significant numbers in the national economy, such as floor waxer, motor vehicle assembler, and counter supply worker. (Id. at 69; see also id. at 104– 26 06.) In the alternative, the VE testified that a hypothetical person with Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC limited to light exertion, could perform the requirements of occupations that 27 existed in significant numbers in the national economy, such as sub-assembler, housekeeping cleaner, and marker. (Id. at 69–70; see also id. at 106.) 28 1 2008, through the date of the ALJ’s decision. (Id. at 70.) 2 III. DISPUTED ISSUE 3 The sole issue Plaintiff raises in the Joint Motion for Judicial Review is whether 4 the ALJ properly considered Plaintiff’s testimony. (J. Mot. at 4.) 5 IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 6 Section 405(g) of the Social Security Act allows unsuccessful applicants to seek 7 judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The scope of 8 judicial review is limited, and the denial of benefits will not be disturbed if it is supported 9 by substantial evidence in the record and contains no legal error. See id.; Buck v. 10 Berryhill, 869 F.3d 1040, 1048 (9th Cir. 2017). “Substantial evidence means more than a 11 mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. It means such relevant evidence as a 12 reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Revels v. Berryhill, 13 874 F.3d 648, 654 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Desrosiers v. Sec’y Health & Hum. Servs., 14 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988)). In determining whether the Commissioner’s decision 15 is supported by substantial evidence, a reviewing court “must assess the entire record, 16 weighing the evidence both supporting and detracting from the agency’s conclusion,” 17 and “may not reweigh the evidence or substitute [its] judgment for that of the ALJ.” 18 Ahearn v. Saul, 988 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2021), superseded by regulation on other 19 grounds. Where the evidence can be interpreted in more than one way, the court must 20 uphold the ALJ’s decision. Id. at 1115–16; Attmore v. Colvin, 827 F.3d 872, 875 (9th 21 Cir. 2016). The court may consider “only the reasons provided by the ALJ in the 22 disability determination and may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which [he or she] 23 did not rely.” Revels, 874 F.3d at 654 (internal quotation omitted). 24 / / / 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 V. PLAINTIFF’S TESTIMONY AND STATEMENTS 2 A. Plaintiff’s Testimony During Administrative Hearing 3 Plaintiff testified that he weighs 290 pounds and is 5’8” tall. (AR at 92.) He lives 4 with his disabled father; his mother lives separately, but Plaintiff talks to her daily and 5 sees her during weekends. (Id. at 85–86, 92.) Plaintiff plays video games every day and 6 walks on a trail around his apartment. (Id. at 91–92, 99.) He does not walk far from his 7 apartment because he does not know street names and the layout of the city, may forget 8 where he is, and may not be able to find his way back. (Id. at 99.) 9 Plaintiff and his father grocery shop, and Plaintiff sometimes helps carry groceries. 10 (Id. at 92–93.) He does not have any friends, and Plaintiff’s father drives him to medical 11 appointments. (Id.) Plaintiff has never taken a bus or a trolley, and has not learned how 12 to drive a car because studying for the driving test is “difficult.” (Id. at 86, 93–94.) 13 Plaintiff had a girlfriend who lives on the East Coast whom he met on Facebook. 14 (Id. at 86–87.) Plaintiff has not traveled to the East Coast, but his former girlfriend 15 visited him in San Diego once. (Id. at 87.) Plaintiff is no longer active on Facebook and 16 social media, but he used to be active in the past. (Id. at 88.) 17 Plaintiff helped his uncle, who works in construction, around the house 18 “throw[ing] away debris,” but Plaintiff was not paid for that work. (Id.) Plaintiff stated 19 that he was “volunteering when he was help[ing] his uncle,” but his uncle at times gave 20 him money. (Id. at 89.) Plaintiff explained that he helped “three or four days” during the 21 month when his uncle did construction projects around his house. (Id. at 97.) 22 Although Plaintiff considered applying for a job at Costco, he did not apply 23 because of irritable bowel syndrome (“IBS”) issues, anxiety, and depression. (Id. at 89– 24 90.) He testified that he cannot work due to his mental and physical limitations. (Id. at 25 93–94.) Because of ADHD, Plaintiff forgets, misplaces, and loses things, and has “hard 26 time understanding most words.” (Id. at 93, 98.) Sometimes he forgets to shower, and 27 his father reminds him to do so, and his mother reminds him to take medications, make 28 his bed, and not misplace things. (Id. at 99–100.) Plaintiff has difficulties with learning 1 and understanding words, and struggles with reading. (Id. at 99.) Because of anxiety and 2 depression, he lies down every day and does not like to be around people. (Id. at 93, 3 100–101.) 4 Plaintiff also testified that his carpal tunnel syndrome and IBS are getting worse. 5 (Id. at 94.) He plays videogames thirty minutes per day, but needs to stop because he can 6 “barely hold . . . objects in [his] hand without [his] hand hurting within five minutes.” 7 (Id.) When the ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s medical records show that he had “5/5 strength 8 in both of [his] hands,” Plaintiff responded that the most recent test by his neurologist 9 resulted in Plaintiff’s referral to therapy. (Id. at 94–95.) When the ALJ pointed out that 10 the most recent test by Plaintiff’s neurologist listed findings of “5 out of 5 bilaterally,” 11 Plaintiff responded that, recently, his hands had become numb and started hurting. (Id. at 12 95.) 13 Plaintiff further stated that although he did not list carpal tunnel syndrome as a 14 physical limitation when he filed his disability claim, he developed issues with carpal 15 tunnel after he filed the claim. (Id.) He has numbness in his right and left hands, 16 difficulties with typing and grip, and weakness in his wrist; frequently drops heavy items, 17 and can lift five pounds for about five minutes before his wrist starts hurting. (Id. at 96– 18 97.) Further, because of IBS, Plaintiff needs to use a restroom every thirty minutes, 19 twenty-to-thirty times per day. (Id. at 98.) He also has difficulties with sleep, goes to 20 bed around 2 a.m., and wakes up around 10:00–11:00 a.m. (Id. at 100.) 21 B. Plaintiff’s Statements in Disability Report and Adult Function Report 22 In his Disability Report dated June 10, 2021, Plaintiff stated that ADHD, anxiety, 23 depression, and learning disability limit his ability to work. (Id. at 297, 302.) He also 24 stated that he “ha[s] never worked.” (Id. at 298–99.) 25 In his Adult Function Report dated July 8, 2021, Plaintiff stated that he cannot 26 focus on simple tasks because of ADHD, and that he has depression, anxiety, and “anger 27 problem.” (Id. at 314, 321.) Additionally, his “prediabetic” condition and “stomach 28 problems” force him to frequently use the bathroom. (Id. at 314.) 1 Plaintiff wakes up in the morning, eats breakfast, plays videogames, showers, and 2 “continues playing video games until dinner.” (Id. at 315.) His “depression gets in the 3 way and keeps[s] [him] from doing things,” he has insomnia, racing thoughts, forgets to 4 shower, does not shave, is able to apply deodorant and pick out clothes, but needs 5 reminders to take medications. (Id. at 315–16.) He eats microwaveable meals, 6 sandwiches and cereal, prepares food several times per week, sometimes washes dishes 7 and vacuums, takes out the trash, and cleans his room. (Id. at 316.) He does housework 8 for two hours before getting distracted. (Id.) 9 Plaintiff sometimes walks outside, but prefers to stay inside because he does not 10 want to get lost. (Id. at 317.) He does not drive because he cannot remember “the 11 answers to the [driving] permit test.” (Id.) He shops in stores, can pay bills and count 12 change, but cannot handle money. (Id.) He writes poems, plays video games, watches 13 TV, and listens to music, but cannot focus on some of those activities. (Id. at 318.) He 14 grocery shops with his father and visits his mother once or twice per week. (Id.) 15 Plaintiff further reported that his conditions affect his memory, concentration, and 16 ability to complete tasks. (Id. at 319.) He can walk a mile, but needs to rest every fifteen 17 minutes. (Id.) He does not finish what he starts, does not follow instructions well, and 18 does not interact with authority figures. (Id.) He does not handle stress well, and when 19 his routines change, his “anxiety goes up and [he] get[s] depressed,” angry, and upset. 20 (Id. at 320.) When Plaintiff gets angry, he “bite[s]” himself. (Id.) Plaintiff wears 21 reading glasses daily, and takes Methylphenidate4 and Fluoxetine.5 (Id. at 321.) 22 23 4 Methylphenidate is a stimulant, commonly known as Ritalin, which is used to treat ADHD. See 24 United States v. Boettjer, 569 F.2d 1078, 1079 (9th Cir. 1978); Alkana v. Berryhill, Case No. CV 17- 25 5743-JPR, 2018 WL 3546281, at *4 n.5 (C.D. Cal. July 19, 2018). 26 5 Fluoxetine is an antidepressant, also known under the brand name Prozac. See Lakonnie M. v. Kijakazi, Case No.: 22cv985-LR, 2023 WL 6378047, at *4 n.6 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2023); Hermiz v. 27 Berryhill, Case No.: 3:18-cv-01035-BEN(KSC), 2019 WL 3780271, at *3 n.3 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2019); Humphreys v. Astrue, No. 12–cv–328–W(PCL), 2014 WL 1255889, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2014). 28 1 VI. DISCUSSION 2 A. Parties’ Arguments 3 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not properly consider his subjective symptom 4 testimony. (See J. Mot. at 4–16, 22–24.) Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ did not connect 5 specific portions of Plaintiff’s testimony to the parts of the record supporting the ALJ’s 6 decision when he concluded that objective evidence did not support Plaintiff’s testimony. 7 (Id. at 7–11.) Plaintiff further alleges that although the ALJ determined the Plaintiff 8 improved with treatment, the ALJ did not consider the impact of Plaintiff’s “bad days” on 9 his ability to work full-time. (Id. at 11–13, 22–23.) Additionally, Plaintiff contends that 10 the ALJ did not establish that his “sporadic” daily activities contradicted his testimony or 11 demonstrated his ability to spend a substantial part of the day doing activities transferable 12 to a full-time work setting. (Id. at 13–16, 23–24.) Plaintiff therefore maintains that 13 substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s decision to discount his subjective 14 symptom testimony. (See id.) 15 Defendant responds that the ALJ appropriately evaluated Plaintiff’s alleged 16 symptoms. (See id. at 17–19.) Defendant asserts that the ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s 17 statements because they were inconsistent with objective evidence and because Plaintiff 18 improved with treatment. (See id. at 21–22.) Defendant further claims that the ALJ 19 properly considered and evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints in light of Plaintiff’s 20 reported daily activities. (Id. at 19–20.) Defendant also states that the ALJ reasonably 21 discounted Plaintiff’s testimony by referencing Plaintiff’s ability to “work informally on 22 and off” performing construction work and landscaping with his uncle. (Id. at 20.) 23 Defendant maintains that the ALJ properly found that Plaintiff had impairments that 24 impacted his ability to work, but not to the extent that the impairments rendered Plaintiff 25 26 27 28 1 totally disabled. (Id. at 21.) Defendant therefore argues that substantial evidence 2 supported the ALJ’s decision to discount Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony. (Id.) 3 B. Applicable Law 4 The Ninth Circuit has established a two-part test for evaluating a claimant’s 5 allegations regarding subjective symptoms. See Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 678 6 (9th Cir. 2017); see also Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029 7 (Mar. 16, 2016). First, the ALJ determines whether there is “objective medical evidence 8 of an underlying impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or 9 other symptoms alleged.” Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 678 (quoting Garrison v. Colvin, 759 10 F.3d 995, 1014–15 (9th Cir. 2014)). Second, if a claimant presented such evidence, and 11 there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ may reject the claimant’s statements about 12 the severity of the claimant’s symptoms “only by offering specific, clear and convincing 13 reasons for doing so.” Id. 14 When evaluating subjective symptom testimony, “[g]eneral findings are 15 insufficient.” Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 493 (9th Cir. 2015). “[A]n ALJ 16 does not provide specific, clear, and convincing reasons for rejecting a claimant’s 17 testimony by simply reciting the medical evidence in support of his or her residual 18 functional capacity determination.” Id. at 489. Instead, the ALJ must identify the 19 testimony regarding the claimant’s symptoms that the ALJ finds not credible, and explain 20 what evidence undermines the claimant’s testimony. See Lambert v. Saul, 980 F.3d 21 1266, 1277 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 22 1090, 1102 (9th Cir. 2014)); see also Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 1139 (9th Cir. 23 2014) (finding error where the ALJ “never connected the medical record” to the 24 claimant’s testimony, and did not make “a specific finding linking a lack of medical 25 records to [the claimant’s] testimony about the intensity” of her symptoms); Orteza v. 26 Shalala, 50 F.3d 748, 750 (9th Cir. 1995) (providing that the ALJ’s reasons for 27 discounting a claimant’s testimony must be “sufficiently specific to permit the reviewing 28 court to conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily discount the claimant’s testimony”). 1 “Because symptoms sometimes suggest a greater severity of impairment than can 2 be shown by objective medical evidence alone,” the ALJ considers “all of the evidence 3 presented,” including information about the claimant’s prior work record, statements 4 about symptoms, evidence from medical sources, and observations by the Agency’s 5 employees and other individuals. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3), 416.929(c)(3); SSR 6 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029. In addition, the ALJ may consider other factors, such as the 7 claimant’s daily activities; the location, duration, frequency, and intensity of pain or other 8 symptoms; precipitating and aggravating factors; the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side 9 effects of any medication taken to alleviate pain; treatment; and any other measures used 10 to relieve pain. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3), 416.929(c)(3); SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 11 1119029. 12 C. Analysis 13 The parties do not dispute the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s medically determinable 14 impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms. (See AR at 15 61; see also J. Mot.) Accordingly, the first prong of the ALJ’s inquiry regarding 16 Plaintiff’s subjective symptoms is satisfied. 17 Turning to the second prong of the ALJ’s inquiry, neither party alleges that the 18 ALJ found that Plaintiff was malingering. (See J. Mot.) The Court therefore is required 19 to determine whether the ALJ identified which of Plaintiff’s subjective allegations of 20 impairment he discounted, and whether the ALJ provided specific, clear, and convincing 21 reasons for doing so. See Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 489; Lambert, 980 F.3d at 1277. 22 The ALJ summarized Plaintiff s written statements and testimony during the 23 administrative hearing as follows: 24 In an Adult Function Report, the claimant alleged an inability to focus on simple tasks because of attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder and random 25 episodes of depression, an anger problem, and prediabetes causing frequent 26 bathroom use and stomach problems. The claimant also alleged bad anxiety. The claimant reported spending the day playing video games. The claimant 27 reported being able to take care of personal care, prepare simple meals, 28 perform light household chores, shop in stores, and handle money. He liked 1 to write poems, play video games, watch television, and listen to music daily. Functionally, the claimant alleged no problems with exertional, 2 postural, or hand use. He could walk a mile. The claimant alleged mental 3 limitations with memory, completing tasks, concentration, understanding, and following instructions. The claimant did not report using any assistive 4 devices. 5 At the hearing, the claimant testified he lives with his father. He does not 6 receive any income for work activity. He has not had any surgery. He has a 7 high school education. He walks on a trail around his apartment. He weighs 290 pounds, and his height is 5’8”. He prepares food in the microwave. He 8 helps his father grocery shop sometimes. He does not have friends. He has 9 a hard time understanding most words. He has anxiety attacks. His father drives him. He has carpal tunnel that is not going away. He plays video 10 games for 30 minutes. He can barely hold objects in his hand without pain. 11 He has numbness in both hands. He can only lift 5 pounds. He has irritable bowel syndrome and uses the restroom every 30–60 minutes. He is not 12 around people. 13 14 (AR at 61 (internal citation omitted).) The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s “statements 15 concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms [we]re not 16 entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record.” (Id.) 17 The ALJ then discounted Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony citing the following 18 reasons: (1) objective medical evidence in the record was not consistent with Plaintiff’s 19 reported symptoms and limitations, (2) Plaintiff’s treatment was conservative and 20 effective in controlling his symptoms, and (3) Plaintiff’s daily activities contradicted his 21 testimony and involved skills that could be transferred to the workplace. (See id. at 62.) 22 The Court therefore will examine each of the ALJ’s stated reasons for discontinuing 23 Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony below. 24 / / / 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 1. Inconsistency with medical evidence 2 The ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony because Plaintiff’s 3 “statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of his symptoms” were 4 “only partially consistent with the record.” (Id.) The ALJ reasoned that “the imaging, 5 testing, physical examinations, and mental status examinations . . . d[id] not fully support 6 [Plaintiff’s] allegations.” (Id.) 7 Generally, the ALJ may not reject the claimant’s subjective complaints based 8 solely on a lack of medical evidence to fully corroborate the alleged severity of pain. 9 Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 2005). However, “when objective 10 medical evidence in the record is inconsistent with the claimant’s subjective testimony, 11 the ALJ may indeed weigh it as undercutting such testimony.” Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 12 F.4th 489, 498 (9th Cir. 2022) (explaining that Burch does not forbid the ALJ from using 13 inconsistent objective medical evidence in the record to discount subjective symptom 14 testimony). Contradiction of the claimant’s subjective complaints with the medical 15 record is a sufficient basis for rejecting the claimant’s subjective testimony. See 16 Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2008). The ALJ 17 must identify “specific, clear, and convincing examples” that contrast the claimant’s 18 “subjective [] testimony with objective medical evidence.” Smartt, 53 F.4th at 499. 19 In this case, the ALJ noted that although Plaintiff alleged disabling mental 20 limitations, his mental status examinations were routinely within normal limits, his 21 speech was normal, attention and concentration were intact, he had fair insight, intact 22 cognitive function and judgment, and did not have delusions. (AR at 64 (citing id. at 776, 23 1120, 1128, 1151).) The ALJ cited records from Certified Physician Assistant Clarion 24 dated July 2, 2019, stating that the findings of Plaintiff’s psychiatric examination were 25 “normal,” Plaintiff was “[o]rineted to time, place & situation,” had appropriate mood and 26 affect, and normal insight and judgement. (Id. at 776.) 27 The ALJ then cited notes from Dr. Durr, who conducted Plaintiff’s psychological 28 consultative examination on August 10, 2021, and discussed in detail Dr. Durr’s findings. 1 (Id. at 65 (citing id. at 1001–12).) The ALJ noted that after examining Plaintiff, Dr. Durr 2 listed diagnoses of ADHD, persistent depressive disorder, and borderline intellectual 3 functioning. (Id. at 1006.) After conducting a mental status examination, Dr. Durr noted 4 that Plaintiff had good hygiene and grooming, was pleasant and cooperative, had good 5 eye contact, and did not have delusions, hallucinations, suicidal/homicidal ideation, or 6 racing thoughts. (Id. at 1002–04.) Plaintiff was oriented to person, time and place, and 7 the purpose of testing; his speech was normal, clear and coherent; his mood was 8 depressed; and his affect was congruent with no obvious psychotic indicators. (Id. at 9 1005.) Plaintiff was not able to perform serial sevens and threes,6 and could spell the 10 word “music” forward but not backward. (Id.) Dr. Durr concluded that Plaintiff was able 11 to understand, remember, and carry out short and simplistic instructions; had “mild 12 inability to understand detailed instructions,” and would likely “perform better with 13 visual instructions than with auditory ones.” (Id. at 1006–07.) Dr. Durr further 14 determined that Plaintiff was able to make simplistic work-related decisions without 15 special supervision, maintain consistency and pace throughout the day, follow normal 16 rules of the workplace, and interact appropriately with supervisors, coworkers, and peers. 17 (Id. at 1007.) 18 The ALJ also cited records from Licensed Clinical Social Worker Juarez dated 19 April 7, 2022, documenting the findings of Plaintiff’s mental status examination, and 20 noting that Plaintiff was cooperative, had slow speech, euthymic mood, flat affect, 21 normal thought process and content, intact memory, adequate attention, developmentally 22 appropriate reasoning, judgement and insight, and good impulse control. (Id. at 1120.) 23 The ALJ further cited progress notes from Licensed Clinical Social Worker Juarez dated 24 25 26 6 “Serial sevens” and “serial threes” refer to a test used to assess concentration during which the subject subtracts serial sevens or serial threes from one hundred. See Salmon v. Astrue, No. 10-CV-03636- 27 LHK, 2012 WL 1029329, at *6 n.3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2012); Sanders v. Barnhart, 1:06cv0101 DLB, 2006 WL 8450997, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2006). 28 1 May 11, 2022, listing the following assessment: “[m]ild episode of recurrent major 2 depressive disorder,” and “[a]nxiety state, unspecified.” (Id. at 115; see also id. at 1152.) 3 Additionally, the ALJ cited progress notes from Dr. DeSilva dated July 12, 2022, 4 documenting the findings of Plaintiff’s mental status examination, and noting that 5 Plaintiff had anxious mood, constricted affect, clear speech, logical thought process, 6 perception within normal limits, no delusions or hallucinations, “[a]verage” intelligence, 7 and thought content, and cognition and judgement “within normal limits.” (Id. at 1128; 8 see also id. at 1131.) 9 The ALJ then discussed in detail notes and findings from Plaintiff’s October 24, 10 2023 comprehensive orthopedic consultative examination conducted by Dr. Tran. (Id. at 11 62–63 (citing id. at 1309–15).) Dr. Tran’s physical examination revealed that Plaintiff 12 was well-developed, well-nourished, and overweight, and that he “ambulated without an 13 assistive device with a mild lateral trunk tilt and a minimally antalgic gait.” (Id. at 1310.) 14 Dr. Tran noted that Plaintiff weighed 280 pounds, was 68 inches tall, and his blood 15 pressure was 160/100. (Id.) Plaintiff’s Romberg test7 was normal, his “[r]adial and 16 dorsalis pedis pulses were intact bilaterally,” range of motion of the cervical and lumbar 17 spine was normal without tenderness, range of motion of the joints and extremities was 18 normal, and straight leg raise test was negative. (Id. at 1311–13.) 19 Dr. Tran further stated that Plaintiff’s neurologic examination showed 5/5 strength 20 in all extremities; his reflexes, sensory, cerebellar, and cranial nerves were all intact and 21 normal; and Plaintiff had intact lower extremity muscle strength, no muscle atrophy, and 22 no postural or gait instability with possible S1 sacral radiculopathy. (Id. at 1313.) 23 24 25 7 A Romberg test is a neurological examination that tests for balance issues. Delu v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. CV-21-01849-PHX-DLR, 2023 WL 6890300, at *3 (D. Ariz. Oct. 19, 2023). The test 26 includes standing unassisted with feet together with eyes open for thirty seconds and then eyes closed for thirty seconds. Anthony M. v. O’Malley, Case No. CV 23-07694-AS, 2024 WL 3469036, at *4 n.5 27 (C.D. Cal. June 11, 2024) (citation omitted). A negative result indicates that the patient did not lose balance during the test. Id. 28 1 Plaintiff had mild bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, a positive Tinel’s test in both wrists, 2 and normal muscle strength without muscle atrophy. (Id. at 1314.) Based on his 3 examination of Plaintiff, Dr. Tran opined that Plaintiff could lift and carry fifty pounds 4 occasionally and twenty-five pounds frequently, stand and walk for six hours in an eight- 5 hour workday, and frequently use ramps/stairs, climb, bend, stoop, kneel, crouch, and 6 crawl. (Id.) Additionally, Dr. Tran determined that Plaintiff did not have any reaching, 7 grasping, fingering, feeling, or wrist movement limitations. (Id.) 8 The ALJ cited progress notes and findings from Plaintiff’s consultative 9 examination that documented his body mass index ranging between 38–46, which the 10 ALJ stated indicated obesity. (Id. at 63 (citing id. at 543–1000, 1308–17).) The ALJ 11 observed that he had considered Plaintiff’s complaints of back pain, knee pain, and leg 12 pain, which he stated “may be a result of [Painitff’s] obesity,” but further noted there was 13 no objective medical evidence in the record, such as imaging, testing, or physical 14 examination demonstrating that Plaintiff had any disorders of the spine, joints, or lower 15 extremities. (Id. at 63.) 16 Further, the ALJ stated that although Plaintiff reported bilateral hand numbness 17 and pain that prevented him from holding objects for prolonged periods of time, and that 18 he could not lift a more than five pounds, his physical examinations did not support such 19 allegations. (Id.) The ALJ cited records showing that Plaintiff had adequate grip 20 strength, normal muscle strength, no muscle atrophy, and no carpal tunnel syndrome 21 surgeries. (Id. (citing id. at 1308–15).) The ALJ further noted that imaging of Plaintiff’s 22 right wrist was negative and imaging of his left wrist indicated ulna minus variant 23 without other abnormalities. (Id. at 63 (citing id. at 990–91).) Additionally, the ALJ 24 25 26 8 A Tinel’s test is used to diagnose carpal tunnel syndrome. See id. at *4 n.5. During the test, a physician lightly taps over the irritated nerve; if the tapping elicits a sensation of tingling or “pins and 27 needles” along the nerve, the test is positive and may indicate carpal tunnel syndrome. Id. 28 1 cited Plaintiff’s treatment records from East County Neurology, which indicated that 2 Plaintiff’s upper extremity strength was intact, but Plaintiff had positive Tinel’s sign 3 bilaterally with decreased sensation on the middle and index fingers, and his July 2021 4 electromyogram and nerve conduction studies, which showed mild bilateral mixed 5 median neuropathy. (Id. at 63–64 (citing id. at 1008–18).) The ALJ also noted that in 6 June 2022, Plaintiff’s physical examination was unremarkable, including hand grip, 7 fingers extension, wrist flexion and extension, elbow flexion and extension, and his upper 8 arm abduction and adduction was 5/5 bilaterally, he had symmetric deep tendon reflexes, 9 stable gait, but positive Phalen’s sign9 in the hands. (Id. at 64 (citing id. at 1316–17).) 10 The ALJ next cited July 27, 2022 imaging of Plaintiff’s lumbar spine, which was 11 negative, and imaging of his cervical spine, which showed possible limbus vertebral body 12 at C6. (Id. at 62 (citing id. at 1241–42).) Further, the ALJ cited medical records that 13 contained relatively unremarkable physical examination findings, except for some 14 subjective pain complaints and a mild antalgic gait, which the ALJ noted was “most 15 likely due to Plaintiff’s obesity,” but the records also showed that Plaintiff had 5/5 16 muscle strength, no indication of any neurological deficits, and no prescribed assistive 17 devices for ambulation. (Id. at 62 (citing id. at 394–1000, 1118–1251, 1308–15).) 18 Additionally, the ALJ cited Plaintiff’s treatment records from San Ysidro Health Center 19 and the orthopedic consultative examination, and noted that the records contained 20 “mostly benign findings.” (Id. at 62.) 21 Additionally, the ALJ noted that there was no evidence in the record indicating any 22 end organ damage or functional limitations related to Plaintiff’s blood pressure, high 23 cholesterol, or prediabetes. (Id. at 57.) The ALJ also cited Plaintiff’s cardiovascular 24 25 9 A Phalen’s test is used to diagnose carpal tunnel syndrome. See Rosemary Guadalupe V. v. Saul, 26 Case No.: 3:19-cv-00715-RBM, 2020 WL 85486, at *4 n.4 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2020). During the test, patients are asked to press the dorsal surface of their hands together and hold the position for thirty to 27 sixty seconds. Id. Burning, tingling or numbness in the hands or fingers is considered a positive test and an indicator of carpal tunnel syndrome. Id. 28 1 exams, which were normal, and stated that Plaintiff’s visits to emergency room with 2 complaints of chest pain were negative and did not result in hospitalization. (Id. at 57–58 3 (citing id. at 1258–1303).) Further, the ALJ stated that despite Plaintiff’s testimony about 4 bilateral hand numbness, problems holding objects, and his physical examination 5 indicative of a positive Tinel’s test in both wrists, other medical examinations showed 6 normal muscle strength without muscle atrophy, and the nerve conduction study showed 7 only mild bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. (Id. at 58 (citing id. at 1008–18, 1243–51, 8 1314, 1316–17).) Additionally, the ALJ stated that although Plaintiff testified that he had 9 irritable bowel syndrome that required him to use the restroom every thirty-to-sixty 10 minutes, “there [wa]s no objective evidence of any such condition,” and cited Plaintiff’s 11 abdominal ultrasound and colonoscopy, both of which were negative. (Id. at 58 (citing 12 id. at 999, 1112, 1115).) The ALJ also stated that although Plaintiff reported bilateral 13 knee and leg pain, and groin pain, Plaintiff’s physical examinations were normal, and 14 there was “no imaging indicating any disorders and no objective diagnostic impressions 15 from an acceptable medical source of any related conditions.” (Id. at 58 (citing id. at 16 1308–15).) 17 Accordingly, the ALJ identified Plaintiff’s symptom allegations that he discounted, 18 and the ALJ cited and discussed voluminous medical records from Plaintiff’s multiple 19 medical care providers and consultative examiners that undermined Plaintiff’s allegations 20 regarding the severity of his symptoms. See Smartt, 53 F.4th at 499 (stating that the ALJ 21 is required to identify “specific, clear, and convincing examples” that contrast the 22 claimant’s “subjective [] testimony with objective medical evidence.”). The ALJ’s 23 determination was therefore supported by substantial evidence in the record. As a result, 24 the ALJ provided a clear and convicting reason, supported by substantial evidence in the 25 record, to discount Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony. 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 2. Effectiveness of treatment and the level of rendered treatment 2 The second reason the ALJ cited to discount Plaintiff’s subjective symptom 3 testimony was that Plaintiff’s treatment was effective in controlling his symptoms and 4 that the treatment was conservative. (AR at 62 (citing id. at 112–42, 145–78, 1008–18, 5 1308–15).) The ALJ specifically noted that “the level of treatment [Plaintiff] received is 6 not consistent with an allegation of disabling impairments, including the type and dosage 7 of prescribed medications.” (Id. at 62.) 8 In assessing a claimant’s subjective symptoms, an ALJ may consider the “type, 9 dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication,” as well as “treatment, other 10 than medication” the claimant receives to relieve “pain or other symptoms.” See 20 11 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3)(iv)–(v), 416.929(c)(3)(iv)–(v). An ALJ cannot “reject a 12 claimant’s testimony merely because symptoms wax and wane in the course of 13 treatment” because “[c]ycles of improvement and debilitating symptoms are a common 14 occurrence.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1017; see also Morales v. Berryhill, 239 F. Supp. 3d 15 1211, 1216 (E.D. Cal. 2017) (noting that some improvement “with treatment is to be 16 expected”). Further, “[a]n ALJ cannot simply pick out a few isolated instances of 17 improvement over a period of months or years but must interpret reports of improvement 18 . . . with an understanding of the patient’s overall well-being and the nature of her 19 symptoms.” Attmore, 827 F.3d at 877 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 20 “[T]he examples an ALJ chooses must in fact constitute examples of a broader 21 development.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 22 In this case, the ALJ stated that Plaintiff’s high blood pressure and high cholesterol 23 had been treated with medication, and that those conditions were “amenable to proper 24 control by adherence to recommended medical management and medication 25 compliance.” (AR at 57.) The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff was not “taking any 26 significant pain medications other than Gabapentin, which is for mild to moderate levels 27 of pain.” (Id. at 62 (citing id. at 354).) The records the ALJ cited contain the list of 28 Plaintiff’s medications, which included Methylphenidate for ADHD, Fluoxetine for 1 depression, Gabapentin for carpal tunnel, Amoxicillin for sinusitis, stool softener for 2 constipation, and Cetirizine for allergies. (Id.) 3 With respect to Plaintiff’s mental health symptoms, the ALJ stated that Plaintiff’s 4 “mental health treatment record is rather minimal and unremarkable except for some 5 reported clinical findings of depressed and anxious moods treated with medication 6 management but is otherwise generally within normal limits.” (Id. at 64.) The ALJ cited 7 notes from Dr. DeSilva dated July 2, 2019, documenting Plaintiff’s report that he was not 8 taking Ritalin daily, that he was taking the medication only when he was studying, and 9 noting Dr. Silva’s recommendation that Plaintiff “stop or reduce Ritalin.” (Id. (citing id. 10 at 770).) The ALJ concluded that the records were “indicative of the lack of severity of 11 [Plaintiff’s] attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder condition.” (Id. at 64.) Additionally, 12 the ALJ cited medical records containing results of Plaintiff’s fifteen separate screenings 13 for depression during the relevant timeframe, which contained two findings of 14 “[m]oderate depression” and thirteen findings of “[m]ild depression.” (Id. (citing id. at 15 768).) The ALJ observed that the records documented that Plaintiff “had primarily mild 16 depression upon screening.” (Id. at 64.) The records the ALJ cited also contained results 17 of Plaintiff’s seven screenings for anxiety disorder, and listed one finding of 18 “[m]oderate” generalized anxiety disorder and six findings of “[m]ild” generalized 19 anxiety disorder during the relevant timeframe. (See id. at 768.) The ALJ noted that 20 Plaintiff’s overall mental health history indicated that he “continued with medication 21 management and infrequent psychotherapy at San Ysidro Health Center demonstrating 22 unremarkable mental status examinations except for some depression and anxiety related 23 symptoms and no need for psychiatric hospitalizations.” (Id. at 64.) The ALJ concluded 24 that Plaintiff’s “treatment is effective in stabilizing moods albeit with remaining 25 moderate limitations,” and that Plaintiff’s “condition is stable with no emergency room 26 visits, psychiatric hospitalizations, suicide attempts, or similar episodes of 27 decompensation.” (Id. at 65.) The ALJ further observed that despite Plaintiff’s 28 allegations of ongoing issues with social anxiety and problems with concentration, 1 Plaintiff’s treatment was “routine” and “outpatient.” (Id. at 65, 67.) The ALJ concluded 2 that Plaintiff “has received minimal, conservative, outpatient treatment, which has been 3 effective in managing his mental symptoms.” (Id. at 68.) 4 The ALJ also noted that although Plaintiff testified that his irritable bowel 5 syndrome required him to use the restroom every thirty-to-sixty minutes, Plaintiff was 6 not prescribed any medication for the condition. (Id. at 58.) Next, the ALJ stated that 7 despite Plaintiff’s allegations of bilateral hand numbness and pain that prevented him 8 from holding objects for a prolonged period of time and lifting maximum five pounds, 9 Plaintiff was only recommended physical therapy for bilateral hand pain and numbness, 10 using a wrist splint continuously, and prescribed Gabapentin. (Id. at 65 (citing id. at 11 1316–17).) The ALJ cited records that contain progress notes from Dr. Mohammad 12 dated June 21, 2022, stating that although Plaintiff reported numbness and pain in both 13 hands, he “[wa]s not using the splint continuously.” (Id. at 65 (citing id. at 1316–17).) 14 Additionally, the records contain Dr. Mohammad’s findings after physical examination of 15 Plaintiff noting the following: “[h]ands grip, fingers extension, wrist flexion and 16 extension, elbow flexion and extension[,] and upper arm abduction and adduction was 5 17 out of 5 bilaterally”; “[d]eep tendon reflexes are symmetric”; and “Tinel’s sign qualities 18 in the hands Phaen’s sing positive[sic], [and] Gait is stable.” (Id. at 1317.) 19 The Court notes that numerous notes from Plaintiff’s medical providers further 20 support the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s treatment was conservative and effective in 21 managing his symptoms. See e.g., id. at 1248 (containing a note from Plaintiff’s 22 neurologist Dr. Mohammad dated October 31, 2022, stating that since Plaintiff’s EMG 23 nerve conduction studies of the upper extremities did not show significant changes 24 compared to previous year, he “recommended conservative management” and physical 25 therapy); id. at 1018 (containing Dr. Mohammad’s July 15, 2021 findings after evaluating 26 Plaintiff for numbness of both hands, stating that “[c]onsidering the mild findings, I 27 recommend conservative management at this point”; also “recommend[ing] adjustment 28 of pain medication,” use of wrist splint, and physical therapy); see also id. at 1014 1 (containing Dr. Mohammad’s progress note dated October 4, 2021, that Plaintiff 2 “[d]enied depression and anxiety”); id. at 1010 (containing Dr. Mohammad’s progress 3 note dated June 23, 2021, documenting that “[Plaintiff] is not complaining as much as 4 before” and that he “[h]as mild depression and anxiety”); id. at 633, 636 (containing Dr. 5 DeSilva’s progress note dated February 23, 2021, stating that Plaintiff “claims that he 6 feels stable that he has no auditory or visual hallucinations” and “no suicidal homicidal 7 ideations”); id. at 646 (containing Dr. DeSilva’s progress note dated September 29, 2020, 8 noting that Plaintiff “is on Ritalin 5 milligrams and Prozac 20 mg,” his “overall mood 9 appears to be better,” and “[h]e wants me to renew the Ritalin”); id. at 673, 676 10 (containing a note from a Certified Physician Assistant Clarion dated July 27, 2020, that 11 Plaintiff was “doing well with medications and follow up visits”); id. at 695 (containing 12 notes from Certified Physician Assistant Clarion dated May 5, 2020, stating the following 13 with respect to Plaintiff’s depression: “doing well with [P]rozac”; and the following with 14 respect to Plaintiff’s ADHD: “No longer taking Ritalin per patient’s choice,” Plaintiff 15 “state[d] he is still able to think and his symptoms are controlled.”).) 16 Accordingly, substantial evidence in the record supported the ALJ’s conclusion 17 that Plaintiff’s treatment was effective in controlling his symptoms and that the level of 18 Plaintiff’s treatment was not consistent with his allegations of disabling impairments. 19 (See id.); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3)(iv)–(v), 416.929(c)(3)(iv)–(v) (providing 20 that an ALJ may consider the “type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any 21 medication,” as well as “treatment, other than medication” the claimant receives to 22 relieve “pain or other symptoms.”). The ALJ therefore provided another clear and 23 convincing reason, supported by substantial evidence in the record, to discount Plaintiff’s 24 subjective symptom testimony. 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 3. Daily activities 2 The ALJ also discounted Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony because his 3 “independent activities of daily living [we]re not consistent with an individual with 4 disabling limitations.” (AR at 62.) The ALJ stated that “[t]here is some indication 5 despite the claimant’s testimony that he is in fact working informally on and off in 6 construction and landscaping with his uncle,” and concluded that “[t]he claimant’s 7 allegations” regarding his disabling functional limitations “are clearly an overstatement.” 8 (Id. (citing id. at 1142).) 9 An ALJ may properly consider the claimant’s daily activities in evaluating 10 testimony regarding subjective symptoms. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3)(i), 11 416.929(c)(3)(i). An ALJ may discount a claimant’s subjective symptom testimony on 12 the following grounds: (1) the claimant’s daily activities involve skills that contradict the 13 claimant’s other testimony, or (2) the claimant’s daily activities meet the threshold for 14 transferable work skills. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 639 (9th Cir. 2007). In this case, 15 the ALJ relied on both grounds to discount Plaintiff’s statements regarding his subjective 16 symptoms. (See AR at 28, 65.) 17 The ALJ initially noted that despite Plaintiff’s testimony that he could not work 18 due to disabling functional limitations, the evidence in Plaintiff’s medical records 19 indicated that Plaintiff “[wa]s in fact working informally on and off in construction and 20 landscaping with his uncle.” (See id. at 61 (citing id. at 1142).) Plaintiff’s medical 21 records that the ALJ cited contain notes from Dr. DeSilva dated February 17, 2022, 22 documenting Plaintiff’s report “that he works on and off in construction and landscaping 23 and gets a little [sic] expenses.” (Id.) The ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s daily 24 activities involved skills that contradicted Plaintiff’s testimony regarding his disabling 25 limitations is further supported by records documenting Plaintiff’s reports to multiple 26 medical care providers over the relevant timeframe that he worked with his uncle on 27 remodeling and construction jobs, cleaned his grandfather’s backyard, and helped to take 28 care of his grandmother. (See e.g., id. at 403 (containing a note from Dr. Attwill dated 1 July 24, 2025, documenting Plaintiff’s report that “he was cleaning his grandfather’s 2 backyard”); id. at 1118, 1122 (continuing notes from Licensed Clinical Social Worker 3 Juarez dated April 7, 2022, that Plaintiff “[w]orks with uncle in contracting”); id. at 1010 4 (containing Dr. Mohammad’s progress note dated June 23, 2021, documenting Plaintiff’s 5 report that “[r]ecently [he] did some remodeling in his grandfather’s house”); id. at 656 6 (containing notes from Certified Physician Assistant Rosenblatt dated September 18, 7 2020, that Plaintiff was “carrying heavy objects” and reported “‘too much working’ with 8 his uncle in remodeling”); id. at 117, 120 (containing Dr. Staley’s notes dated June 18, 9 2020, that Plaintiff “[w]orks w[ith] his uncle who gives him $50/day for labor”); id. at 10 712, 715 (containing Dr. DeSilva’s notes dated March 6, 2020, documenting Plaintiff’s 11 report that “[h]e helps take care of his grandmother”); id. at 748, 751 (containing Dr. 12 DeSilva’s notes dated January 3, 2020, stating that Plaintiff “stopped going to school. 13 [N]ow wants to work for his uncle in his construction company.”).) The ALJ therefore 14 rationally concluded that Plaintiff’s daily activities contradicted his testimony regarding 15 his disabling limitations and level of functioning. See Orn, 495 F.3d at 639; see also 16 Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958–59 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that an ALJ may 17 properly rely on inconsistencies between claimant’s testimony and claimant’s daily 18 activities). 19 The ALJ next cited Plaintiff’s statements in Adult Function Report that he spends 20 the day playing video games, writing poems, watching television and listening to music; 21 that he “takes care of personal care,” prepares simple meals, performs light household 22 chores, shops in stores, handles money; and that he can walk a mile. (AR at 61 (citing id. 23 at 314–21).) Additionally, the ALJ cited Plaintiff’s testimony during the administrative 24 hearing that he plays video games, walks on a trail around his apartment, prepares food in 25 the microwave, and sometimes helps his father to shop for groceries. (Id. at 61 (citing id. 26 at 77–110).) The ALJ stated that Plaintiff “engages in independent activities of daily 27 living, including spending most of his time playing video games and using a computer, 28 except he does not drive,” and concluded that those activities “further demonstrate[d] 1 [Plaintiff’s] capability to perform the mental demands of work activity, such as memory, 2 focus, concentration, and interacting with others.” (Id. at 65.) 3 The activities the ALJ cited in his decision are similar to activities that the Ninth 4 Circuit found involve skills transferrable to the workplace. See Burch, 400 F.3d at 681 5 (finding that the claimant’s daily activities could reasonably be found to be transferrable 6 to a workplace, where the activities suggested that the claimant was “quite functional” 7 because she was able to care for her personal needs, cook, clean, shop, interact with her 8 nephew and boyfriend, and manage her and her nephew’s finances); Stubbs-Danielson v. 9 Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that the claimant’s activities, which 10 included cooking, house cleaning, doing laundry, and helping her husband in managing 11 finances, “suggest[ed] the claimant may still be capable of performing the basic demands 12 of competitive, remunerative, unskilled work on a sustained basis”). Notably, the ALJ 13 also cited Plaintiff’s construction and landscaping work for his uncle. (AR at 62.) “An 14 ALJ may consider any work activity, including part-time work, in determining whether a 15 claimant is disabled.” Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1156 (9th Cir. 2020); see also Nadon 16 v. Bisignano, 145 F.4th 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 2025) (“An ALJ is permitted to consider any 17 work done by a claimant when evaluating a disability claim, regardless of whether the 18 work constitutes substantial gainful activity.”); Richardson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 588 19 F. App’x 531, 533 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding that the claimant’s “ability to work part-time 20 after applying for benefits” supported the ALJ’s decision to discount the claimant’s 21 testimony); Carter v. Astrue, 472 F. App’x 550, 552 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding that the ALJ 22 properly discounted the claimant’s statements, in part, because the claimant “worked 23 part-time for nearly another year after his alleged disability onset date”). The ALJ 24 therefore found that Plaintiff’s daily activities met the threshold for transferable work 25 skills. See Orn, 495 F.3d at 639. 26 The ALJ reasonably discounted Plaintiff’s allegations of disabling functional 27 limitations because Plaintiff’s daily activities contradicted his testimony and involved 28 skills that were transferable to a work setting. Therefore, Plaintiff’s daily activities 1 || provided another clear and convincing reason, supported by substantial evidence in the 2 ||record, to discount Plaintiff's subjective symptom testimony. 3 4. Conclusion 4 Substantial evidence in the record supported the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff's 5 || subjective symptom testimony was inconsistent with the medical record, Plaintiff's 6 || treatment was conservative and effective in controlling his symptoms, and Plaintiffs 7 || daily activities contradicted his testimony and involved skills that could be transferred to 8 ||the workplace. The ALJ therefore provided clear and convincing reasons for discounting 9 || Plaintiff's subjective symptom testimony. 10 VII. CONCLUSION 1] For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that the ALJ properly discounted 12 || Plaintiff's subjective symptom testimony. Accordingly, the Court ORDERS that 13 ||judgment be entered affirming the decision of the Commissioner and dismissing this 14 || action with prejudice. 15 IT IS SO ORDERED. 16 || Dated: September 28, 2026 17 19 Honorable Lupe Rodriguez, Jr. 20 United States Magistrate Judge 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ye