Bolden v. Liberty Healthcare Corporation

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS ROCK ISLAND DIVISION DONNELL BOLDEN, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) 4:25-cv-04091-MMM ) SHAN JUMPER, et al. ) ) Defendants. ) ORDER Plaintiff, proceeding pro se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, presently civilly detained at the Rushville Illinois Treatment and Detention Facility in Rushville Illinois, pursues claims against facility staff and contractors. Plaintiff has requested leave to proceed under a reduced payment procedure for indigent plaintiffs who are institutionalized but who are not prisoners as defined in 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(h). The “privilege to proceed without posting security for costs and fees is reserved to the many truly impoverished litigants who, within the District Court’s sound discretion, would remain without legal remedy if such privilege were not afforded to them.” Brewster v. North Am. Van Lines, Inc., 461 F.2d 649, 651 (7th Cir. 1972). Additionally, a court must dismiss cases proceeding in forma pauperis “at any time” if the action is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim, even if part of the filing fee has been paid. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Accordingly, this Court grants leave to proceed in forma pauperis only if the complaint states a federal action. A claim is legally insufficient if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. The Court accepts the factual allegations as true, liberally construing them in the plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). Conclusory statements and labels are insufficient – the facts alleged must “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). Plaintiff names medical and mental health contractor Liberty Healthcare Corporation, Greg Donathan, Erin Posey, Shan Jumper, Sharlene Caraway, Kenneth Queen, M. Sheldon, H. Hymes, M. Stauffer, and H. Esparza-Velez. Plaintiff has been determined to be a sexually violent person under Illinois law. He seeks to allege that he is not receiving the mental health treatment required by the Constitution for individuals in his situation. He alleges his attorney told him that he could refuse a state examination, so he did so. His treatment groups were then changed, and he is dissatisfied with the changes, and believes he is not progressing in his treatment as rapidly as he should be progressing. Plaintiff’s Complaint does not state a claim. “Due process requires that the conditions and duration of [involuntary civil detention] must bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which persons are committed.” Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 265 (2001). Involuntarily committed persons have a substantive due process right to “conditions of reasonable care and safety, reasonably nonrestrictive confinement conditions, and such training as may be required by these conditions.” Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982). The Seventh Circuit has extended and summarized Youngberg to include those individuals committed because they are sexually dangerous or violent: “(a) committed persons are entitled to some treatment, and (b) what that treatment entails must be decided by mental-health professionals.” Lane v. Williams, 689 F.3d 879, 882 (7th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation omitted). Here, Plaintiff has alleged that on advice of counsel he refused to participate in an examination by a state official, and his treatment was later changed, to his dissatisfaction. Plaintiff’s attorney may well have been correct that he was not required to sit for the examination under protections against self-incrimination or otherwise. But Plaintiff’s refusal does not entitle him to dictate his treatment while refusing to comply with program requirements. Plaintiff’s allegations are consistent with Plaintiff receiving mental health treatment as decided by mental health professionals and as required by Younger and its progeny. Plaintiff’s allegations do not raise a plausible inference that his treatment was inconsistent with professional mental health treatment. The Court understands his frustration and lack of progress. However, his allegations do not raise a plausible inference that he was being denied mental health treatment as determined by mental health professionals. Plaintiff’s Complaint also does not state a claim against Liberty Healthcare. As a private corporation, Liberty can only be held liable under § 1983 if it maintains an unconstitutional policy or custom that violated Plaintiff’s rights, see Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Curry v. Butler, 2023 WL 2981445, * 3 (7th Cir. Apr. 18, 2023). Because Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged any violation of his constitutional rights in the first place, he also necessarily has not alleged that a policy of Liberty caused a constitutional violation. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED: 1. Plaintiff's Petition to Proceed in Forma Pauperis [3] is DENIED and the Complaint is DISMISSED because his allegations fail to state a claim for relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 2. Plaintiff's Motion for Status [6] is DENIED. 3. Plaintiff is allowed 21 days to file an amended complaint if he so desires, and if he in good faith believes he can state a claim for relief. He must also renew his motion to proceed in forma pauperis if he desires to so proceed. If Plaintiff does not amend within 21 days of the entry of this order this action will be dismissed without prejudice. Entered this 20th day of January, 2026. s/Michael M. Mihm MICHAEL M. MIHM UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE