Prior v. United States

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Case No. 3:18-cr-00019-HDM-CLB 4 Case No. 3:24-cv-00505-HDM Plaintiff, 5 v. ORDER 6 STONEY PRIOR, Defendant. 7 8 The defendant, Stoney Prior (“Prior”), has filed a motion 9 to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 10 § 2255 (ECF No. 346). The government has responded (ECF No. 11 350). Prior has not filed any reply, and the time for doing so 12 has expired. 13 In 2021, Prior was convicted pursuant to jury verdict of 14 two counts of Murder within Indian Country in violation of 18 15 U.S.C. § 1111, 1151 & 1153. (ECF Nos. 105 & 283). He was 16 sentenced to two consecutive terms of life. (ECF No. 306). The 17 conviction was affirmed on appeal, and the United States Supreme 18 Court denied Prior’s petition for writ of certiorari. (ECF Nos. 19 341 & 345). Prior now moves for relief under § 2255, asserting a 20 single claim: that his attorney rendered ineffective assistance 21 of counsel for failing to file a motion challenging the court’s 22 subject matter jurisdiction “via treaty rights.” (ECF No. 346 at 23 5). 24 Under § 2255, a federal inmate may move to vacate, set 25 aside, or correct his sentence if: (1) the sentence was imposed 26 in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States; 27 (2) the court was without jurisdiction to impose the sentence; 28 (3) the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law; 1 or (4) the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack. 2 Id. § 2255(a). 3 Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are governed by 4 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Under Strickland, 5 a petitioner must satisfy two prongs to obtain habeas relief— 6 deficient performance by counsel and prejudice. 466 U.S. at 687. 7 With respect to the performance prong, a petitioner must carry 8 the burden of demonstrating that his counsel’s performance was 9 so deficient that it fell below an “objective standard of 10 reasonableness.” Id. at 688. “‘Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s 11 performance must be highly deferential,’ and ‘a court must 12 indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within 13 the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.’” Knowles 14 v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 124 (2009) (citation omitted). In 15 assessing prejudice, the court “must ask if the defendant has 16 met the burden of showing that the decision reached would 17 reasonably likely have been different absent [counsel’s] 18 errors.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696. 19 Prior asserts that his attorney was ineffective for 20 refusing to file a motion to dismiss the indictment for lack of 21 jurisdiction. 22 The court’s jurisdiction over this matter stems from 18 23 U.S.C. § 1153, otherwise referred to as the Major Crimes Act. 24 That section provides in relevant part: 25 (a) Any Indian who commits against the person or property of another Indian or other person any of the 26 following offenses, namely, murder . . . within the Indian country, shall be subject to the same law and 27 penalties as all other persons committing any of the above offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of 28 the United States. 1 Indian country includes “all land within the limits of any 2 Indian reservation.” Id. § 1151(a). 3 That the federal government has the authority to pass laws 4 exercising jurisdiction over Indians who have committed crimes 5 against other Indians in Indian country has been a matter of 6 settled law for well over a hundred years, see United States v. 7 Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-85 (1886), as has the federal 8 government’s power to abrogate treaties, see Lone Wolf v. 9 Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 564-68 (1903). The constitutionality of 10 the Major Crimes Act has likewise been upheld repeatedly. See, 11 e.g., United States v. Gordon, 2023 WL 8014358, at *1 (9th Cir. 12 Nov. 20, 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 1083 (2024). 13 Prior asserts that the Major Crimes Act is unconstitutional 14 as applied to any Indian whose tribe had a treaty with the 15 government protecting its inherent sovereignty prior to the 16 passage of the Act. He argues that treaty rights can never be 17 abrogated by subsequent legislation, and he argues that his 18 tribe, the Paiute-Shoshone, are one such tribe that maintains 19 its inherent sovereignty “via treaty rights.” 20 Prior centers his argument on a misreading of Ex parte Kan- 21 Gi-Shun-Ca, (otherwise known as Crow Dog), 109 U.S. 556 (1883). 22 Prior asserts that in that case, the Supreme Court held the 23 federal government did not have jurisdiction to prosecute a 24 Sioux Indian who had murdered another Sioux Indian on Sioux land 25 because of two articles in a treaty between the Sioux Indians 26 and the U.S. government. But that is not at all what Crow Dog 27 held. Rather, in Crow Dog the Supreme Court held that the 28 1 federal government did not have jurisdiction because of federal 2 law, which provided: 3 Sec. 2145. Except as to crimes, the punishment of which is expressly provided for in this title, the 4 general laws of the United States as to the punishment of crimes committed in any place within the sole and 5 exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, except the District of Columbia, shall extend to the Indian 6 country. 7 Sec. 2146. The preceding section shall not be construed to extend to crimes committed by one Indian 8 against the person or property of another Indian, nor to any Indian committing any offense in the Indian 9 country who has been punished by the local law of the tribe, or to any case where by treaty stipulations the 10 exclusive jurisdiction over such offenses is or may be secured to the Indian tribes respectively.’ 11 Id. at 558 (internal punctuation omitted) (emphasis added). In 12 seeking to nevertheless exercise jurisdiction over Crow Dog, the 13 government asserted that the “exception contained in section 14 2146 . . . [was] repealed by operation and legal effect of the 15 treaty with the different tribes of the Sioux Indians of April 16 29, 1868, . . . and an act of congress.” Id. at 562. The Supreme 17 Court concluded that the treaty and its ratification were not a 18 clear expression of an intent to repeal section 2146 and 19 therefore the exception precluding jurisdiction over crimes 20 committed by Indians against Indians remained in effect. In 21 response to Crow Dog, Congress just two years later passed the 22 Major Crimes Act, which provided explicitly for federal 23 jurisdiction without exception over several enumerated offenses, 24 including murder. As noted above, the federal government’s 25 authority to pass this law and the constitutionality thereof is 26 a matter of settled law. See Larrabee v. United States, No. 27 1:04-CR-10004-CBK, 2018 WL 9538208, at *1 (D.S.D. May 2, 2018). 28 1 Moreover, the fact that a tribe maintains sovereignty to 2|| prosecute crimes committed by its members does not preclude 3|| federal jurisdiction. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978), superseded on other grounds by statute, 25 U.S.C. $§ 1301-1303. 6 As Prior’s jurisdictional argument is without merit, his 7|| counsel did not render ineffective assistance in failing to 8|| raise it, see Sexton v. Cozgner, 679 F.3d 1150, 1157 (9th Cir. 2012) (counsel is not ineffective for failing to raise meritless claim). Nor did such failure cause Prior prejudice. 11 Accordingly, as Prior has not established any entitlement 12|| to relief, IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 13]| motion (ECF No. 346) is DENIED. 14 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Prior is DENIED a certificate of 15|| appealability, as he has not made “a substantial showing of the 16|| denial of a constitutional right,” see Allen v. Ornoski, 435 17|| F.3d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 2006); 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) (2); Slack v. 18|| McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000). 19 The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment accordingly. 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. 21 DATED: This 11th day of June, 2025. 22 03 brim” D fl fMb> 24 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 25 26 27 28