Opinions and documents
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
JASON T. O’NEIL, :
:
Plaintiff, :
:
v. : Civil Action No. 20-319-RGA
:
WARDEN BOBBY MAY, et al., :
:
Defendants. :
Jason T. O’Neil, James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, Smyrna, Delaware.
Pro Se Plaintiff.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
November 30, 2020
Wilmington, Delaware
/s/ Richard G. Andrews
ANDREWS, U.S. District Judge:
Plaintiff Jason T. O’Neil, an inmate at the James T. Vaughn Correctional Center
in Smyrna, Delaware, filed this action on March 3, 2020, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
(D.I. 2). Plaintiff appears pro se and has been granted leave to proceed in forma
pauperis. (D.I. 4, 8). Plaintiff requests counsel. (D.I. 7). I will screen the Complaint
and Amended Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(a). (D.I. 2,
6).
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges violations of his right to due process under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and his right to be free from
cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. He raises four counts.
Count One alleges breach of contract of a settlement entered in CLASI v. Coupe,
Civ. No. 15-688-GMS (D. Del.), a case that concerned solitary and other conditions of
confinement and mental health treatment of inmates with mental health conditions. (D.I.
2 at 5). Plaintiff alleges that as of July 31, 2018, Defendants DOC and Connections1
were non-compliant with the settlement and Plaintiff, who was one of the original 100
plaintiffs in CLASI suffered serious physical harm that required surgery due to
Defendants’ deliberate indifference, wanton infliction of pain, and intentional deprivation
1 Connections is no longer the contract health care provider for the Delaware
Department of Correction. A new health care provider began providing health care
services to the DOC on April 1, 2020.
1
of treatment.2 (Id.). Count Two alleges “negligence for the same reasons stated” in
Count One. (Id. at 6).
Count Three alleges deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs,
abdominal surgical issues, and mental health disorders when he was denied adequate
treatment and suffered permanent injury. (Id.). Plaintiff explains that on August 13,
2019, he was on suicide watch and housed in the residential treatment unit, Building 21.
(Id.). Plaintiff alleges that under the CLASI settlement agreement, the residential
treatment unit in Building 21 was supposed to be temporary until the DOC increased
bed space for mental health treatment at the JTVCC and the Delaware Psychiatric
Center. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that the DOC did not increase bed space and that
Connections did not report nor object to the DOC’s failure. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that
the ventilation system in Building 21 is filled with toxic black mold. (Id.).
He alleges that while on suicide watch and during an attempt at self-harm when
he swallowed a paper clip, he and Defendant Mason Frazier had an “escalated” verbal
exchange, Frazier declined to call the licensed mental health profession, and Frazier
emptied a can of pepper spray at Plaintiff’s face that caused permanent eye damage.
(Id.).
2 Plaintiff did not attempt to name the DOC or Connections as defendants in either the
caption of the complaint or in the section that identifies Defendants. The “non-
compliant” sentence is the only sentence in Count One that refers to the DOC and
Connections.
2
Count Four alleges deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.3 (D.I. 6).
Plaintiff is a “swallower” of foreign objects. Plaintiff alleges that on March 12, 2020, he
explained to Defendant Mental Health Director Dr. Paola Munoz that he ingested foreign
objects and he was placed PCO (i.e., psychiatric close observation) after weeks of
begging for medication to curb cravings for pain medication. Plaintiff alleges that Dr.
Munoz has a duty to protect Plaintiff from himself. (Id. at 2)
On March 15, 2020, Plaintiff’s abdomen was x-rayed and it revealed a piece of
metal (which Plaintiff identifies as a radio antenna). (Id. at 2). A second x-ray was
taken on March 18, 2020 and it showed that the metal had not moved. (Id. at 3).
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Dr. Jordan, Dr. Adith, and Dr. Araziack informed him of
a new policy for “swallowers.” (Id.). Inmates who swallow foreign objects are not sent
to the hospital unless it is a life threatening matter; instead, an inmate is x-rayed weekly
to monitor the object. (Id.). Plaintiff, who has had numerous surgeries after swallowing
foreign objects, alleges this new policy places him at risk of death. (Id.).
Plaintiff continues on PCO status. (Id.). He alleges that since March 12, 2020,
he has been in severe pain, has blood in stool, has non-stop vomiting, high fevers, high
and low blood pressure, and high heart rates. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that the health care
providers are placing his life in danger. (Id.).
Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as injunctive relief
(including surgery to remove the metal object) and declaratory relief. (Id. at 11).
3 I consider Count Four to consist of those allegations raised in the Amended
Complaint. (D.I. 6 at 1-3).
3
SCREENING OF COMPLAINT
A federal court may properly dismiss an action sua sponte under the screening
provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b) if “the action is frivolous or
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Ball v. Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448,
452 (3d Cir. 2013). The Court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true
and take them in the light most favorable to a pro se plaintiff. Phillips v. County of
Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93
(2007). Because Plaintiff proceeds pro se, his pleading is liberally construed and his
complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. at 94.
A complaint is not automatically frivolous because it fails to state a claim. See
Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d. 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319, 331 (1989)); see also Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 112
(3d Cir. 2002). “Rather, a claim is frivolous only where it depends ‘on an “indisputably
meritless legal theory” or a “clearly baseless” or “fantastic or delusional” factual
scenario.’” Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d at 374 (quoting Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523,
530 (2003) and Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28).
The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant
to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1) is identical to the legal standard used when
ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions. Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir.
1999). However, before dismissing a complaint or claims for failure to state a claim
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upon which relief may be granted pursuant to the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C.
§§1915 and 1915A, the Court must grant Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint unless
amendment would be inequitable or futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293
F.3d at 114.
A well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere labels and conclusions.
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007). A plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to show that a claim has substantive
plausibility. See Johnson v. City of Shelby, 574 U.S.10 (2014). A complaint may not
dismissed, however, for imperfect statements of the legal theory supporting the claim
asserted. See id. at 11.
A court reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint must take three steps: (1) take
note of the elements the plaintiff must plead to state a claim; (2) identify allegations that,
because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth;
and (3) when there are well-pleaded factual allegations, assume their veracity and then
determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. Connelly v. Lane
Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780,787 (3d Cir. 2016). Elements are sufficiently alleged when
the facts in the complaint “show” that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Deciding whether a claim is plausible will be a
“context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience
and common sense.” Id.
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DISCUSSION
Personal Involvement. The caption of the complaint lists Dr. Robin Belcher-
Timmey and, under the “Defendant Information” section, identifies Dr. Belcher as the
supervisor of mental health. (D.I. 2 at 4).
It appears that Dr. Belcher was named as a defendant based upon her
supervisory position. As is well known, there is no respondeat superior liability under
§ 1983. See Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 330 (3d Cir. 2016). Notably, there are
no allegations directed towards Dr. Belcher-Timmey or facts that refer to her.
A defendant in a civil rights action “cannot be held responsible for a constitutional
violation which he [ ] neither participated in nor approved”; personal involvement in the
alleged wrong is required. Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 210 (3d Cir. 2007); see
also Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (holding that liability in a § 1983
action must be based on personal involvement, not respondeat superior). Such
involvement may be “shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual
knowledge and acquiescence.” Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005).
Plaintiff provides no facts as to how Dr. Belcher-Timmey violated his
constitutional rights, that she expressly directed the deprivation of his constitutional
rights, or that she created policies wherein subordinates had no discretion in applying
them in a fashion other than the one which actually produced the alleged deprivation.
Accordingly, she will be dismissed as a defendant under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)
and § 1915A(b)(1).
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Counts One and Two. Plaintiff alleges breach of a settlement agreement in the
CLASI case. He alleges breach of contract by Defendants. Plaintiff alleges that the
DOC and Connections, neither of whom are named defendants, were non-compliant
with the settlement agreement. The Court takes judicial notice that the two DOC
defendants named in this action – Warden Bobby May and Frazier – were not named
defendants in the CLASI action making it impossible for either to breach the settlement
agreement.
In addition, even had Plaintiff named the DOC and Connections as defendants,
the claim fails. Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See D.I. 1 at 2).
A breach of the settlement agreement cannot serve as the basis of a § 1983 claim. See
Walsifer v. Borough of Belmar, 262 F. App’x 421, 426 (3d Cir. 2008) (Defendants’
violation of the stipulation of settlement cannot serve as the basis of a § 1983 claim).
For these reasons, I will dismiss Counts One and Two as legally frivolous.
Counts Three and Four. Plaintiff has alleged what appear to be cognizable
claims under the Eighth Amendment against Frazier (excessive force), and Drs. Jordan,
Araziack, Adith, and Munoz (deliberate indifference to serious medical needs). He will
be allowed to proceed on these claims.
REQUEST FOR COUNSEL
Plaintiff seeks counsel on the grounds that an attorney would better present his
claims, he is disabled under SSI guidelines, factual investigation is required, he does
not have the ability to retain counsel on his behalf, the case will required credibility
7
determinations and/or expert testimony; and an attorney could obtain needed
documents through discovery. (D.I. 7).
A pro se litigant proceeding in forma pauperis has no constitutional or statutory
right to representation by counsel.4 See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 192 (3d
Cir. 2011); Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 153 (3d Cir. 1993). However, representation
by counsel may be appropriate under certain circumstances, after a finding that a
plaintiff=s claim has arguable merit in fact and law. Tabron, 6 F.3d at 155.
After passing this threshold inquiry, the Court should consider a number of
factors when assessing a request for counsel. Factors to be considered by a court in
deciding whether to request a lawyer to represent an indigent plaintiff include: (1) the
merits of the plaintiff=s claim; (2) the plaintiff=s ability to present his or her case
considering his or her education, literacy, experience, and the restraints placed upon
him or her by incarceration; (3) the complexity of the legal issues; (4) the degree to
which factual investigation is required and the plaintiff=s ability to pursue such
investigation; (5) the plaintiff=s capacity to retain counsel on his or her own behalf; and
(6) the degree to which the case turns on credibility determinations or expert testimony.
See Montgomery v. Pinchak, 294 F.3d 492, 498-99 (3d Cir. 2002); Tabron, 6 F.3d at
155-56. The list is not exhaustive, nor is any one factor determinative. Tabron, 6 F.3d
at 157.
4 See Mallard v. United States Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296 (1989)
(§ 1915(d) (now § 1915(e)(1)) does not authorize a federal court to require an unwilling
attorney to represent an indigent civil litigant, the operative word in the statute being
“request.”).
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Several of the Tabron factors militate against granting Plaintiff’s request for
counsel at this time. This case is in its early stages and the parties have not yet been
served. Plaintiff adequately pled claims against several defendants and, at this time it is
far from clear that counsel is necessary. Accordingly, the Court will revisit the issue
should counsel become necessary. The request for counsel will be denied without
prejudice to renew.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Court will: (1) deny without prejudice to renew
Plaintiff’s request for counsel (D.I. 7); (2) dismiss Counts One and Two as legally
frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and § 1915A(b)(1); (3) dismiss Bobby
May and Dr. Robin Belcher-Timmey as the claims against them are legally frivolous
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and § 1915A(b)(1); and (4) allow Plaintiff to
proceed on Counts Three and Four against Corporal Frazier, Dr. Jordan, Dr. Araziack,
Dr. Adith, and Dr. Munoz.
An appropriate Order will be entered.
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