Sledge v. Director, TDCJ-CID

** NOT FOR PRINTED PUBLICATION ** IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS LUFKIN DIVISION STEVEN GERARD SLEDGE § VS. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 9:19cv184 DIRECTOR, TDCJ-CID § ORDER OVERRULING OBJECTIONS AND ACCEPTING THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION Petitioner Steven Gerard Sledge, an inmate confined at the Clements Unit, proceeding pro se, brought this petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The court referred this matter to the Honorable Keith F. Giblin, United States Magistrate Judge, at Beaumont, Texas, for consideration pursuant to applicable laws and orders of this court. The Magistrate Judge recommends the petition be dismissed as barred by limitations. The court has received and considered the Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge filed pursuant to such order, along with the record and pleadings. Petitioner filed objections to the Report and Recommendation. This requires a de novo review of the objections in relation to the pleadings and the applicable law. See FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b). After careful consideration, the court concludes petitioner’s objections should be overruled. Petitioner filed his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus more than five years after the expiration of the limitations period. Neither proceeding pro se, having limited access to a law library, nor lacking knowledge of filing deadlines can serve as a basis for equitable tolling as they are not a “rare and exceptional” circumstance of prison life. See Felder v. Johnson, 204 F.3d 168, 170 (5th Cir. 2000). Further, a pro se prisoner’s ignorance of the law of habeas corpus is likewise insufficient to invoke equitable tolling. Alexander v. Cockrell, 294 F.3d 626, 629 (5th Cir. 2002). Petitioner’s petition is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Furthermore, petitioner is not entitled to the issuance of a certificate of appealability. An appeal from a judgment denying federal habeas corpus relief may not proceed unless a judge issues a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253; FED. R. APP. P. 22(b). The standard for granting a certificate of appealability, like that for granting a certificate of probable cause to appeal under prior law, requires the movant to make a substantial showing of the denial of a federal constitutional right. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000); Elizalde v. Dretke, 362 F.3d 323, 328 (5th Cir. 2004); see also Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 (1982). In making that substantial showing, the movant need not establish that he should prevail on the merits. Rather, he must demonstrate that the issues are subject to debate among jurists of reason, that a court could resolve the issues in a different manner, or that the questions presented are worthy of encouragement to proceed further. See Slack, 529 U.S. at 483-84. Any doubt regarding whether to grant a certificate of appealability is resolved in favor of the movant, and the severity of the penalty may be considered in making this determination. See Miller v. Johnson, 200 F.3d 274, 280-81 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 849 (2000). Here, petitioner has not shown that any of the issues raised by his claims are subject to debate among jurists of reason. The factual and legal questions advanced by the movant are not novel and have been consistently resolved adversely to his position. In addition, the questions presented are not worthy of encouragement to proceed further. Therefore, petitioner has failed to make a sufficient 2 showing to merit the issuance of a certificate of appealability. A certificate of appealability shall not be issued. O R D E R Accordingly, petitioner’s objections are OVERRULED. The findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Magistrate Judge are correct and the report of the Magistrate Judge is ACCEPTED. A final judgment will be entered in this case in accordance with the Magistrate Judge’s recommendations. 3